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i
SUMMARY 
 
Philosophical Textuality and Khoral Theology: 
Concursus in the Providence of God of Charles Hodge 
And Event in Khora of Jacques Derrida 
 
     Without self-knowledge, there is no way to know God.  Self-knowledge as imago 
Dei (the image of God) has to be construed by concursus (occurring together) under 
His Providence, i.e., total presence, not by existentialist and authenticist ways of 
self-understanding.  Even if God’s Providence works like Adam Smith’s invisible 
hand, as Charles Hodge recognised, it operates as a concursus of the first and second 
causes in His potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata.  Since concursus is initiated 
by the transcendental power of God and happens spontaneously as an event, for our 
knowledge, it is indecidable in Jacques Derrida’s words, a paradox for Søren 
Kierkegaard and irony for Richard Rorty.  Therefore, self as a second cause has to 
be understood in the context of the indecidability and spontaneity of an event.  In 
this thesis, the self is embedded by the death of the I, which assumes responsibility, 
gift and faith in the Messianic event of possibility of the impossibility.  When the 
death of the I is embedded in a self with the Holy Spirit, it assumes the humility of 
death happening on the Cross of Jesus Christ. 
     Khora is the space of juxtaposition of the death of the I and the Holy Spirit.  
Since they are juxtaposed, chains of supplemental events are occurring in this space 
for the pursuit of the true transcendental point between God and us.  In Hodge’s 
words, ‘God’ is the first cause and ‘we’ are the second cause.  However, khora does 
not cause something to happen in such ways of receiving and producing, but is the 
event (happening) itself between the two.  Hence our knowledge of God is only 
possible as an event in this space.  Because our knowledge of God should not be 
confined in static and metaphysical epistemology, but is faith, as John Calvin 
asserted, and the leap of faith, as Kierkegaard recognised, khora always signifies our 
faith and traces of God.  Accordingly, in this thesis, we want to understand the 
theology of Hodge with the perspective of the event of faith in our life experiences.  
The understanding of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling in chapter V will show us 
how khora works in tracing of God as a means of faith with responsibility, gift and 
humility. 
     Hodge’s theology, as influenced by Scottish Common Sense Realism, is 
discussed with the philosophical textualities of Thomas Reid, Immanuel Kant, John 
Dewey, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty and Derrida, and 
with the literary textualities of Kierkegaard, Leo Tolstoy and Ralph Waldo Emerson.  
These textualities will achieve Khoral theology, in which we can practice theology 
without losing its own distinctive value, and conviction of faith while being context-
sensitive to different faiths and cultures.  In Hodge’s theology, his conviction is 
revealed in his explication of the inerrancy of the text of the Bible.  The discussion 
of textuality is important in Hodge, because textuality does not injure the text itself, 
but makes it possible to trace the adaptability of the text to our life experiences.  In 
this sense, this thesis begins with the argument that the responsibility of a self in 
sinning in Hodge’s doctrine of Providence should be extended to the moment of the 
death of the self, by believing that textuality will lead us to a true transcendental 
point, i.e., the event of concursus.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Jacques Derrida and the Theology of Charles Hodge  
     The effects of postmodernism on Christian religion have been extensively 
researched by many scholars, among whom, especially in the field of Christian 
hermeneutics in theology, Anthony Thiselton observes three distractions caused by 
so-called ‘postmodernity’: first, ‘a general distrust of rationality, traditions and 
universal truth-claims’; second, ‘an over-ready hospitality to radical pluralism, 
pragmatism’; and third, ‘the giving of privilege to the “local” criteria of “my” 
group.’
1
  However, when we regard Christianity as a particular religion, concerning 
its distinctive truth-claim in comparison with other religions, the losses of 
postmodern Christian theology that Thiselton worries about may also be great gains, 
in thinking of the roles that Christian theology and hermeneutics can play in diverse 
and plural societies.  Christians believe that their own particular faith and 
knowledge—what Thiselton calls ‘local criteria’—will eventually achieve the 
Messianic prophecy of Christianity in the parousia (παρουσία) for the complete 
fulfillment of the Kingdom of God.  Thus the diversities and pluralities that 
postmodernity represents will not do harm, but rather give tremendous insights and 
challenges, to Christian hermeneutics in theology.   
     Jacques Derrida— like Francis Bacon, as Kevin J. Vanhoozer notes—was more 
concerned with particular criteria among pluralities than interested in general rules, 
laws and principles.
2
  However, these particulars do not simply, as Vanhoozer writes, 
‘swallow up any attempt to unify them or to domesticate their sheer plurality’
3
, but 
function as the very elemental sources for accomplishing true transcendental 
                                                 
1
 Anthony Thiselton, On Hermeneutics: Collected Works With New Essays (Grand Rapids, M.I. and 
Cambridge, England: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006), p. 634. 
2
 Kevin Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?: The Bible, The Reader, and the Morality of 
Literary Knowledge (Grand Rapids, M.I.: Zondervan, 1998), p. 39. Vanhoozer argues that Derrida is 
doing induction (not deduction) without end or conclusion, but Bacon does deduction with a finalised 
conclusion.  
3
 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
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universality without any synthetic kind of unification.
4
  Also, we need to notice 
Thiselton’s argument, citing Vanhoozer, that ‘Derrida’s deconstruction of the author 
is a more or less direct consequence of Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of 
God.’
5
  This argument is inadequate because what Derrida deconstructs is not the 
author, but the metaphysical epistemology of what is written.  Theologically 
speaking, the object of the so-called ‘deconstruction’ of Derrida is not God, but the 
text.  In Derridean writings, since God remains though paradoxically in his absence 
as the Transcendental Signified, God cannot and should not be ‘dead’ or relativised 
at all.
6
  Conversely, I argue that Derrida’s deconstruction is meaningful in search of 
the death of the self rather than ‘the death of God’.  For this reason, Derrida is 
important in the discussion of the Calvinistic theology of Charles Hodge, in view of 
its belief in the total depravity of human beings, who are destined to die due to their 
sinful nature.  Later in this chapter, I will discuss in detail the death of self that is, 
the subject, in terms of the death of the I in relationship to Derrida. 
     It is my clear contention that Derrida was a major theological figure drawing 
upon his Jewish tradition in the context of post-modernity.  Although this clearly 
might be argued, there is no doubt that as his work progresses through the 1980s and 
1990s, Derrida’s increasing preoccupation is with both biblical and theological 
themes and issues.  Thus, although he begins his important essay ‘How to Avoid 
Speaking: Denials’
7
 (in which he introduces the theme of khora, see p. 4), with a 
denial of his writing as ‘negative theology’ in the tradition of the Pseudo-Dionysus, 
nevertheless this is a continuing preoccupation, prompting in 1992 the publication of 
a book entitled Derrida and Negative Theology edited by Harold Coward and Toby 
Foshay, with a concluding essay by Derrida himself.  Almost all of Derrida’s later 
writings are meditations or discussions of religious themes, especially after The Gift 
of Death (1995), and in 1998 he edited, with Gianni Vattimo, a volume entitled 
                                                 
4
 Derrida’s position is that while pursuing solidarity, he resists any movements that tend ‘toward a 
narcissism of minorities’ within such groups as feminists, homosexuals, colonized people, 
communitarianism, and so on.  In Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow…: 
A Dialogue (Stanford: Stanford University, 2004) p. 21. 
5
 Thiselton, On Hermeneutics, p. 634. 
6
 Though we might note Derrida’s comment on the loss of the ‘infinite Signified’ in language at the 
beginning of Grammatology (1967/1976). 
7
 Jacques Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser, eds., 
Languages of the Unsayable trans. Ken Frieden (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). 
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Religion, establishing him in the main stream of radical religious thinking. 
Especially one of his last books, published in 2002, is entitled Acts of Religion, 
edited by Gil Anidjar.
8
  At the same time, it is possible to understand him as 
deconstructive of Western religious tradition and as representing therefore a form of 
secularism after Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger.  For example, Anthony Thiselton, 
George Steiner, Ann Jefferson and many others have seen him in this light.
9
   
     This thesis describes how to understand the theology of Charles Hodge in the 
postmodern context.  For this, in this space I want to define several key terms such 
as concursus, khora and the death of the I and link those concepts for our discussion. 
     Firstly, concursus is from the Latin meaning ‘running together’ or ‘concourse’, 
with the active implication of dynamic encounter or even collision.  The origins of 
the verse concurso are of an energetic even violent meeting.  The term then endorses 
not only a revealed religion but the event of divine encounter with human activities 
that becomes thereby secondary causes.  Within the theology of the Protestant 
tradition, concursus expresses the encounter that ‘defines the continuing divine 
support of the operation of all secondary causes whether they are free, contingent, or 
necessary’.
10
  Following the Westminster Confession of Faith, Turretin agrees that 
God concurs with secondary causes not only by a particular and simultaneous 
concursus, but also by a previous concursus.11  This Reformed idea, in Francis 
Turretin’s view one of the most difficult in theology, was passed along to many 
Reformed American theologians, including Hodge.
12
  After Turretin, Hodge 
                                                 
8
 See also – John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion 
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1997); Susan Handelman, The Slayers of Moses: The 
Emergence of Rabbinic Interpretation in Modern Literary Thinking (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 
1982); Walter Lowe, Theology and Difference: The Wound of Reason (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993); Graham Ward, Barth, Derrida, and the Language of Theology (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995)   
9
 For a forceful statement of Derrida as the ‘end’ of Western religion, see George Steiner, Real 
Presences (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989), pp. 119-23; Similarly, Anthony Thiselton, 
New Horizons in Hermeneutics (London: Harper Collins, 1992), pp. 103-13; On Derrida’s anti-
logocentrism, see Ann Jefferson and David Robey, eds. Modern Literary Theory: A Comparative 
Introduction, Second Edition. (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1986), pp. 112-19. 
10
 Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from 
Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1985), p. 76. 
11
 ET, v. I, p. 505. 
12
 This idea also affected the Southern Reformed theologian R. L. Dabney.  Douglas F. Kelly argues 
that Dabney’s basic area of theological concern is the concursus between ‘God’s sovereign, primary 
control of all things, and the reality and validity of human and natural secondary causation… The 
way he believes is clearer than the expositions of Dick, Hodge, and McCosh.’  Kelly also argues that 
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understands concursus as the vital connection between God’s sovereign, primary 
control of all things, and the reality and validity of human and natural secondary 
causation.  Especially Hodge’s concursus, whether in free, contingent, or necessary 
modes of the experience of first and second causes—which will capture the religious 
immediacy of Hodge’s theology—shows us that our sense of religious experience 
lies within the event of the encounter between the divine and humane.
13
 
     As a simple example, the characteristic bipolarity of God’s Word can be 
explained as ‘at the same time other-worldly and this-worldly’.
14
 Concursus is 
important, not only in understanding the dynamic hermeneutic processes of the 
Bible, but also in understanding the nature of faith and knowledge as encountered in 
a Providential space
15
, as well as the human and Divine natures of the Christ of the 
Incarnation.  The belief described here is that God deals with His people by His 
sovereign providential care experienced in the concursus between His divine nature 
and His people in society and culture.  In Christian theology, this bipolarity can be 
understood in terms of kenosis.  Kenosis is derived from the Greek word kenos 
(kenόs), which means, of persons and things, being empty or fruitless.16  In 
Philippians 2:6-8, there is a primary example of kenosis as God divesting himself of 
his glory in the Incarnation:  
6
Who being the very nature of God, did not consider equality with God 
something to be grasped, 
7
But made himself nothing, taking the very nature 
of a servant, being made in human likeness. 
8
And being found in appearance 
as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient to death—even death on 
a cross! 
     Kenotic theology is particularly developed by the Lutheran theologian Gottfried 
Thomasius in mid-nineteenth-century Germany.  Kenotic theologians, wanting to 
                                                                                                                                         
Dabney was critically influenced by Turretin.  ‘Robert Lewis Dabney’ in David F. Wells, ed., 
Southern Reformed Theology (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1989), p. 53. 
13
 There are similarities between theological discussions of Hodge and Karl Barth which also 
similarily linked to Derrida in Graham Ward’s book, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).  
14
 David F. Wells, ‘An American Reformed Theology: The Painful Transition from Theoria to 
Praxis’, in George Marsden, ed., Evangelism and Modern America (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984), p. 93. 
15
 By Providential space, I refer to the term khora. See below and Chapter VII. 
16
 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, new ninth ed. (Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 938. 
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overcome a dualistic view of the divine and human nature of Christ in the discussion 
of the Trinity, argue that Christ ‘emptied himself’ in his incarnation.  That is, Christ 
agreed to ‘self-limitation’ and came down to us as a man only.  Yet in thinking of 
kenotic theology, while affirming the idea of ‘Christ’s emptying himself’, we also 
have to recognise the very truth that the Trinitarian God cannot change and that even 
in the flesh—Christ remains God. 
     Secondly, khora is both the place and event of concursus, and it therefore 
functions as metaphor of which the characteristic is universality and at the same 
time particularity.  Khora maybe understood as a providential space of the event 
between God and us that can be construed by an appropriate space (topos) in time 
(kairos).  It is, we might say a space or moment in which a thing or a man ‘is’.  
According to the Greek lexicon, kairos stands for some point of importance of time, 
an exact or critical time, season or opportunity.
17
  Tόpos (literally ‘a place’) refers to 
a ‘region, position, place or part of the body, place or passage in an author, a room 
in a house, common place or element in rhetoric’.
18
 In section 52 of The Timaeus, 
Plato understands khora as ‘space’19 as one of the realities that was before the world 
came into existence.  Eternal and indestructible, khora, ‘provides a position for 
everything that comes to be’, it is, says Plato, ‘hard to believe in’ as it is 
apprehended without the senses, as in a kind of dream. 
     Figuratively understood, khora is a space/event whereby values become 
established.  Metaphorically understood, khora is ‘the place assigned to anyone in 
life, one’s situation, place and position’.
20
 In an argument connecting time and space, 
khora becomes place which is ‘appropriate’.  That is, as a common place of 
argument, khora is not your or my specific place for criticising each other as a 
manner of being. Yet it looks like a place, it is topos in between ontic/ontological, 
good/evil, truth/lying, future/past, faith/reason, death/life and so forth.   Khora is a 
value-oriented space: it seems to be invisible but functionally accommodates our 
knowledge and faith as visible by recognising the freedom in the encounter between 
                                                 
17
 Ibid., p. 859-60. 
18
 Ibid., p. 1806.  
19
 Plato, Timaeus and Critias. Trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 73-4. 
20
 Ibid., p. 1749. 
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ourselves and the Holy Spirit.  Hence, our knowledge and faith yresiding in it makes 
it possible for us to live together in this visible world without losing our own 
particular identities.    
     Derrida’s view on khora comes from his critical reading of Plato’s Timaeus:  
[Khora’s] ‘eternity’ is not that of the intelligible paradigms. At the moment, 
so to speak, when the demiurge organizes the cosmos by cutting, introducing, 
and impressing the images of the paradigms ‘into’ the khora, the latter must 
already have been there, as the ‘there’ itself, beyond time or in any case 
beyond becoming, in a beyond time without common measure with the 
eternity of the ideas and the becoming of sensible things.
21
    
Khora in the Timaeus not only refuses to be integrated into God’s fabrication and 
solidifying of the cosmos but also is elusive to the discourse.
22
 And Augustine 
claims this space as ‘no time’ and also ultimate time beyond time; even Heaven and 
Earth in a sense did not exist before time: 
If there was a “time” before you made heaven and earth, how can it be said 
that you were not at work then, you who are the initiator of all time? For of 
course you would have made that time too; there could not have been any 
passing times before you created times. If, therefore, there was no time 
before heaven and earth came to be, how can anyone ask what you were 
doing then? There was no such things as “then” when there was no time.
23
 
Drawing further on Plato
24
 Derrida’s interest in khora lies in its quality as ‘outsides’ 
a hope of negativity which, apophatically is beyond metaphor as actual description.  
Although he wrote an independent essay titled ‘khora’ in On the Names (1995) 
edited by Thomas Dutoit, Derrida never completed a proposed sustained discussions 
of the subject.
25
 
    As Plato and Augustine imply, khora is such a thing that existed even before the 
Creation.  Therefore khora is the ‘neither an intelligible extension, in the Cartesian 
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sense, a receptive subject, in the Kantian sense of intuitus derivativus, nor a pure 
sensible space, as a form of receptivity’.
26
  Khora goes beyond the category of 
Enlightenment ideas.  Although khora is beyond Enlightenment epistemology and 
philosophy, such as Cartesian and Kantian categories, at the same time these 
categories are the vehicles to take us to the point at which we can study the theology 
of Hodge in the space of khora, since we are able to acknowledge khora only in that 
theology.  I will discuss the meaning and function of space as khora in detail in 
relation to theology in section C, to human beings in chapter V, and to Hodge’s 
doctrine of Providence in chapter VII.  Placing Hodge’s theology in the space and 
time of khora inevitably requires a new interpretation (a hermeneutic change).  I 
hope this project will renew Hodge’s values, which have been neglected by many 
scholars and believers for so long. 
     Thirdly, the Death of the I.  Only in the space where the modes of the death of 
the I are participating are we able to acknowledge the event of khora. The Death of 
the I is not a simple and actual death of subject or person, but is an historical event 
encompassing the responsibility and the experience of gift, faith and humility 
occurring between God and the self.  We die to the self in order to find the self anew 
by ‘concursus’ in the space and event of khora, it is, we might almost say, a 
Sacramental event and therefore universal.  In this thesis, at the same time the death 
of the I, in the shadow of post-Kantian epistemology, lays absolute stress upon 
subjectivity and its realization of itself in its very deconstruction. In comparison 
with the death of God, the death of the I is our experience of kenotic concursus. 
‘Death’ in Derrida means ‘the movement of différance to the extent that that 
movement is necessarily finite’.
27
  Here, the différance of Derrida ‘makes the 
opposition of presence and absence possible’ and ‘produces what it forbids, makes 
possible the very thing that it makes impossible’.
28
  That is, the death of the I always 
moves between presence and absence and thus makes impossibility possible.
29
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Derrida claims that ‘without expectation of death and of the other’, there would be 
no ‘act of faith, nor promise, nor future, nor expectancy’, ‘nor relation to the 
singularity of the other’.
30
 
     As a champion of Calvinist doctrine of Old Princeton in the 19
th
 century, it is 
important to recognize that Charles Hodge was a critic of the theology of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher because of Schleiermacher's emphasis on our feeling toward God 
rather than interpreting God in the Bible as is.  At the same time, despite his 
criticism of Schleiermacher in the Systematic Theology, paradoxically Hodge 
elsewhere acknowledges and employs Schleiermachean ‘feeling’ in his discussion of 
religious immediacy.  It is clear that Hodge did not buy wholesale into rationalist 
critiques of biblical authority.  However, during his research trip to Germany Hodge 
had the chance to attend services at Schleiermacher's church and had been impressed 
by Schleiermacher’s use of ‘feeling’ as effective when hymns sung spiritually filled 
him with praise and gratitude to Christ as a Savior.  Hence when it comes to define 
the essential attributes of a spirit, Hodge adds ‘feeling’ to “thought’ and “will’, 
which is rejected or ignored by Calvin and Turretin.  In feeling, the self or subject 
experiences the moment (or place) of simultaneously destabilizing which both 
negates and affirms the thinking subject before God.  In Hodge, this ‘feeling’ thus 
becomes the vehicle to explain religious immediacy that designates a true 
transcendental point.  In this thesis, our feeling that produces religious immediacy 
has close links variously with the function of Dewey’s idea of ‘process’, Gadamer’s 
‘fusion of horizons’, Habermas’s ‘communicative action’ and Derrida’s ‘event’ in 
khora.   
     Although the thought of Derrida and Hodge might, at first glance, seem a strange 
connection to make, the link between them resides in the recognition of 
Schleiermacher’s emphasis on ‘feeling’ within religious thought and experience.  
This emphasis, with its acknowledgement of the immediacy of experience, is 
developed in this thesis in the sense of the moment of concursus and event in khora.  
It shall be also be emphasized that this immediacy of feeling is found in the tradition 
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of Scottish Common Sense philosophy and this recognition is not unrelated to the 
theology of Schleiermacher. 
     Hodge’s theology is often regarded as a precursor of American Fundamentalism, 
or of Evangelicalism based on traditional Calvinism.  Traditionally, since ‘-isms’ 
have operated in the name of ‘religions’—thus distorting the name of God—I want 
to distinguish between religion and ‘–isms’.
31
  Hence, no religion, including 
Christianity, should be confined to any ‘-isms’. Hodge’s theology is no exception.  It 
should not be restricted to Calvinism, Fundamentalism or Evangelicalism.  (By the 
same token, for example, Islam is not Islamism.) 
     These ‘-isms’ are statically summarised ideologies of theological movements that 
want to change the world into a shape which their adherents want.  However, if we 
regard Christian faith as a particular one among others in the context of this time and 
space, one which achieves universality in its distinctive parousia, discussions about 
‘-isms’ cannot but result in a prejudice of a group based on ideology or theology.  
Rather, the term ‘Reformed’ is desirable in thinking of Hodge’s theology because it 
is not a static term, but has the capacity to transcend a particular time and space.  In 
this sense, the slogans of ‘Reformation’, Sola Fide, Sola Scriptura and Sola Gratia 
are still effective if they are catalysts for reform.  With these values or convictions 
which always transcend a given time and space, I believe the theology of Hodge has 
the ability to reform by itself.  
     The importance of Derrida in the Reformed theology of Hodge lies in the 
implications that, first, particularity will enhance the purity of Christian faith and 
knowledge; second, the death of the I will simultaneously acknowledge and 
absolutely free from the subject from the Calvinistic doctrine of the total depravity 
of a human being; and third, endless reforming will enable context-sensitive 
adaptability in Hodge’s theology.   
 
B. Thesis 
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     A theology of Charles Hodge has a power of juxtaposition when he articulates a 
true transcendental point (concursus) by distinguishing the function of a human 
being’s self-determined liberty (freedom) from the work of the Holy Spirit.  With 
this juxtaposition, Hodge wants to secure the purity of Christian Religion in the way 
that Christian belief of doctrinal universality achieves only at the moment when a 
true transcendental point happens.  The distinctive belief of Christianity lies in the 
doctrine which presupposes that believers know that a true transcendental point is 
already-not-yet achieved.  In Hodge, this point happens as a concursus of the first 
and second causes.  Francis Turretin (1623-87) observed that concursus is 
contingent in God’s providence throughout the history of humanity.
32
 
     Since concursus is contingent, it happens as a spontaneous event ‘in between’33 
self-determined liberty and the work of the Holy Spirit.  Then it has to capture the 
intersubjective modes of the transformation of a human being’s liberty into an 
absolute responsibility in the space and time (khora) that represent a passage of 
history of God’s providence.  For Hodge, ‘responsibility’ of a human being plays a 
role in not assigning the authorship of sin to God.  However, I argue that Christians 
taking responsibility for what they do in God’s providential space, where they are 
living, is possible by participating in a new freedom that can only be generated by 
the selfless humility.  In order for the selfless humility to be observable at a true 
transcendental point in concursus in a given space and time, it should go beyond the 
realm of the responsibility that Hodge is assigning the sin that we commit.   
     In other words, in Christianity, the one who claims to have the knowledge of the 
true transcendental point has to assume selfless responsibility even at the moment of 
death, when his final result of sin is coming at the point of concursus, because he 
believes that the Kingdom of God is already here.  Then the new freedom as a 
genuine source of truth will flow out of this responsibility, as if the death of Paul 
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each day was the origin that set his heart free.  The responsibility that engenders the 
new freedom will be seen as an event of the death of the I34 in the life experience of 
the one with the objective knowledge of a true transcendental point and with the 
subjective faith exercised by selfless humility.  The true transcendental point will 
capture the moment of experiencing the responsibility of death. 
     Following this logic, in this thesis, I want to argue that the concursus in Hodge's 
theology should have the capacity to expound on this space of moment of which the 
significant function is to make possible hermeneutic universality where the irrational 
idea of new freedom recognises responsibility through the experience of death.  That 
is, Hodge's theology has to be construed by a space which is comprehensive of our 
self-determined freedom and responsibility, and of the Holy Spirit. This space will 
not only trace a particular spontaneous moment of an event but also has a universal 
function to direct different identities to the true transcendental point by juxtaposing 
their bipolarity. 
      In order to examine Hodge’s nineteenth-century theology in view of the faith 
and knowledge of a believer who is living in the diverse and pluralistic societies of 
this era, I will raise questions on three important themes: first, an identity of a 
person as an image of God living in this space; second, a khora permeated by the 
condition of God; and third, the role of Hodge’s theology in this space.  As vehicles 
to interpret the theology of Hodge, I will define the death of the I as a trace of the 
history of religion in conjunction with the image of God; khora as a universal living 
space of the providence of God; and Khoral Theology as a theology of responsibility.  
These themes will be dominant throughout this thesis. 
     The implications of this study are not confined to philosophical theology and 
philosophical hermeneutics.  On the one hand, I hope it will be helpful to Christian 
circles struggling to understand theology in the space of diverse contexts while 
keeping Christianity’s distinctive values and convictions.  On the other hand, for 
other disciplines and religions, I hope this can be a case study for those who are 
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interested in a space where diverse identities are residing together.  Especially for 
university departments of theology and religion, this study will give insights of how 
different religions can have a relationship with each other without compromising 
their religious convictions, reminding us that the idea of ‘religious pluralism’ does 
not necessarily require religious syncretism or synthesis of differences.     
 
C. A Theology in Space and Time 
     In order that a theology may be influential in its synergetic impact in life, we 
must ask how one’s faith builds relationships within a space where God is working, 
rather than asking how one’s faith is directly related to God.  Thinking of our faith 
within a space of God’s working is not about simply attributing everything to the 
knowledge of God in the Bible, but, to go further, about asking what would happen 
if one had faith in God.  
     This development is an event of faith and of knowledge of a believer under 
God’s providence.  In other words, a theology in a providential space of God is not 
about Pharisaic law, not about theories of Jesus Christ and God, but about the facts 
of our faith and knowledge exercised here and now.  An authentic theology is 
possible only if it obeys the events of one’s faith and knowledge happening in this 
providential space which God provides for one to live now.  
     In spite of the fact that Derrida describes khora as negativity or atheological,35 it 
can be theological if we think of theology as a space of events between God and us.  
Then theology as a chain of events is to be understood hermeneutically.  In thinking 
of the theology of Charles Hodge, we cannot but encounter hermeneutical questions 
about how the truth of God is revealed and how we can perceive it.  In other words, 
so that theology should not be any barrier to knowing the omniscient and 
omnipresent God, it definitely has to show the answers to the question of how to 
know the truth of God.  Since God is not a spectator in this world but, as Hodge 
indicates, abides everywhere in ‘his essence, knowledge, and power’,
36
 we need to 
know how we have a relationship with God in His providence.   
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     Francis Turretin recognises that all things—‘small as well as great, contingent 
and free, natural and necessary’—are taken for granted or happen under the 
providence of God.
37
  He observes that all occurrences in a human being are 
‘contingent and fortuitous’, and ‘not of something that is determined to one 
direction’.
38
  With these views on things and on human beings, Turretin maintains 
that the work of God (‘infallibility of the event from the hypothesis’) does not take 
away our ‘contingency from the condition of second causes’ and from our ‘mode of 
acting (in which there is always an intrinsic faculty and indifference to the 
opposite)’.
39
  Likewise, khora can be construed as a providential space of free and 
voluntary things which are in our power and executed by our purpose.
40
 
     In Hodge’s theology, khora is the kenotic space of all creation and of God as a 
topos of ‘in between’ potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata.  We will discuss 
these themes extensively when we deal with Hodge’s doctrine of providence in 
chapter VI.  The two ideas, potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata, are used to 
explain the government of God.  Hodge maintains that the Scriptures are the 
evidence of God’s governing of all His creatures and all their actions.
41
  This sense 
of government legitimizes the fact that khora is theological in God’s providential 
sense, and it is applicable to any culture, paradigm, time and space by means of 
contextualization.  On the one hand, Hodge places providence as God’s operation of 
his grace in the supernatural category of potentia absoluta, along with prophecy and 
miracle.  God works in human beings to produce acts of faith and repentance that are 
beyond the ability of men in their present sinful condition.  In Christianity, such 
results that surpass the limit of human ability are due to the indwelling of the Holy 
Spirit.
42
  In this case, the work of the Holy Spirit represents the potentia absoluta of 
God. 
     On the other hand, as Hodge puts it, the doctrine of potentia ordinata admits to 
the effective presence of second causes, both material and mental, but denies that 
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they are independent of God.
43
  The providential agency of God in relation to these 
God-given capacities of man is called potentia ordinata, and is such that He 
exercises control over the ordinary acts of a human being, especially those of the 
wicked, very much like he exercises control over material causes.  In neither case is 
anything accomplished which transcends the efficacy of second causes, either 
physical laws or a human being’s ability to perform.  God guides the action, but the 
results are such that the person, with his natural abilities, is able to perform the work 
and is responsible for the results.
44
  At this point of discussion, following Hodge, we 
confirm that khora, as a providential space of God, is the space of our responsibility 
and of God’s grace, as well.  This responsibility will be related to that of theology 
and of khora in our discussion. 
     Accordingly, in practising theology in khora, thinking of our responsibility, 
freedom (what Hodge calls ‘liberty’) and the grace of God is imperative.  Freedom 
is always secured by our responsibility.  The sanctity of our lives can be understood 
in the context of the human-Divine relationship, and only within this relationship is 
our moral responsibility fully intelligible.
45
  In this case, freedom and responsibility 
are two sides of the same coin.  Since khora is not static, but the living space of our 
freedom and responsibility as well as of God’s grace, Derrida argues, we need to 
avoid speaking of khora as of ‘something’ that is or is not, that could be ‘present or 
absent, intelligible, sensible, or both at once, active or passive, the Good or the Evil, 
God or man, the living or the nonliving’.
46
  Khora is the place of ‘in between’ of two 
different sides, neither Being nor the Good, nor God, nor man, nor History, and so 
on.  Khora will always resist being something. Therefore, the idea of ‘neither/nor’ 
may no longer be converted into that of ‘both’.  Khora always has been and will 
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have been ‘the very place of an infinite resistance, of infinitely impossible resistance, 
of an infinitely impassable persistence’, that is, ‘an utterly faceless other’.
47
 
     Following Derrida, if khora (place, space and receptacle) is neither sensible nor 
intelligible, and seems to participate in the intelligible in an enigmatic way,
48
 it 
definitely remains somewhere between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. 
Hence, we are not able to measure the distance from the two points in space, yet 
what is certain is that khora, as the providential space of God, is the very common 
ground of different signifiers (in Hodge’s words, ‘free agents’) of the universe in 
between the two theologically signified concepts.  
     In recent years, the study of kenosis between God and humanity has been 
undertaken by such scholars as Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Mark. C. 
Taylor, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Ilse N. Bulhof, John Milbank and Slavoj Zizek.  They 
have interpreted kenosis as ‘emptying’ in various ways: ‘exhausting’, 
‘phenomenology’, ‘erring’, ‘onto-theology’, ‘secret lucid voice’, ‘the Being 
otherwise than being’, ‘Incarnation as language’, ‘friendship’, ‘hermeneutical-
rhetorical ontology’, and so forth.
49
 However, I believe that these trials have not 
achieved a true transcendental point.  Only a Derridean event can designate a true 
transcendental point between Divinity and humanity.  The event of Incarnation in 
kenosis has to be construed by potentia absoluta and concursus, as Hodge and 
Francis Turretin maintain, and, in the theology of Hodge, potentia absoluta and 
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potentia ordinata need to be understood as an event.  That is, potentia absoluta 
(such as Incarnation, Resurrection and such Miracles of God), where a true 
transcendental point is taking place, has to be conceived of as the possibility of the 
impossibility in the space of khora.  
     Hodge’s idea of concursus discussed above can only be understood as an event in 
Derridean khora because only such an event can provide a true and genuine source 
of faith in and knowledge of God.  Even though the space and time of an event is 
spontaneous and temporal, this event gives us the possibility of the honest ways of 
practising theology.  Since nobody can be like God, we need to be careful when we 
use His name.  John D. Caputo criticises the stance of strong (‘metaphysical’) 
theology, which regards its authority as having ‘historical determinacy and 
specificity’ in recognising that God is only ‘the highest being in the order of 
presence (overseeing and ensuring the presence of order), who presides over the 
order of being and manifestation’.
50
 
     Not thinking of God alone, but also of the khora of an event, will benefit us in 
practising theology because we can clearly perceive as Thiselton put it, ‘biblical 
insights into the deceitfulness of the human heart and the realities of human bondage 
to sin as self-centered criteria of value’ and ‘recognize the illusionary nature of 
value-neutral perception and value-neutral horizons’.
51
  
 
D. Universality and Particularity in Hermeneutics 
     As John Duns Scotus (1265/66-1308), a Franciscan and a founder of Scotism—a 
form of Scholasticism—noted, ‘each thing has the form of “this-ness” (haeceeitas) 
which singularizes it and makes it individual.’
52
  Duns Scotus means that 
commonality in universality is that every particular thing has a distinct identity.  
Following Duns Scotus, in the context of khora—as we have seen—since 
Christianity has to be construed as a particular religion among other religions, we 
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need to recognise that Christianity should be reconciled with other religions in order 
to achieve universality while longing for the promise of concursus, a true 
transcendental point and meeting place.  This reconciliation demands that we 
consider the relationship between universality and particularity. 
     One of the major tasks of this thesis in placing the theology of Charles Hodge in 
the space of khora is defining universality, particularity and their relationship.  This 
task is closely related to examining Hodge’s inductive theological method and, 
building up a relevant method in khora for identifying the true transcendental point 
as Turretin and Hodge’s concursus.  For understanding the function of universality, 
particularity and their relationship in theological, as well as philosophical, contexts, 
I want to discuss how universality is to be understood and how current philosophical 
hermeneutics have been developed.   
     In metaphysics, the noun ‘universal’ contrasts with individual, while the 
adjective ‘universal’ contrasts with particular.  Then, universality is the claim that 
universal facts are in opposition to relativism of particularity.  Then truth is 
considered to be universal if it is valid in all times and places.  In Christianity, 
universality has to be understood in conjunction with the moment of parousia where 
the universality of truth has to be seen as eternal or as absolute.  Accordingly, in this 
thesis, universality is seen where the whole is intended rather than actually in the 
whole.
53
  The last section of Gadamer’s Truth and Method is entitled ‘The Universal 
Aspect of Hermeneutics (Part III. c).  This ‘universal aspect’ has been borrowed 
from Hegel’s idea of ‘concrete universality’ and can be difficult to grasp without 
understanding what Gadamer has called the ‘fusion of horizons’; we encounter an 
understanding that is not only social (shared) but also universal in nature (‘an I that 
is We and a We that is I’).   
     We can begin to grasp the idea of universality among particularities when 
Gadamer distinguishes ‘taste’ and ‘fashion (Mode)’.  Gadamer writes that ‘the 
universality of taste has quite a different basis and is not the same as empirical 
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universality’.
54
  Here, empirical universality is achieved by fashion (Mode) which 
implies ‘a changeable law (modus) within a constant whole of sociable demeanor’.  
Yet the universality of taste is achieved not only by recognizing this or that as 
‘beautiful’, but also ‘having an eye to the whole.’  With this universality, ‘against 
the tyranny exercised by fashion, sure [good] taste preserves a specific freedom and 
superiority.’
55
  Following Gadamer in his discussion of aesthetics, we affirm that the 
universality is possible ‘wherever a whole is intended but not given as a whole’.
56
  
     Gadamer’s way of achieving universality can also be observed in John Dewey.  
In Dewey, the idea of ‘beautiful’ as good taste is seen as universality, with the vision 
that the foundations of aesthetic judgement are laid out in the four moments of the 
‘analytic of the beautiful’: the moments of quality, quantity, relation and modality.
57
 
Here we need to recognise that both Gadamer and Dewey are different to Immanuel 
Kant on taste and aesthetics.  Kant sees that ‘the judgement of taste is subjective, i.e., 
non-cognitive in the sense that it is not based on definite concepts, but rather that its 
predicate is a feeling of pleasure.’
58
  The difference for Kant is that aesthetic value is 
attached to the syntactic, not the semantic, dimension of meaning.  Only in that way 
is the artist free to create something ‘purposive, [but] without purpose’.
59
 
     In spite of the fact that Jacques Derrida dismisses Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics in light of the universality achieved through ‘fusion of horizons’, 
Derrida’s rhetoric of khora can still allow us to think of universality achieved 
through similar fusions of the universal (synchronic) and the particular or historical 
(diachronic) and is always more than either. Thus despite their differences, there is a 
close similarity between Gadamer and Derrida in our discussion of universality. 
     In Gadamer and Habermas, the universality in the process of understanding is 
observed through intersubjective modes. Intersubjectivity, as distinct from process, 
includes both object and subject in the process of operating between two distinct 
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realities.  In this sense, it is a set of mechanisms of common understanding and 
behaviour constructed by people in their interactions with each other in their 
everyday social and cultural life.  Intersubjectivity arises from an existentialist 
perspective evident in the thinkers as diverse as Heidegger and Martin Buber in his 
work I and Thou(1923)in which the subject is realized in the other and perhaps the 
most developed meditation can be found in Paul Ricouer’s late work, Oneself as 
Another.60 
     Anthony Thiselton summarises four models of hermeneutics.
61
 Considering these 
models for understanding how universality is attained among particularities, we can 
presuppose that the field of hermeneutics is divided into two approaches: a context-
relative approach, which abandons the idea of universal criteria for trans-
communities, and a socio-critical approach, which still holds to the idea of 
universality.
62
   
     The former approach can be seen in the contextual and cultural discipline that 
recognises differences of race, location, language, culture, and so on, as distinctive 
or prejudiced.  Hans-Georg Gadamer (whom we will discuss in detail in chapter IV) 
uses this methodological approach with interdisciplinary hermeneutics.  He criticises 
the preoccupation of post-Enlightenment rationalism and praises ‘method’ as the 
means of grasping truth.
63
  As we will see in chapter IV, Gadamer’s mode of 
understanding as the fusion of horizons always overcomes not only our own 
particularity, but also that of the other.
64
  With this argument, I affirm that 
Gadamer’s universality is meaningful and possible because it is achieved by 
overcoming the limits of both prejudiced sides.  In the process of Gadamer’s fusion 
of horizons, hermeneutic universality can be seen linguistically.  Since language has 
the capacity to keep value when it is expressed, it does not relativise or synthesise 
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the objects at all.  Universality in the form of fusion is achieved by, as Gadamer puts 
it, language in which ‘we articulate the experience of the world as something we 
hold in common’.
65
  
     In response to Jürgen Habermas’s critique that Gadamer’s idea is relative, 
Gadamer argues that since our experience of the world is that of language, language 
enables us to encounter reality.
66
  Gadamer believes that the function of language is 
to break ‘political ideas’ that recognise ‘our capability’ of ‘domination and 
unfreedom’.
67
  Here, he relates linguisticality to the idea of freedom.  What underlies 
his thesis is that only in linguistics is the Enlightenment principle of freedom 
possible at all.  Hence, in Gadamer, universality is possible through freedom, which 
comes from language. 
     In khora, universality is observed as an event in the hermeneutic textuality of its 
happening in space and time.  Textuality as intersubjective modes and chains of 
events in khora shows the relationship between signifiers, and that the singular 
distinctiveness of one signifier is a particular form of relation to the other.  In 
Derrida, the universality of khora in the providential space of God is achieved as a 
series of events among the intersubjectivity of distinctive particular signifiers.  I will 
discuss textuality with the idea of ‘the supplement’ in more detail in chapter II. 
     The latter, socio-critical approach is to regard those differences coming from 
class conflict as in the universal criteria.  This view acknowledges that the lack of 
understanding among particularities is caused by intellectual deficiency in 
perceiving universal criteria of a human society.  A typical example is Jürgen 
Habermas.  In Habermas, since human conscience and objectivity cannot be easily 
connected, the universality in the subjective-objective dichotomy is possible through 
dialectical modes of communication.  These modes make objective understanding of 
a subjective intended meaning possible.  From this stance, cultural differences can 
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be seen as a diversity of voices that can be deciphered by intelligible, subjectively 
intended meaning.
68
  We will discuss Habermas in detail later in chapter IV.   
     These different views on universality in contemporary philosophy have generated 
controversy between so-called ‘postmodernism’ and modernism.  However, defining 
modernism and postmodernism, and drawing a clear line between the two, is not that 
simple.  Who defines what?  Should modernists define postmodernism, or should 
postmodernists define it?  Or should postmodernists define modernism?  If 
postmodernists do, then, who are defined as postmodernists?  Whatever the answers 
are, in general, current discussions on the universality of hermeneutics are set by 
two groups, as we have discussed: the ones who believe in a plurality of different 
times and spaces, and achieve a universality that encompasses a trans-community 
dialogue; and the others, who presuppose universal criteria to make trans-
community dialogue possible.  In fact, true universality as concursus can neither be 
perceived by the universal criteria for trans-particular human beings and creatures, 
nor be understood by the universal modes of transcendental understanding of the 
object/subject dichotomy. 
 
E. Self-Assertive Will and Self-Destructive Will 
     In the modern paradigm, the will to freedom is antithetical to the will to truth.  
Friedrich Nietzsche thought the intrinsic problem of Christianity was caused by a 
self-destructive view of a human being in pursuing truth.  For this reason, in On the 
Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche overturns ‘the will to truth’ and substitutes for it 
‘the will to power (freedom)’.  His vehicle for pursuing freedom (power) is what he 
means by ‘bad conscience’ that results in self-violation.  Nietzsche argues that ‘only 
bad conscience, only the will to self-violation, not “cruelty” or “a self-contradictory 
concept” of “the selfless, self-denial, self-sacrifice,” provided the precondition for 
the value of the unegoistic.’
69
  Here, we need to notice that, according to Nietzsche, 
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the origin of bad conscience is not something gradual and voluntary, but ‘a broach, a 
leap, a compulsion, a fate which nothing could ward off, which occasioned no 
struggle, not even any resentment’.
70
 
     However, in the paradigm of khora, self-denial is not the phenomenon of self-
contradiction.  Rather, it is the very tool for the expression of freedom.  In khora, the 
death of the subject becomes the source of power that makes the impossibility 
possible.  Yet its function follows Nietzsche’s idea of ‘broaching’ that ‘bad 
conscience’ does.  When the death of the I in khora is embedded in a person with the 
Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit—for example, Paul who set our heart 
free—the freedom functions as a broaching supplement.  In khora, our freedom 
comes from the experience of death in the grace of God, as Paul could experience 
impossible freedom when he was confined to a cell by God’s grace.  That is, in 
khora, our selflessness, self-denial and self-sacrifice rather enhance our freedom.  
     Likewise, khora presents the way to overcome the limit of the modern paradigm 
of thinking and rehabilitates both modern theology and philosophy, which are 
confined to their epistemology, by shifting their ground to khora.  Yet the insights of 
Nietzsche’s questions in On the Genealogy of Morality are critical in thinking of 
khora: first, what is it in us that wants truth? (how can we know truth?); second, why 
do we wish not to be deceived?; third, to what extent is life bearable without the 
existence of an ideal?; and fourth, must religious beings always be ascetic? 
     So far, I have formed a set of foundations for the discussion of the theology of 
Charles Hodge.  We have studied Derridean validity in Hodge’s theology; the 
importance of an event in providential space and time, or khora; universality, and 
how it is achieved among particularities; and selflessness as the source of Christian 
freedom.  Considering these foundations, let us examine how an event in khora 
works, and how our freedom is obtained in its universality, in the context of John 
8:1-11.  
 
F.  John 8:1-11: The Event of Faith and Knowledge 
                                                 
70
 Ibid., p. 62. 
  
 
23
     According to the Gospel of John, the events of one’s faith and knowledge occur 
at the time (concurrence) of regeneration (redemption) and sanctification.  Jesus 
obviously recognises that regeneration and sanctification should begin at the same 
time.  In the narrative of John 8:1-11, when forgiving a woman who was seized in 
the act of adultery by the teachers of the regulation and the Pharisees, Jesus declares 
to those who gather around Him in the temple court, ‘[I]f anyone of you is without 
sin, let him be the first to throw a stone at her.’  However, nobody dares to, and all 
except the woman, an offender, leave without a sound.  Thereafter, Jesus proclaims 
the forgiveness of sin to the woman, indicating that He will never condemn her, and 
at the same time declares, “Go now and leave your life of sin.”  
     This narrative, according to Jesus, clearly shows that sanctification while living 
in this world is not so much the condition as it is the clear evidence of regeneration.  
As a result of being forgiven by Jesus, the woman has faith in and knowledge of 
Him.  In other words, the event of forgiveness of Jesus at the instant of redemption 
and sanctification initiated a sinner’s faith and knowledge.  Faith and knowledge are 
not things that authority demands, but are gifts of the Trinitarian God in the life of a 
sinner that are seen as an experiential event between Jesus and her.
71
 
      At that moment, a sinner’s having faith and knowledge at the same time as 
redemption and sanctification is not the business of a human being, but the grace of 
God revealed by the redemptive atoning cross of Jesus Christ, the Son, and executed 
by the sanctifying illumination of the Holy Spirit.  Likewise, for the one who is 
living in the universal space of this planet, one’s Christian (particular) faith and 
knowledge are observed as already not-yet-occurring events of the grace of the 
Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.
72
  Here, one’s particularity will interact 
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with others in the universally created khora as a person with the Trinitarian 
personhood, which is derived from the idea of the God of both one and three, whose 
being is revealed in an intersubjective belongingness.  The function of the 
Trinitarian relationship of Father, Son and Spirit will give hints on how the 
universality of faith and knowledge is to be achieved in a person with the Trinitarian 
personhood illuminated by the Spirit.  However, I do not argue that the Trinitarian 
personhood of the Holy Spirit ‘ought to happen’, but ‘is happening’ as an event.  
Since the saving Spirit is the other, Christians can only recognise the work of the 
Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit in the event of their life experiences in 
relationship with the intersubjective modes between the Holy Spirit and them.  
     We also need to recognise that, if we presuppose that those who are living 
together in this world of the providential space are forgiven and unforgiven sinners, 
the business of discerning the forgiven and the unforgiven is not ours, but God’s.
73
 
Nobody but God has the knowledge to judge sin.  For this reason, I want to argue 
that sinners—whether forgiven or not, living in a universal space of God—are to be 
understood, first of all, not in terms of the object of repentance, but are to be 
regarded as prospective ‘salt and light’ of this world.  Since saving power is the 
other, we cannot deny that the killing and war of this era, especially among different 
religions, are caused by human judgements in discriminating sinners from the saved, 
or believers from non-believers.  Yet khora is the place of living together. 
      Observing philosophically, the happenings of faith and knowledge are events in 
the intersubjective modes of a believer’s life experience, where independent 
objective knowledge of God, Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, and the subjective 
particular faith of a believer, are embedded.  The reality of our experience is 
sometimes independent from our consciousness, which remembers what we ought to 
do.  Our experience is always accompanied by the events happening between 
objectivity and subjectivity, and the process of that relation.  Concerning the 
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relationship between objectivity and subjectivity, I will also prove that theology has 
validity not only if it is actualised in the intersubjective modes of a believer’s life 
experiences, that is, between the universal mode or presence of the Holy Spirit and 
each believer’s particular faith and knowledge, but also has validity when it operates 
in the universal space where the particular Christian identity of ‘I’ is embedded in 
the universal identity (commonality) and participation in the death of the I. 
      Consequently, my argument is that, without exercising evidently particular faith 
and knowledge, achieving universality is meaningless.  Conversely, the ones who 
cannot achieve universality are those who do not exercise what they know of their 
own faith and knowledge.  Particular faith and knowledge should accomplish 
hermeneutic universality with others.  Temporality or spontaneity of this 
intersubjective mode does not result in a mixture of synthesized entity,
74
 but shows 
vibrant movement of the object and subject.  As a proton and a neutron are 
incessantly vibrating in a very stable atom, intersubjectivity is operating incessantly 
without losing its elemental identity. 
 
G. Commonality of ‘I’ as the Death of the I 
     One of the important themes of this thesis is the concept of the death of the I.  
The perspective of this concept is the key to distinguishing ‘the autonomy of the “I”’.  
That is, it is not a simple kind of subject or person, but an historical event 
encompassing the responsibility, faith and gift occurring between God and the self.  
I will discuss this in relation to Derrida later in this section, with the hope that the 
death of the I will resolve complicated ongoing problems in hermeneutic plurality, 
whether they are generated from postmodern or modern disciplines.  
     Claus Westermann interprets the image of God (imago Dei) in terms of an event 
between God and us.  He emphasizes it as a description of action, rather than a 
definition of the nature of man.
75
  Accordingly, ‘the image and likeness of God’ 
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based on our action requires our responsibility.
76
  The self as an image of God has to 
be understood in relationship with others and our individual responsibility before 
God.  As an image of God, the self experiences the possibility of being oneself and 
losing oneself, ‘fallenness, guiltiness, resolve, temporality, death.’  Westermann 
surveys the image of God in Genesis 1:26-7 and concludes: ‘All exegetes from the 
fathers of the church to the present begin with the presupposition that the text is 
saying something about people, namely that people bear God’s image because they 
have been created in accordance with it.’  Therefore, while acknowledging the 
whole question centers around the image of God in the modes of actions of a person, 
Westermann concludes in the discussion of the image of God is that ‘there can be no 
question that the text is describing an action, and not the nature of human beings.’
77
  
Following Westermann, John Macquarrie analyses that Westermann’s view is 
similar to Martin Heidegger’s constitutive structures of the being of man (Dasein).78  
     In Genesis 2:18 and 20, the original solitude of a man is involved in a woman 
helper ‘corresponding to him’.  In this sense, the image of God has Dasein’s 
spatiality: a man already has a relationship with a woman, since she was created by 
being taken out of a man (Genesis 2:23).  But God did not create man as a solitary 
being, for from the beginning “male and female He created them.”’ (Genesis 1:27)  
Their companionship represents khora, a space of being together.  Without having a 
relationship with others in khora, the self cannot fulfill what God intended to be His 
image. 
      By the same token, with respect to the identity of the self as an image of God, 
when we think of the relationship with non-Christians in Christian theology, we also 
have to consider ways to live with others without losing one’s own identity as a self 
with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.  Because the context of ‘I’ is a 
space where ‘We’ are living together, first of all, we need to find out the 
commonality of self identity in order to think of context-sensitivity in this space.  
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      According to both modern and postmodern thinkers, the commonality of the self 
is based on the ‘responsibility’ of a universal human being.  David Klemm has 
argued that the fundamental principles of ‘theological humanism’ are: ‘the 
autonomy of the “I”’; ‘the finality of the “you”’; ‘the universality of the “they”’; and 
the preciousness of the Earth and its creatures.
79
  Klemm concludes that the 
autonomous self should assume ‘the responsibility for the integrity of life’, arguing 
that no theology can be true without respecting and measuring itself by this.
80
  
     My response to his argument is how ‘the autonomy of the “I”’
81
 can assume 
responsibility for the integrity of life at the moment when it decides not to be 
responsible for what it has chosen in its life.  It is true that sometimes and 
momentarily, ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ would be as unstable as in William 
Shakespeare’s dilemma: ‘To be, or not to be; That is the question.’ This instability, 
temporality or vulnerability of Klemm’s ‘the autonomy of the “I”’, caught in the 
inescapable providential time and space within which it is responsible, limits its 
autonomy and its judgement.  Hence, David Jasper, in The Sacred Desert, asserts 
that a self (a poet, in Jasper’s words) must have the courage to die and not to be in 
order that the meaning of life can emerge at the moment when it is totally broken.
82
  
      More serious problems come about when ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ decides not 
to be responsible.  Where is the integrity in not assuming responsibility?  In 
Klemm’s structure, the presupposed autonomous self cannot abandon responsibility 
because ‘I’ is already related to ‘you’, ‘they’, ‘earth’ and ‘creature’.  With this 
structure, Klemm presupposes ‘I’ as already being autonomous.  In the modern 
structure, like in Klemm, ‘I’ ‘should’ imperatively be responsible.  However, 
Klemm’s ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ (modern self) never fulfils the responsibility of 
being a perfect autonomous self, which is exclusive to God Himself: ‘I am Who I 
am.’  ‘The autonomy of the “I”’, according to Colin Gunton, has an intrinsic 
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problem because it regards the other as necessarily heteronymous, believing that the 
concept of the other as God of judgement and grace is a threat to independence and 
freedom.
83
  To be genuinely autonomous in daily life, we do not need the concept of 
autonomy at all to lead the way to autonomy. 
       In The Gift of Death, in comparison with ‘I’ assuming responsibility, Derrida 
argues that ‘religion is responsibility or it is nothing at all.’
84
  Furthermore, he 
proceeds to say that ‘religion’s history derives its sense entirely from the idea of a 
passage to responsibility.’85  That is, ‘a passage of history of religion’ assumes 
responsibility.
86
  Then the subject of responsibility becomes not ‘I’, but ‘a passage 
of history of religion’.  ‘A passage of history of religion’ replaces ‘the autonomy of 
“I”’ because Klemm’s ‘autonomy of the “I”’ is already embedded in it.  Heidegger 
was right in observing that ‘space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space,’ but 
the ‘“subject” (Dasein), if well understood ontologically, is space and it shows itself 
“a priori.”’87  Therefore, the subject, ‘a passage of history of religion’ does not 
designate an objective judgement of decision in exercising the integrity of life, but 
spatiality itself, where responsibility reveals.  According to Heidegger, this space 
has an a priori nature, which stands for ‘the previousness with which space has been 
encountered (as a region) whenever the ready-to-hand is encountered 
environmentally’.
88
  
     While with Heidegger, ‘a passage of history of religion’ has Dasein’s spatiality, 
it definitely overcomes his ontological level of understanding of the space of Dasein.  
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Not only does it experience past history, but it also experiences the history to come, 
which is ontic.  In this sense, while we understand that Heidegger’s Dasein is 
ontological, implying just being there, ‘a passage of history of religion’ has to be 
understood with the idea of khora between ontic and ontological.  Yet we should not 
forget that as a way of understanding a human being’s particular state of being as an 
image of God, ‘a passage of history of religion’ has deep roots in existential Dasein.  
     Since Derrida views history as bound not only to responsibility but also to faith 
and to gift, history is not a simple history, but is a passage of history.89  So as to get 
the idea of passage, we need to listen to Derrida’s precise summary of what is 
happening in that passage in terms of the way in which history is bound to 
responsibility, faith and gift, as follows: 
To responsibility in the exercise of absolute decisions made outside of 
knowledge or given norms, made therefore through the very ordeal of the 
undecidable; to religious faith through a form of involvement with the other 
that is a venture into absolute risk, beyond knowledge and certainty; to the 
gift and to the gift of death that puts me into relation with the transcendence 
of the order, with God as selfless goodness, and that gives me what it gives 
me through a new experience of death.
 90
 
     As we can see above, a passage, as a vehicle or a place in which the history of 
religion is embedded, is where ‘a passage of history of religion’ is, first, to pass 
through the very ordeal of the undecidable (paradoxical life experience); second, to 
venture into absolute risk; and third, to have a relationship with God with the 
transcendental selfless goodness through a new experience of death. 
     Hereafter, I will identify this replacement subject, ‘a passage of history of 
religion’, with the death of the I, in contrast with ‘the autonomy of the “I”’.  ‘Death’ 
in Derrida means ‘the movement of différance to the extent that that movement is 
necessarily finite’.
91
  Here, the différance of Derrida ‘makes the opposition of 
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presence and absence possible’ and ‘produces what it forbids, makes possible the 
very thing that it makes impossible’.
92
  That is, the death of the I as ‘a passage of 
history of religion’ always moves between presence and absence and makes 
impossibility possible.  Derrida claims that ‘without expectation of death and of the 
other’, there would be no ‘act of faith, nor promise, nor future, nor expectancy’, ‘nor 
relation to the singularity of the other’.
93
 
     When we try to understand Derrida’s philosophy on the opposition of presence 
and absence, we need to pay attention to the coincidentia oppositorum of Nicholas 
of Cusa (Cusanus).  According to Cusa, coincidentia oppositorum is 
incomprehensible to human reason, i.e., our discursive, logical and dialectical 
thinking.  For Cusa, God, named as maximum, is, by coincidentia oppositorum, also 
minimum.94  Therefore, the coincidence of bipolar opposition would be a mistake to 
think ‘positively’ since reason, using the principle of non-contradiction, actually 
cannot think in coincidentia oppositorum, which is supra omnem rationis discursum 
(i.e., ‘beyond the limits of thought’).  
     The death of the I, with the above three modes of the experiences of ‘a passage of 
history of religion’, traces responsibility, faith and gift, tied to the history of religion.  
Only the death of the I can allow for this because it has a passage.  ‘The autonomy 
of the “I”’ cannot, because it does not have spatiality with the capacity of passage, 
as we have seen in Heidegger.  Otherwise, ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ is already being 
embedded in the death of the I.  That is, only the death of the I has the capacity for 
passage, a vehicle or a place in which the history of religion is revealed.  ‘The 
autonomy of the “I”’ cannot trace because a passage is perceived neither by 
intelligibly extended knowledge nor by intuitively derived knowledge.
95
  A passage 
itself is a source of knowledge.  It is an innate knowledge embedded in the death of 
the I.   
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      Even before pointing out something with autonomous human reason, the death 
of the I is already committed in the past experience and the promise for the future.  
Therefore, the responsibility of the death of the I naturally surpasses the limit of ‘the 
autonomy of the “I”’.  For this reason, Derrida counts history as responsibility, and 
this is possible only when ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ defers speaking.
96
  When ‘the 
autonomy of the “I”’ avoids inexact, erroneous, aberrant and improper speaking, it 
can be responsible for history.  It is clear that the ‘I’ who can avoid speaking while 
expressing itself with commitment and promise is the death of the I, not ‘the 
autonomy of the “I”’.  
     The death of the I as a common identity of a space is a crucial supplement to a 
person with the Holy Spirit in theology.  This figure can explain the characteristics 
and role of ‘the righteous’ living here and now.  The righteous that God sought at 
Sodom and Gomorrah can be considered as the analogy of the death of the I 
embedded in a person with the Holy Spirit.  The righteous person that does not lose 
his identity as a man of God, but is also a context-sensitive figure with his 
experience of death, is desperately needed for this world and for the world to come.  
Abraham in our discussion in chapter V will be a good example. 
  
H. Universal Space of Khora 
      In this section, I want to clarify the meaning of khora in detail in relationship 
with the doctrine of predestination.  In chapter V, I will discuss khora in view of its 
role among beings (‘the genius’ of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘the ironist’ of Richard 
Rorty, ‘Ivan Ilyich’ in Leo Tolstoy and ‘Abraham’ in Søren Kierkegaard) in this 
world.  
     Christian theology needs to identify a space where sinners, whether forgiven or 
not, are struggling in this world rather than directly informing what sinners are to do.  
Assuming that human beings are sinners before God, how can we actually perceive 
His redemptive or the providential space where we sinners are residing?  This space 
cannot but be a providential space, which is prescribed as a universal space 
                                                 
96
 Ibid., p. 16. 
  
 
32
including this world, where human beings, forgiven and unforgiven sinners, are 
residing and the Creator, transcendental God, is working.  For this reason, we are 
required to accept that a providential space of God in this world is not exclusively 
for Christians, but for every creation of God.  Once again, when it comes to refer to 
a space, we need to recognise that a particular religion, such as Christianity, is to 
live together with other religions of this world.  That is, the discontinuity between 
particular religions has to be understood within the continuity in a universally 
created space.   
     If we presuppose that the place where we are living is that of election and of 
reprobation, we conclude that the election and reprobation has nothing to do with 
our option to choose.
97
  Theology then needs to focus on the phenomenology of the 
space of sinners living in this world.  Philosophers such as Heidegger, Gadamer, 
Habermas, Rorty and Derrida, with whom we are going to deal in the following 
chapters, have lots to contribute on this kind of space.  However, the epistemology 
of theology tends not to extend its study further to the universal space in which 
sinners are residing.  So in this era, when subjective, invisible spirituality is growing 
to be influential on all sorts of academic disciplines and values, we need to 
investigate this space both philosophically and theologically. 
     The particularity of Christian theology and the universality of a space for living 
together involve three things: a space where different identities reside without losing 
their own identities; a space of the providence of God that nevertheless allows for 
both the predestined to be elected and reprobated; and a space that takes precedence 
over every other particular identity, including Christianity.  Given these three 
presuppositions, Christian theology needs to ponder hermeneutic universality by 
recognising the reality of plurality and diversity of created beings.  
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I. Theology as a Reduced Form of the Death of the I: Khoral Theology 
     If theology is not to degenerate into theory and produce speculative theological 
jargon, it has to deal with the space/event of our faith and knowledge.  There might 
be some theologians who are leading daily lives according to their faith and 
knowledge.  However, theology has hardly been successful in its progress according 
to the space/event of our faith and knowledge here and now.  Theology as the 
knowledge of God and as that of ourselves
98
 should act by itself, not only in our 
faith, but also in our lives.  This is why I want to propose a khoral theology in action. 
     More than a half-century ago, John Macquarrie argued that ontological inquiry in 
theology is not external but intrinsic, ‘an inquiry into the idea of being which 
theology assumes’.
99
  Therefore, a theologian must be a philosopher in critical 
understanding even if not in creative power.
100
  Following Macquarrie’s insight, I 
propose that a Christian theology, as a different kind of a passage of history of 
religion, also passes through the narratives as the death of the I.  I will show the 
possibility of ‘Khoral Christian Theology’ with the point of view that the death of 
the I is embedded in a person with the Holy Spirit.  Eventually, this theology will 
accomplish a universality of hermeneutics not only by situating itself as one of 
beings in the world (signifiers of signifiers), but also at the time of parousia that I 
discussed at the beginning of this thesis.  That is, in khora, traditional conceptually 
signified theologies change their roles as mere signifiers in khoral theology.  
     ‘Khoral theology’ means a theology which is based on hermeneutic universality, 
with endless contextual sensitivity through temporal and spontaneous movements of 
faith acts.  At the same time, it is distinctive in its particular conviction that God’s 
identity as God is never dependent on His creation.  Here, we should notice that the 
space/event of faith and knowledge in khoral theology is not simply the result of a 
practical subsequent application of the theology, but of the very source of it.  
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     Furthermore, the occurrence of faith and knowledge at the time of regeneration 
and sanctification cannot be achieved by any work of human beings, but are possible 
only through the incarnation and the intersection of the exact imprint of God’s very 
being, Jesus Christ, and the communicative work of the Holy Spirit.  In this 
particular situation, the distinctive Christian experience of redemption can be 
perceived as a promise of ‘deliverance from all the cause-effect chains of forces 
which hold the self to its past, through the work of Christ and the agency of the Holy 
Spirit who opens new possibilities of futurity “from beyond” the situatedness of the 
self’.
101
  Then the object and source of the theology become not only the text of the 
Bible itself, but also textuality, in which the Bible produces meaning through the 
death of the I.  
     I will examine Charles Hodge’s theology through the inquiry of what would 
happen if a Christian experienced faith and knowledge at the concurrence of 
regeneration and sanctification in a space of khora.  This inquiry will be developed 
on the foundations of the three conditions of a space that I described before,
102
 and 
will generate following four points in thinking about Hodge’s theology: the identity 
of a Christian ‘I’ as the death of the I embedded in a person with the Trinitarian 
personhood of the Holy Spirit; the existence of a space as khora, where forgiven and 
unforgiven sinners live together; the fact that  the death of the I, embedded in a 
person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Spirit as the image of God, enables a 
distinctive Christian responsibility before God, residing in the universal space of 
khora; and a theology of Hodge as a reduced sample of the ‘history of religion’ in 
khora.  With these foundations, we will review Hodge’s modern theology in his time 
and space that teaches ‘what ought to happen’ according both to the facts written in 
the Bible and the work of the Holy Spirit.  
     Then the task becomes how I can evaluate Hodge’s objectively written theology 
while keeping his subjectively intended meaning or belief.  That is, what I want to 
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do is not to show objective understanding of subjectively intended meaning, but to 
show that Hodge’s objectively written theology is meaningful when it is understood 
in the context of a history of religion, i.e., the death of the I.   I will discuss the 
relationship between the death of the I and Hodge’s theology in more detail in 
section K.  Having grasped the theological place of the death of the I, we will then 
scrutinise the theology of Hodge.  
 
J. The Journey of the Death of the I 
     In order to deepen the above understandings of the three core ideas on space and 
of the four points involved in scrutinising Hodge’s theology,
103
 philosophical and 
literary investigation is necessary.  Philosophy’s importance in practising theology 
as a method can be found within Hodge’s theology.  Hodge often uses the terms 
‘philosophy’ and ‘philosopher’ in Systematic Theology.  He comments that the 
theologian’s method of ‘ascertaining what the Bible teaches is the same as that 
which the natural philosopher adopts to ascertain what nature teaches’.
104
  In an 
article in the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, he remarks that ‘every 
theology is in one sense a form of philosophy.  To understand any theological 
system, therefore, we must understand the philosophy which underlies it, and gives 
it its peculiar form.’
105
 
     As Hodge practised theology by using the philosophy of Scottish Common Sense 
Realism, we need to explore how the death of the I experiences the space/event of 
faith and knowledge in modern philosophies.  From literature, we will trace 
paradoxical and temporal experiences of the death of the I’s ordeals, venturing into 
absolute risks and having a relationship with God in this world. 
     That is, theology is a reduced form of the death of the I in khora whose 
intersubjective identity can be traced by Enlightenment ideas.  I want to trace back 
how Enlightenment ideas of ethics, aesthetics and faith have been developed.  Such 
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Kierkegaardian questions include ‘Can the death of the I suspend ethics?’, ‘What is 
the death of the I’s responsibility to God?’ and ‘How can the death of the I execute 
its faith?’  This study will show us the footprints of the death of the I as a passage of 
the history of religion.  We shall get the answers to these questions in chapters III, 
IV and V through studying the philosophies and literature of Plato, Kant, 
Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, Emerson, Dewey, Gadamer, Habermas and Rorty.   
 
K. The Death of the I in the Hermeneutic Universality 
     The complexities of hermeneutics in the death of the I inevitably allow us to 
explore how Enlightenment ideas on reason have evolved.  The study of Kant’s 
account of reason and practical reason, debates between Gadamer and Habermas, 
the relationship of ‘habit and reason’ in Dewey, and the comparison of the ‘genius’ 
of Emerson with the ‘ironist’ of Rorty will show us how the death of the I, 
embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, plays a 
role in a space where theology operates in action.  The characteristics and 
relationships of ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘we’, and ‘they’ in a space of khora will be explored.  I 
will especially focus on Paul Ricoeur, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jacques Derrida, 
who all owe debts to Heidegger.  As Susan Handelman notes, these figures, among 
contemporary philosophers of hermeneutics, are distinctive figures who tried to 
sever their ties with the Western (Greco-Roman) tradition.
106
 
     Throughout these philosophical exercises, such as ‘transcendental deduction’, 
‘universality of hermeneutics’, ‘power reflection’, ‘fusion of horizon’, ‘anti-
dualism’ and ‘pragmatism’, we will investigate how the transcendental God is 
revealed through a believer in a providential space of khora.  This study will give us 
clues to follow the historical traces of khora and its validity as a space for the 
universality of hermeneutics in practising theology.  In this way, the intersubjective 
mode in khora as a signifier of a signifier shows that the one (a signifier) is a 
particular form of relation to the other (a second signifier), and that universality is 
khora, the providential space of God. 
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L. The Role of Practical Reason in Hermeneutics 
     Hermeneutic activity is practically observed in the process of life experience.  
Gadamer argues that any kind of life experience happens in the hermeneutic 
community, because understanding and communication are modes of social 
coexistence as a community of dialogue.  For this reason, ‘nothing exists outside the 
universal medium of practical reason.’
107
  In our life experiences this practical 
reason operates independently of any particular desires and aims, especially when 
rational beings consider acting when they ought to do something.
108
 
     The importance of life experience in hermeneutics can be seen through the 
conflict between the church and Copernican observation.  The biblical view of 
Creation before the Copernican revolution in astronomy was totally distorted by a 
theoretically stereotyped interpretation by the church.  What was considered to be 
Biblical truth according to the dogmatic theory of the church turned out to be 
fabrication.  The ‘authoritative’ church paradoxically lost the authority of truth since 
it was not able to recognise the dimension of hermeneutic experience.  So as to keep 
the truth in the Bible to be true (acknowledging that the Earth is a part of the 
universe and is moving), the church should have recognised hermeneutic experience 
rather than reside in the dogmatism of prejudiced human reason.  This is why we 
need practical reason in doing theology. 
     Even if we think that something is definitely true, we need to have an open, 
practical mind.  Claims of truth need to be deferred until we address the question of 
how we can get the truth.  Therefore, when one who is prejudiced due to his limited 
insight speaks in the name of ‘reason’, he always contradicts himself.
109
  What the 
death of the I, embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy 
Spirit, needs to do is not to claim what truth is, but to act upon what it believes to be 
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true.  The one who acts upon what he believes to be true knows that his truth claim 
is only effective in his presupposition.  
     The death of the I has the capacity to know particular faith and knowledge, and 
participates in modes of life experiences.  Thus, the death of the I, which already 
knows that it is exposed to its particular presupposition, also activates ‘the mode of 
being of historicity’.
110
  In this way, the one who has the sense of ‘belonging’ to 
historicity rather than an ontic sense of ‘homogeneity’,
111
 recognises that a human 
being is a hermeneutic and finite being.  Khora is not such a unified society or other 
reality.  It is not the place where multitudes of signifiers are homogenised, but where 
particular signifiers have relationships with others.  
     With this presupposition that the participants of khora are not homogeneous but 
heterogeneous, the death of the I experiences and at the same time presents the 
universality of hermeneutics, as Gadamer depicts it: the totality of understanding or 
interpretation even when it simply intends to know ‘what is there’ and to discover 
from its sources ‘how it really was’.
112
  Then hermeneutic experiences such as 
understanding and interpretation are to be construed as modes to know the truth. 
1. Fusion of Horizons: Intersubjective Modes of Life Experience in the Universality 
of Hermeneutics  
     As we have seen, our understanding begins by recognising that our prejudice is 
historically and geographically established.  Then we have questions of what 
happens when prejudices conditioned by different times and spaces collide in a 
space of now, and how we can know what the universality of hermeneutics achieves 
among the collision of different horizons.  
     Both Gadamer and Habermas seek a reconciliation of the subject-object 
dichotomy that is evident in modern rationality.
113
  However, because the 
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relationship between subjectivity in the intention of human conscience and 
observable objectivity cannot be bridged immediately for Habermas, the subject-
object dichotomy needs dialectical modes of investigation.  That is, in Habermas, 
intersubjective modes are observed dialectically, so that ‘objective understanding of 
subjectively intended meaning’ is possible.
114
 
     However, in Gadamer, the intersubjective mode as an integration of subject and 
object is not only a means of understanding, but also is an end of it.  Theology 
should not remain an intellectual business of objective understanding of the Bible 
and the Trinity of God.  Theology needs to have a capacity to talk about subjectively 
intended meanings of the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.  That is to say, 
intrinsically, theology has to be generous in harvesting all the costs it has invested, 
but it also has to be ready to pay all the costs of practising for the sake of the love of 
God and love of others.  
     I believe that the death of the I will do the job of investing its cost by allowing a 
theology to be context-sensitive, being embedded in the subjective working of the 
Holy Spirit in God’s creation.  The process of context-sensitivity in devotion, 
generosity and humility actually belongs to the other, because a person with the 
Trinitarian personhood does not behave according to the promise of compensation, 
but for the other.  
     Here, we need to notice that Gadamer’s idea comes from Heidegger’s 
‘temporality and historicity’ of Dasein and Husserl’s ‘radicality of the 
transcendental reduction’.
115
  Heidegger’s Dasein means spatiality as a mode, and it 
is essential to its basic state of being-in-the-world.
116
  We can follow that knowing 
activity with what is known, not just as a form of behaviour of a subject, but as 
definitely shown as intersubjective modes of Dasein.  
     Gadamer has a question one step further from Heidegger’s ‘ontology’, as to ‘how 
hermeneutics, once freed from ontological obstructions of the scientific concept of 
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objectivity, can do justice to the historicity of understanding’.
117
  For Gadamer, the 
only ‘objectivity’ is a confirmation of fore-structures in their being worked out. 
Since the arbitrariness of inappropriate fore-structures cannot play a role in this 
work, understanding cannot achieve its full potential.
118
  Thus 
it is quite right for the interpreter not to approach the text directly, relying 
solely on the fore-meaning at once available to him, but rather to examine 
explicitly the legitimacy, i.e., the origin and validity, of the fore-meanings 
present within him.
119
 
     Therefore, a person who tries to understand a text must be, from the start, 
preparing himself for a text to tell him something, sensitive to the text’s quality of 
newness.  This kind of sensitivity, Gadamer says, is:  
neither ‘neutrality’ in the matter of the object nor the extinction of one’s self, 
but the conscious assimilation of one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices. 
The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text may 
present itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against 
one’s own fore-meanings.
120
 
      That is, the being of Dasein is changed as it becomes an experience of the 
spectator, and the being of the spectator is changed by experiencing what is seen.  
Through this process, Gadamer wants to demonstrate a transcendental interpretation 
of understanding through ‘thrown projections’ of meaning where Dasein’s ‘own 
potentiality-for-being has always already “been”’.
121
  These ‘thrown projections’ can 
also be understood as ‘transporting ourselves’, i.e., putting ourselves in others’ 
positions.
122
  This is what is happening in Gadamer’s intersubjective mode of 
understanding experience, called a ‘fusion of horizons’.  This mode of 
understanding always participates in the universality of hermeneutics that 
‘overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other’.
123
  In this way, 
‘the superior breadth’ of one’s vision enlarges his horizon.  That is, ‘one learns to 
look beyond what is close at hand—not in order to look away from it, but to see it 
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better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion.’
124
  The horizon of now is 
incessantly progressing due to one’s testing his past prejudice and forming his 
present historical one.  Therefore, ‘understanding is always the fusion of these 
horizons supposedly existing by themselves.’
125
  What happens at the moment of 
fusion, in such tradition, is an ongoing process of creating a living value of now, 
‘without either being explicitly fore-grounded from the other’.
126
 
    Understanding and language are inseparable.  According to Gadamer, experiences 
of meaning as an event in understanding contain application.
127
  Thus, for Gadamer, 
the whole process of understanding is possible through the application of language, 
because only through human linguisticality can substantive understanding and 
agreement take place in a different way every time among parties of 
understanding.
128
  In this way, the method as an application of language plays a 
central role in Gadamer’s universality of hermeneutics.  
     So what does Gadamer mean by universality in hermeneutics?  In order to know 
this, we need to understand Gadamer’s idea of ‘horizon’.  A reader’s prejudice in a 
hermeneutical process represents his limits. The reader, who already knows that he 
is historically conditioned, will think of effective historical consciousness, because 
he knows that what he believes is his own critical thinking is already exposed to 
history and to its effects.  At this moment, when he tries to understand a text or an 
historical event, according to Gadamer, there happens a universality of hermeneutics.  
This means that our historically conditioned prejudices are merged with the 
historicity of the text or the event in the text, and they both come to constitute a 
universal horizon that includes the historical depths of our self-consciousness.
129
   
2. Meaning and Application of Derridean Trace 
     The insights the death of the I learned from Gadamer’s fusion of horizon are that: 
it wants to see something better in a space, rather than have a birds-eye view; it has 
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an incessant concern with pre-understood prejudices of the other, whether residing 
in the space or out; and it sustains its openness in a process of understanding.  Yet, 
in the Derridean khora, this intersubjective mode is nothing but a signifier of a 
signifier.  That is, the events in a concurrent time and space can be perceived as facts 
of understanding.  Furthermore, what is distinguishable is that these intersubjective 
modes trace the Transcendental Signified.  This trace makes it possible for the 
intersubjective modes to have the capacity to manoeuvre the future in view of the 
past.  This futurity makes the impossibility possible in Derrida.  
     At the moment, we need to recognise that, in Derrida, Gadamer’s intersubjective 
mode happens in ‘the supplement’.
130
  According to Derrida, ‘the supplement’ is that 
which appropriates deficiency caused by ‘an accident and a deviation from 
Nature’.
131
  As that deficiency is observed as in the immaturity of a human being in 
childhood, ‘the supplement’ can be seen in the immaturity of a human being living 
in a space and time.  For example, such intersubjective modes of Dewey’s ‘habit or 
culture, cultivation’ and Gadamer’s ‘tradition, authority and prejudice’ are 
something to be supplemented to Nature.  In this sense, while understanding the 
immaturity of self presupposes ‘prejudice’ for Gadamer, Derrida introduces ‘the 
supplement’ as a substitute for Gadamer’s intersubjective modes of understanding, 
i.e., the fusion of horizons. 
     The intersubjectivity of ‘the supplement’ is complex.  This intersubjective mode 
has the power of substitution.  Through progressive and regressive movements, and 
vicarious action in its representation, ‘the supplement’ moves and acts according to 
this power.
132
  According to Derrida, substitution appears as ‘the sign, the image or 
the representer’, and it becomes a driving force for the movement of the world.
133
  In 
this way, ‘the supplement’ is the image and representation of Nature.    
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     When we begin to talk about supplement and trace, we need to recognise that 
these terms are inconceivable to reason
134
 because they do not say what is, but trace 
a path.  The traced path broaches the ‘methodological or logical intraorbitary 
assurances’ of the totality.
135
 According to Derrida, there is always exteriority 
beyond the totality of the age of logocentrism.  This exteriority can only be 
accessible by empirical experience.  Even in the history of Christianity, the totality 
of logocentrism could not recognise two-thirds of the world’s particular historical 
backgrounds.
136
  A distinguished evangelical missiologist at Westminster 
Theological Seminary, Harvie Conn, strongly argues that ‘even evangelical theology 
will have a different look when it is shaped in a context where Confucius, not Kant, 
is king’.
137
  
     Hence, the death of the I cannot but be radically empirical.  It proceeds like a 
wandering thought on the possibility of itinerary and of method.  It is as affected by 
the absence of knowledge as by its future, and it ventures out deliberately.  However, 
this empiricism destroys itself by its vulnerability and immediacy.
138
  This is why 
we need to consider ‘the supplement’ in theology.  According to Derrida, the 
modern opposition of philosophy and nonphilosophy (empiricism) could not solve 
the very moment of temporality of truth when the value of truth is shattered, and 
could not solve the internal contradictions of scepticism.
139
  What Derrida argues is 
that the modern opposition of philosophy and empiricism does not allow empiricism 
to be simply empirical.  In this sense, Derrida postulates that modern empiricism is 
abused and misunderstood.
 140
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    Having said this, ‘the supplement’ can be seen or embedded in the behaviour of 
the death of the I.  Since the process of the death of the I is to suffer an ordeal, to 
venture risk and to transcend it to achieve selfless goodness, as discussed above, 
what is shown and expressed by it cannot represent itself.  If one is to decide to 
suffer, to venture and to transcend oneself, one is definitely focused on the inner self, 
where all the life experiences before and to come are embedded, and one would 
mediate by tracing, rather than just beginning to speak of them.  
     What, then, is the characteristic of this trace?  Before thinking of this, we need to 
recognise that there is an ontic/ontological (absence/presence) concurrence between 
the death of the I and the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.  Therefore, in 
this thesis, it is imperative to find the characteristics of the traces of intersubjectivity 
between these two. 
      It is common sense that there is no one who has seen and heard God physically 
and directly.  Correctly speaking, those living here and now can only sense the 
traces between God and human beings.  Therefore, when the death of the I, as that 
which enjoys total freedom and exercises voluntary responsibility, is embedded in a 
person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, it will trace God.  The 
trace of the death of the I, then, is not so much exclusively God’s as the condition of 
God.  As a scientist pursues facts through research, we sense nothing but immediate 
experience of now as a moment of tracing.  Accordingly, rather than the 
Transcendental Signified itself, the place of signifiers of signifiers as a happening 
place of trace, of writing and of inscription is a major concern in this thesis.
141
   
     Theologically speaking, ‘trace’ in Derrida is the nearest evidence of what seems 
to be a human recognition between knowledge of the self and knowledge of God.  In 
Calvinistic terminology, our faith as the knowledge of God is executed in the 
Derridean trace while thinking his doctrine of reprobation is the tool to make us 
think of being humble.  What I want to do in this thesis, especially in the trace 
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between the death of the I and the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, is 
neither to interrupt all talk about God nor to merely assume a metaphysical 
Transcendental Signified.  Derrida’s question of how depraved human language can 
even speak of God pushes me to do khoral theology, not focusing on the 
metaphysical Transcendental Signified, but on the now as the time and the here as 
the place in khora—“place, spacing, receptacle (hypodokhé)”142—which is an event 
or happening itself.  For Derrida, khora remains ‘the place of waiting, awaiting the 
realization of the promise’.
143
   
 
M. In Sum: The Death of the I and the Theology of Charles Hodge 
     The death of the I does not simply represent human identity, but is a universal 
medium that allows us to experience a true transcendental point at the event of 
concursus.  Since the death of the I is defined as ‘a passage of history of religion’ 
with responsibility, gift and faith from time to time, the participation of the death of 
the I in a particular faith or religion will enhance the zeal for a true transcendental 
point of each faith or religion.  As a reduced form of the death of the I in khora of 
this space and time, I suggest that Charles Hodge’s theology come back as a textual 
theology among God, the Scriptures, the world and the self in the context of the 
twenty-first century, as it came about in the nineteenth-century United States. 
     In the theology of Hodge, a father of American Reformed theology, the 
discussion of textuality where the Bible itself produces meaning through the death of 
the I is somewhat awkward, because such a Princetonian as Hodge is regarded as a 
defender of the authority of the Bible.  However, in the Reformed tradition, a 
theology such as Hodge’s, textuality where contextualisation occurs between context 
and text, will not enfeeble the doctrine of Sola Scriptura because ‘Calvinists believe 
in a comprehensive revelation of God in Scripture, the world, and the self.’
144
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     If this theology achieves the universality of hermeneutics with its context-
sensitivity and without losing its distinctive identity, it will achieve its Kingdom to 
come.  Since ‘now’ is a ‘messianic’
145
 time, the context of ‘what is happening now’ 
within intersubjective modes of concursus in the theology of Hodge should expose 
the contingency and deconstructibility of the present Kingdom at hand.  With the 
promise of the Kingdom of Heaven already not yet achieved, in which we are 
responsible for the entire history of humanity, forgiven and unforgiven sinners shall 
know what is happening in khora. 
     If we think of Hodge’s theology as a receptor of the space where the text of the 
Bible itself produces meaning, we can not only widen our eyes to see abundant 
threads of grace shed upon all parts of our life, but we can also trace our forefathers’ 
wisdom in church history that will eventually enlighten our urgent duty as ‘salts and 
lights’ of this world.  With the experience of faith and knowledge, in the context of 
the death of the I embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy 
Spirit, I want to trace the textuality where the Bible produces meaning in the 
theology of Hodge.  That is, I want to examine how Hodge’s Biblical theology 
works in the intersubjective modes of religious experience, between the objective 
truth in God of the Bible and subjective faith. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE MEANING OF THE DEATH OF THE I EMBEDDED IN A PERSON AS 
THE PRESENCE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT 
 
     As we saw in Chapter I, the participation of the death of the I in a human being as 
a passage of history of religion enables us to approach true universality with its 
distinctive sense of responsibility, gift and faith.  This universal participation is 
observed in the event of khora in between the juxtaposition of presence/absence and 
ontic/ontological.  In a particular Christian person, there are modes of life 
experience with others—as in the Trinitarian personhood of God, who is both one 
and three—in relationship to Gadamer’s ‘thrown projections’, derived from 
Heidegger’s ‘temporality and historicity’ of Dasein and Husserl’s ‘radicality of 
transcendental reduction’.  A Christian with the Holy Spirit has been observed 
between presence and absence in khora and experiences impossibility (a true 
transcendental point) as possible with the Derridean universal sense of ‘death’.  
     While both the death of the I and the Holy Spirit are invisible, their bipolarity is 
clear: secular/Christian.  Since we understand particularity as a Christian identity, 
we want to identify its particular characteristics in relationship with the universality, 
the death of the I.  Keeping in mind that the particularity does not lose its identity in 
the discussion of the juxtaposition of the two, we will examine how the embedding 
of the death of the I in a person with the Holy Spirit manifests itself. 
 
A. Identity of a Person With the Holy Spirit 
     Since the death of the I is a passage of history of religion, it does not have any 
personal identity, either static or relational.  It is only sometimes able to be 
recognised as an event, spontaneously and temporally.  Now I want to identify a 
Christian personhood in view of the embedding of the death of the I in a person with 
the Holy Spirit.  
     Kwame Anthony Appiah argues in The Ethics of Identity that the identity of the 
self can be recognised by modes of concepts and practices of contemporary people 
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living within their religious, societal, educational and regional distinctiveness.
146
   
With this proposition, Appiah wants to build up the individual self in order to 
overcome the vision of authenticity that sprang from theories of Romanticism and 
Existentialism.  
     Before further discussing self-identity in detail, I want to present authenticity and 
existentialist ways of self-identification in relation to doing theology.  According to 
Appiah, the discussion of authenticity in self-identity is a matter of being true or not 
to who I am as I am, or who I would be as I would be.  That is, on the one hand, that 
an authentic self knows what is true by its careful reflective or reflexive recognition 
of what is already there.  On the other hand, the existentialist view is that I create an 
identity of something out of nothing, and then decide what to do and what to be.
147
  
     With the reflective and reflexive recognition of authenticity and the view of 
existentialists, existential theologies generally want to prove what is accessible to 
our own observations according to our daily-life experiences and relative knowledge 
as a means of knowing truth.  These theologies are very successful in catching up to 
a rapidly changing and tremendously diverse world of different times, spaces and 
people.  Rudolf Karl Bultmann (1884 – 1976) uses existentialism as a useful tool to 
express the intended meaning of the New Testament message itself.  He utilises 
existentialism not only in ‘the basic manner of raising the question that the gospel 
message answers’, but also in ‘the system of basic concepts in which this answer 
must come’, that is, ‘the realm of human existence’.
148
  There is a dialectic 
relationship between authentic and inauthentic existence.  
     Bultmann follows Heidegger’s two modes of being: one is that people develop an 
authentic existence whenever they accept the challenge of being thrown into the 
world, and the other is that people develop an inauthentic existence whenever they 
lose the distinction between the self and the world.
149
  For Bultmann, inauthentic 
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existence is unbelief in oneself searching for the security and satisfaction in the 
tangible world apart from God, while authentic existence refuses to base one’s life in 
the world, but instead on intangible realities coupled with the ‘renunciation of self-
centred security and openness to the future’.
150
  Authenticity for Bultmann is the 
very expression of faith, seeing the world as if it is not the world.  Then the risen life 
in Christ becomes an existential possibility for which men are asked to decide.
151
  
As John Macquarrie (1919 – 2007) points out, we do not have to dismiss the 
importance of existentialism’s concern with the long-neglected phenomenon of a 
human being in fallenness, care, death and guilt, and its ‘quest for an authentic 
existence’ in rediscovery of the Biblical understanding of man.
152
 
     As Macquarrie recognises, the real stumbling blocks of the existentialist 
approach of Bultmann are the objection to myth, the surrender of self-sufficiency 
and the acceptance of the cross.
153
  This is due to the intellectual or conceptual 
presentation of theology, which remains in the realm of ‘the autonomy of “I”’ in 
general.
154
  For this reason, I want to overcome this limit of authenticity and the 
existentialist approach, based on the viewpoint of the death of the I. 
      The identity of ‘I’ in practising existential and authentic theology—for example, 
in Bultmann—is confined to a pre-socially-conditioned identity of ‘the autonomy of 
the “I”’.  That is, the religious life of a self is confined to the possibility of decision 
between the double agenda: to live with God, or to lose oneself in the world.
155
  Yet 
what Appiah wants to propose at this moment of existentialist theology, is that the 
identity of the self cannot be determined by ‘the autonomy of “I”’.  According to 
Appiah, the identity of ‘I’ is not of a ‘pre-social thing—not some authentic inner 
essence independent of the human world into which we have grown—but rather the 
product of one interaction from our earliest years with others’.
156
  However, a 
modern existentialist understands the basic principle of existentialism as that 
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existence that is prior to any essences.  That is, the very existence of ‘I’ (the effect of 
a cause) is the one that makes one’s life while living.  When this existentialism is 
applied to theology, we need to notice that the identity of God is apt to be reduced to 
the viewpoint of a creature.  
     Clearly negating the authentic and existentialist view on ‘I’, what Appiah 
proposes here is that ‘I’ cannot be identified as an ‘independent’ object and subject, 
but by ‘interaction’ between ‘one’ and ‘others’.  That is, identity should be 
understood as a mode of relationship, and the mode of relationship is confined to the 
interaction of the earliest years.  As we saw in chapter I, ‘the autonomy of “I”’ does 
not have any room for spatiality.  
     Modernity’s paradox lies in its endeavour to reduce the identity of God to the 
viewpoint of humanity.  It maintains the belief in the possibility of achieving an 
objective understanding of ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ displaced from God above by 
an immanent sphere below.  Reducing the other to this-worldly reality for the 
purpose of objective apprehension will result in critical damage to the concept of the 
Creator, God.  According to Colin Gunton, the displacement of the Creator with the 
Creation is ‘damaging and sometimes demonic’.
157
  Gunton gets the contradiction of 
modernity straight when he comes to evaluate modernity as 
an era which has sought freedom, and bred totalitarianism; which has taught 
us our insignificance in the vastness of the universe, and yet sought to play 
god with that same universe; which has sought to control the world, and yet 
to loose forces that may destroy the earth.
158
 
     In Christian theological discussion, the contradiction is more serious when ‘the 
autonomy of the “I”’ begins to think of the self not as a particular individual 
involved in the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, but as a universal means 
which pretends to have the capacity to understand the totality of the transcendental 
God.  The contradiction is twofold: that what the existentialists presume to be an 
autonomous self reduces the true autonomy of God’s ‘I am Who I am’ for the sake 
of praising its objective understanding; and that the existentialists actually lost God 
by overlooking the intersubjective linguistic recognition of His work in their pursuit 
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of conceptual totalitarian understanding of Him.  As I have maintained, this thesis is 
not about how a modern self understands postmodern issues, but about how a 
postmodern self deals with the modern conception of bipolarity of the self and the 
world.  That is, while the authentic existential ‘I’ has to see the world as if it is not, 
the death of the I sees the world as the space of multiple signifiers’ intersubjective 
relationality. 
     Nowadays, many kinds of practical theological disciplines are based on reflective 
and reflexive recognition or experiences in life, and are called postmodern 
theologies.  For example, Stanley Grenz regards the embedded subject as theology: 
‘Culture: Theology’s Embedding Context’.
159
  In this case, due to the violence of 
theological epistemology, when theology becomes subject, theology cannot but 
diminish the purity of theology itself and the culture as well.  The same is the case as 
in feminist theology.  Feminists use theology as a tool to dismantle the power 
structure, and eventually use it to enhance their social and political status.  These 
problems come from their stubborn presupposition that theology has to agree 
universally with their own reason. 
     As I have argued, particular Christianity, or a person with the Trinitarian 
personhood of the Holy Spirit, achieves universality in the space of khora where the 
death of the I ventures and experiences Derridean death.  Again, neither Christianity 
nor any form of theologies should regard itself as having any sense of universality.  
Universality is always being accomplished by the invisible other, as in the death of 
the I and the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. 
     Both universality and particularity have a relationship with the intersubjective 
modes, because khora is the place where belongingness or relationship is possible.  
In this sense, a particular person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit 
has to be understood in the ‘belongingness’, ‘thrown projections’ and ‘spontaneous 
event’ of the universal death of the I.  The recognition of particularity will not lead 
to subjectivism, relativism and pluralism in theology, but will play a role in the 
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intersubjective modes of the two, the death of the I and a person with the Holy Spirit, 
in a pluralistic world.  
     It is true that the universality of Charles Hodge’s theology is a God of providence, 
who can be known by the sources of the Bible.  In this case, Hodge’s universality 
cannot but demand something we ought to do, since Hodge believes that universality 
has already been achieved in the Creation.  Once it is achieved, then a theology of 
universality believes that the Creation is timeless and perfect.  Therefore, universally 
understood Creation in Hodge’s theology intrinsically does not want any 
supplements.  
     Yet we need to notice that when Hodge understands evolution in terms of God’s 
providence and design, he recognises the process-orientation of a created being in 
the case of a germ developing into a human being.  In this case, Hodge deals with 
evolution as a universal norm of the Creation.  However, even in the doctrine of 
Creation, as Gunton argues, theology needs to recognise true plurality and the 
diversity of Creation.
160
  With these points in mind, I will discuss what would 
happen if the death of the I were embedded in the theology of Hodge, in the context 
of universality and particularity, in chapters VI (the Bible) and VII (the Providence 
of God). 
 
B. The Necessity of ‘the Supplement’ 
     In modernity, as we have seen, there is a clear opposition of empiricism and 
realism. This opposition, and that between reason and facts, create one-sided 
metaphysical hierarchies.  Philosophy cannot alone resolve these hierarchies, but 
always opposes non-philosophy violently.  Even though traditional philosophy tries 
to embrace empiricism, the violence of philosophy makes empiricism not simply 
empirical.  Modern empiricism has always been abused and misunderstood by 
philosophy.
161
  For this reason, Derrida argues that this opposition or hierarchy has 
to be overturned, because it cannot explain the very moment of pure empiricism, the 
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temporality of truth when the value of truth is shattered, and the internal 
contradictions of scepticism.
162
  
     The violence of philosophy is seen in what Derrida calls logocentricism.  
According to Derrida, logocentrism means that the logos (speech, thought, law or 
reason) is the central figure in language and philosophy.  In this system, language 
comes from a process of thought which produces speech, and that speech then 
produces writing.  However, Derrida argues that ‘phonetic writing, the medium of 
the great metaphysical, scientific, technical, and economic adventure of the West, is 
limited in space and time and limits itself even as it is in the process of imposing its 
laws upon the cultural areas that had escaped it.’
163
  As we have seen, Derrida 
introduces the idea of ‘the supplement’ to identify what has escaped as the result of 
the opposition of logocentric philosophy and language, as well as non-philosophy 
and empiricism. 
     We now want to study more about the supplement that we discussed in chapter I.  
Derrida’s supplement is not something that is secondary or inferior.  It is both 
extraneous and necessary.  It is entirely superfluous, and yet it somehow plays a 
crucial role as broaching into the other, by standing in for the opposition that is 
supposed to be essential.  The supplement acts and moves by the power of 
substitution, but it is one for which the value of the original—the thing for which it 
substitutes—is able to be recovered.  However, the original cannot be seen, as in the 
sign or image, because it is inconceivable.  
     In Derrida’s Of Grammatology, such things as writing are the supplement; 
writing is a substitute for the real presence of speech with speechless value.  For 
while it turns out that even the most earnest and spontaneous speech is engaged in 
the gaps in between and therefore ambiguous, the most intimate relationship 
between the two is less a perfect communion than it is the mere contiguity, in space 
and time, of two sides.  In this way, the supplement is the representation of the 
universality in particularity.  It will appear temporally for the substitution of the 
deficiency of Nature in such activities as the ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and 
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‘event’.  In the theology of Charles Hodge, the supplement will direct us to focus on 
what is written in the heart of a person with the Holy Spirit.  From this point on in 
this chapter, we will discuss the supplement and context-sensitivity in the Biblical 
narrative of Peter’s denial, in the work of John Calvin and Calvinism, and in that of 
Hodge. 
 
C. Context-Sensitivity and Textuality in the Khoral Theology 
     Context-sensitivity in theology is not displacing text (God, the Bible) with the 
viewpoint of a context (human beings).  Rather, it is the voluntary involvement of 
the text in the experience of the context.  In the Bible, the context-sensitivity of 
Paul’s voluntary involvement in his life experience is seen in the intersubjective 
modes which happen in the relationship between God and him.  God being with Paul 
is not caused by humanity.  The God of sovereignty is involved voluntarily in the 
life experience of Paul through the Holy Spirit.  As we can see, God just wills it.  
The God of sovereignty is involved voluntarily in the life experience of Paul through 
the Holy Spirit.  God just wills it.  However, it is Paul who lowers himself as a 
servant, not God.  Paul does not simply try to understand the people on the road by 
standing on the balcony as an onlooker, but he lowers himself to the road.  Paul is 
never a detached spectator who observes and interprets from afar; rather, he 
participates in the context of a diverse world. 
     As Paul’s life shows, the discussion of intersubjectivity and event is Biblical, 
while, at the same time, Calvinistic.  The doctrine of predestination in Calvinism is 
about God’s voluntary involvement in our life experiences.  Its teaching is that God 
has eternally decreed the election of some and the damnation of others, not in view 
of the good or evil deeds they will do or Paul does.  God is not displaced by Paul, 
but God is with Paul. Paul’s dauntless preaching of the Gospel is event itself. 
     Modern philosophy, based on an existentialist and authentic picture, has the 
tendency to interpret ‘God’s being with us’ as a substitution or displacement.  
Charles Hodge’s inductive theological method, based on the modern philosophy of 
Francis Bacon and Thomas Reid, is no exception.  Modernity, or theology in the 
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form of  modern philosophical epistemology, has to bend down to be a vehicle 
loaded with the people experiencing now-happenings on the road, just as Paul makes 
himself a low servant to all in order to win more people (I Corinthians 9:19) and 
became all things to all men (9:22).  Theology has to transform by itself in search of 
its deep adaptability to different contexts rather than gluttonously enlarging its 
superficial boundary with its onlooker’s perspective.  The theological feature at 
stake is not its inclusiveness, but its adaptability.  The adaptability involves 
intersubjectivity and event, and overcoming the violence of philosophical 
epistemology in theology with Biblical theology.  As we have seen, the Biblical 
model of Paul will guide us in the way to practise theology: theology of the death of 
the I embedded in a person with the Holy Spirit.  The facts of the Bible, especially 
the experience of the Biblical characters, will give us the sources for overturning the 
philosophical hierarchy in Hodge’s theological epistemology while maintaining his 
idea of Biblical theology.
164
  In general, this discussion will be a generic discussion 
of what theology is and how to practise it. 
1. Contextualisation and Textuality 
     If the progress of theology is to be achieved by the intimate interaction between 
the text of the Bible and context, we need to show concern for humanity’s subjective 
situation, context, sociology, psychology and language in their historical and 
cultural backgrounds, as well as for the text of the Bible.  In this sense, a theology 
has been and must be framed in terms of a particular time, space, culture and people.  
If a theology stubbornly adheres to its own doctrine and does not pay attention to the 
different people living in a certain culture, space and time, it is no longer relevant.  
     In order that theology be adaptable, i.e., sensitive to a certain time, space and 
context, we need to discuss it in textuality, which we discussed in the previous 
chapter.  I want to recognise that contextualization and textuality have the common 
purpose of being context-sensitive in understanding different identities.  In the 
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author’s Contextualization in the Princeton Theology, a Th.M. thesis at Westminster 
Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, I scrutinised contextualization as a context-
sensitive theology and argued that, in order for a theology to be adaptable to 
different spaces and times, contextualization is imperative,
165
 following David 
Bosch’s argument that all theologies are contextual and that contextualization is the 
only way in which theology can be meaningful.
166
  Without question, as we know, 
the four Gospels of the Bible are, to no small degree, four different attempts at 
contextualizing the Gospel for different situations and readers.  Early Christians 
definitely recognised that the Gospel had to have different forms of narrative for 
understanding the meaning of the given Gospel within their context, and they 
theologised accordingly.  
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     However, while confirming the importance of contextualization, I want to 
propose that textuality in hermeneutics will eventually take over the role of 
contextualization because it has the capacity of interpreting all sorts of occurrences 
in the past, present, and even future.  If we regard contextualization as a dialogue 
between object and subject, textuality is an intersubjective dialogue of what is 
already embedded in the subject.  For example, if contextualization were to apply 
the Scriptures to the experience of a particular culture to make its message better 
understood there, textuality would already be conceiving the differences of space, 
time, culture, world view, language, behaviour, ways of thinking, judgement and so 
on in its passage of history of religion, i.e., the death of the I.   If we acknowledge 
that truth is contextualized in the culture in its history in the Bible, we must 
conclude that the Bible should be de-contextualized and re-contextualized.  
Textuality will do this work spontaneously, as an event at any time and at any place 
among intersubjective modes of life experience.  Here, we need to notice that the 
work of textuality has the characteristic of intersubjectivity and event.  For this 
reason, textuality is not relative, since we do not interpret God with our own 
perspective, but as a voluntary participant in and with us.  Eventually, the condition 
of God is to be revealed in an event in the context of His providence.  
2. Textuality and the Theology of Charles Hodge 
     A theology which has its own historical, philosophical and cultural background 
should be reconsidered in the context of our own lives.  By this reasoning, we 
cannot but encounter the hermeneutical question of how the truth of God is revealed 
and how we can perceive it.  That is, in order that theology should not be a barrier to 
knowing an omniscient and omnipresent God, it definitely has to show the answers 
to the question of how to know the truth.  God is not a spectator in this world, but, as 
Charles Hodge indicates, abides everywhere in ‘his essence, knowledge, and 
power’.
167
  Even if the definition of science might change fundamentally at a certain 
point, a theology has to provide a clue to unravel the scientific problem.  But so far, 
theology has sometimes been far behind science, and was put in a headstall.  
Theology has to be both scientific and divine. 
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     According to Thomas Aquinas, theology is a sacred science.  It is sacred because 
it is for ‘man’s salvation’, which is based on revelation:  
The whole salvation of man, which lies in God, depends on the knowledge of 
this truth [knowledge of God]….  There is no reason, then, why the same 
things, which the philosophical sciences teach as they can be known by the 
light of natural reason, should not also be taught by another science as they 
are known through divine revelation. 
168
 
       Similarly, Hodge derives his understanding of theology and its nature from 
knowledge of the self and of God, as scientific knowledge of facts and ideas.
169
  
With scientific objectivism and rational scholasticism, Hodge understands 
knowledge as an intellectual apprehension of the self that comes from common facts, 
examined with the senses.  Therefore, theology, he says, must be coherent with the 
internal relation, with the facts and with the Bible.
170
  Hodge’s knowledge of self, 
according to the scientific facts of the Bible, is that 
all men being sinners, justly chargeable with inexcusable impiety and 
immorality, they cannot be saved by any effort or resource of their own…. In 
others words, a man may be moral in his conduct, and by reason of inward 
evil passions, be in the sight of God the chief of sinners, as was the case with 
Paul himself.
171
 
Hodge’s Calvinistic character is clearly evident here.  He comments on knowledge 
in The Way of Life: 
To be renewed in knowledge, or rather unto knowledge, means to be 
renewed so as to know; and knowledge includes the perception, recognition, 
and application of what is true and good. This comprehensive sense of the 
word is not unusual in the scriptures; and hence it is said that to know God as 
Jesus Christ is eternal life. Such knowledge is the life of the soul; it is 
conformity to God in the perception and approbation of truth.
172
 
That is, God cannot be displaced by Paul, who cannot but be a sinner in the sight of 
God.  A man may be righteous in the sight of man; however, Hodge demands that 
we not fail to notice the knowledge that a man’s heart is ‘the seat of pride, envy or 
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malice’.
173
 Hodge argues for the knowledge of total deficiency of human reason and 
unlimited love and irresistible grace of God.  
    If we regard theology as being textuality where the Bible produces meaning 
through the death of the I, theology should be more dynamic than just studying 
(logos) of God (theos).  Alister McGrath defines Christian theology as ‘talking about 
God’.  What he means by ‘talking’ is a process of reflecting on the Bible and 
weaving together its ideas and themes, and developing certain ideas or doctrines as a 
result of this reflection.
174
  This process of reflection is a process of knowing God. 
 
D. The Implication of ‘the Supplement’ in John Calvin  
     At this point of the argument on context-sensitivity in theology, I want to 
introduce the thoughts of John Calvin, since Hodge traces his theological origins to 
Calvin.  Calvin’s teaching is distinctive in the sovereignty of God.  The ‘total 
depravity of a human being’ presupposes that the only sovereign and perfect 
autonomous self is God, ‘I am Who I am.’  God does not need any help from us, and 
He does not even require our worship.  Only He is sincere, and therefore, He is the 
only Being of integrity.   
     Calvin thinks that theology is the process of having true knowledge of God.  For 
Calvin, the knowledge of God and of the Creator
175
 is obtained through our 
existential self-knowledge: ‘Without knowledge of the self there is no knowledge of 
God’, and ‘Without knowledge of God, there is no knowledge of the self.’
176
  As we 
can see, our knowledge of God is secured by way of hermeneutics that dynamically 
involves knowledge of the self.  Knowledge of God, for Calvin, means to know God 
the Creator, who created and sustains His creatures, rather than the Being or 
existence of God.  Therefore, according to Calvin, our knowledge 
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should serve first to teach us fear and reverence; secondly, with it as our 
guide and teacher, we should learn to seek every good from him, and, having 
received it, to credit it to his account.
177
 
     According to the editor of Calvin’s Institutes, this knowledge is existential 
apprehension. With this existential initiation, according to Calvin, we can have faith:  
Here indeed is pure and real religion: faith so joined with an earnest fear of 
God that this fear also embraces willing reverence, and carries with it such 
legitimate worship as is prescribed in the law.
178
 
Thus, the knowledge of God is different to our knowledge of nature.  It is not a 
series of propositions about God, as if God were an object of academic knowledge, 
but a knowledge which is implied in our faith.  Christ is called the ‘Spirit of 
Sanctification’ because He ‘not only quickens and nourishes us by a general power 
that is visible both in the human race and in the rest of the living creatures, but he is 
also the root and seed of heavenly life in us’.
179
      
     Knowledge of self, for Calvin, is about the ‘miserable ruin, into which the 
original sin of the first man cast us’.
180
  Therefore, this self-knowledge cannot but 
compel us to look upon God.  Thus, Calvin says, ‘not only will we, in fasting and 
hungering, seek thence what we lack; but being aroused by fear, we shall learn 
humility.’
181
  In Calvin, we can repeatedly discover the close relationship of 
humility and self-knowledge.  In sum, for Calvin, theology is about the knowledge 
of ourselves as being nothing but dust or totally depraved human beings.  Thus we 
cannot but be humble, and the knowledge of God acquired by the knowledge of 
ourselves is the product of our humility.  In Calvin, humility is a distinct character of 
‘I’ in the textuality between the knower and the known.  It is imperative that the 
study of textuality between God and us should be initiated through the knowledge of 
ourselves as dying to ourselves (humility).  That is, theology is not only the study of 
God, but also of a human perspective on the events between ordinary power 
(potentia ordinata) and absolute power (potentia absoluta).     
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     The process of getting knowledge of God and ourselves in Calvin is textuality.  
As Calvin shows, textuality between God and us requires our humility. We need to 
add ‘humility’, the character of the death of the I when it is embedded in a person 
with the Holy Spirit.
182
  As we have seen in the previous chapter, the death of the I  
passes through the very ordeal of the paradoxical life experiences, ventures into 
absolute risk, and has a relationship with God with the transcendental selfless 
goodness through a new experience of death.  In addition to these three 
characteristics, when the death of the I participates in a particular faith of 
Christianity, it humbles itself like Christ, as if it were to die to itself.  Paul in I 
Corinthians 2:1-5 has these four characteristics: 
And I, brethren, when I came to you, came not with excellency of speech or 
of wisdom, declaring unto you the testimony of God.  For I determined not to 
know any thing among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified. And I was 
with you in weakness, and in fear, and in much trembling. And my speech 
and my preaching [was] not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in 
demonstration of the Spirit and of power: That your faith should not stand in 
the wisdom of men, but in the power of God.
183
 
     For Derrida, humility comes from the idea of what he calls X.
184
  While objecting 
to his idea of trace or of différance being assimilated to negative theology,185 he is 
fervent in saying of such things (X) as trace, the supplement or différance, ‘[It] “is” 
not [negative or affirmative theology] and does not say what [negative or affirmative 
theology] “is”.  It is written completely otherwise.”
186
  Since X ‘situates itself 
beyond all affirmative and negative position’, it has a place beyond all position.
187
  
Because the Transcendental Signified is written in him by X, as it is with Paul, 
Derrida humbles himself by deferring speaking: 
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One day I would have to stop deferring, one day I would have to try to 
explain myself directly on this subject and at last speak of ‘negative 
theology’ itself, assuming that some such thing exists.
188
 
     Derrida’s deferring speaking means writing.  To write, according to Derrida, is 
the only way of keeping speech because ‘speech denies itself as it gives itself.’
189
  In 
order to speak what it means to speak as it is, Derrida’s writing begins.  Therefore, 
writing is not something disguising and secondary, but is the very essence of an 
expression.  It follows from this that in the death of the I embedded in a person with 
the Holy Spirit, Derrida’s writing is revealed as humility.   
     Therefore, writing encompasses what Derrida calls logocentrism, of which a 
form is historico-metaphysical theology.  Accordingly, the work of writing in 
theology is not controlled by ontology or epistemology, but reveals hidden premises 
of traditional theology.  If so, writing in theology cannot but be an invention in 
search of its value.  Derrida would not need any theologies, whether affirmative or 
negative, because the function of the substituted writing for speaking also ‘replaces 
presence by value’:
190
   
If there were a purely pure experience of prayer, would one need religion and 
affirmative or negative theologies? Would one need a supplement of prayer? 
But if there were no supplement, if quotation did not bend prayer, if prayer 
did not bend, if it did not submit to writing, would a theology be possible?
191
 
      Theology is impossible?  No.  I mean theology is possible if it keeps the 
supplement of value, if such a thing as prayer bends and submits to writing—tracing.  
Khora, which will eventually be regarded as the object for theologising and 
contextualising, is the place where the writing or tracing is happening.  Again, 
theology is possible if preaching, prayer, evangelism, mission, and so on, submit to 
khora, the place of now where the world is happening: this is ‘the’ supplement of 
theology.  Therefore, what I mean by ‘invention of theology’ is the supplement of 
theology that I call Khoral theology, in which our faith signifies.  Derrida is essential 
as the supplement to Hodge’s nineteenth-century Reformed theology.   
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     The supplement of theology as theology in action in the field of Christian 
missions is seen as ‘bold humility’.  The editors of Mission in Bold Humility cite 
David Bosch’s Transforming Mission on the first page of their book: 
We regard our involvement in dialogue and mission as an adventure, are 
prepared to take risks, and are anticipating surprises as the Spirit guides us 
into fuller understanding.  This is not opting for agnosticism, but for humility. 
It is, however, a bold humility—or a humble boldness…. [W]e do this, 
however, not as judges or lawyers, but as witnesses; not as soldiers, but as 
envoys of peace; not as high-pressure salespersons, but as ambassadors of 
the Servant Lord.
192
 
 
E. The Death of the I as the Supplement to Peter’s Denial and the Theology of 
Charles Hodge 
     In this section, I want to discuss how to overcome this contradiction in practising 
theology.  For this, we need to know what supplement means in practising theology, 
and we will specify the supplements to Hodge’s theology.  We can find the meaning 
of the death of the I, embedded in the Trinitarian personhood, through the very 
Biblical facts of the spontaneous moment of Peter’s denial, when his value of truth 
is shattered by his internal contradiction of scepticism at a temporal time and space.  
The narrative of Peter’s denial will guide us in dealing with Biblical theology, of 
which Hodge consistently maintains the distinct characteristics.  
1. Peter’s Denial 
     As we saw in chapter I, a person with the Holy Spirit has the characteristic of 
intersubjective modes of Dasein.  At the beginning of this chapter, in the discussion 
of Appiah, we also found that a person with the Holy Spirit is not just confined to 
past intersubjectivity, but manoeuvres from the past to the future since the promise 
is not yet established.  Further, the death of the I as a universal commonality of ‘I’ is 
already embedding in Peter in a relationship with responsibility, gift, faith and 
humility.  In this case, we need to notice the work of the universality of the death of 
the I as the supplement to a particular self of Christian religion.  That is, a passage of 
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history of religion, which is already embedded in Peter, from time to time substitutes 
Peter’s original being with the Holy Spirit.  Through chains of substitution in Peter’s 
mind, the being of Peter is purified and eventually becomes the source to strengthen 
his brothers (Luke 22:33) in the face of Satan’s sifting, as of wheat (22:31).    
     We need to recognise that this substitution is necessary not because of the 
deficiency of the Holy Spirit, but because of the deficiency of a creation, Peter.  
Accordingly, the death of the I is extraneously necessary to let the prayer of Jesus 
strengthen Peter in the face of Satan’s sifting (22:31-34) and has to be answered at a 
certain point of Peter’s life.  
     What happens to Peter with the Holy Spirit at the moment when Peter 
spontaneously denies and is vulnerable, in spite of Jesus’s naming him a rock 
(‘Cephas’ in Aramaic or ‘Peter’ in Greek)?  When a female servant questions Peter 
three times, he denies Jesus each time before the rooster crows.  The Bible’s 
narrative shows that Peter denies three times, with increasing intensity, that he has 
ever known Jesus.  Peter’s answer is negative, “No.”  Peter denies.  However, this 
denial of Peter enables him to recognise how wretched he is.  
     We need to recognise that Peter’s denial is linked to a passage of his life which 
was before and which is to come.  There is necessarily a commitment or a promise 
even before the event.
193
  That is, the narrative about Peter being named as a ‘rock’ 
before and becoming a firm rock after shows that the chain of events of his three 
denials, at the time when Jesus is on trial, is related to the enactment and promise of 
Peter’s being in the presence of the Trinitarian God.
194
  
     The Trinitarian God is with Peter.  Then is Peter’s denial speech the work of the 
Holy Spirit?  Peter himself probably never thinks that it is Divine work. Yet it is the 
work of the Trinitarian personhood (Jesus prophesises in Luke 22:23).  At this point 
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in the discussion, we should recognise a clear distinction between the death of the I 
and the Holy Spirit.  Both of them are invisible spirits.  However, the death of the I 
is the spirit that achieves universality in khora, while the Holy Spirit is exclusively a 
Saving Spirit.  Only the death of the I’s embedding in Peter with Holy Spirit can 
explain that Peter’s denial is the work of the divine God.  
     By embedding itself in Peter, the death of the I as the supplement makes the 
impossibility (denial as the work of the Holy Spirit) possible (affirmation after 
turning back as the work of the Holy Spirit) by its temporal presence and absence.  
Knowledge of a ruined self after his denial turns on Peter’s responsibility (being 
with the Holy Spirit) as a disciple who has been with Jesus.  The denial itself is 
agony and crisis, but has begun to bear the fruit of his responsibility. 
     Conversely, without the denial of God, how can I be responsible for my speech 
acts?   Peter denies God even if he decides and intends not to deny him when he 
confesses before Jesus.  Peter boasts that he would never deny Jesus, and proudly 
proclaims that even if all left Jesus, he would not (Matthew 26:33).  It is an 
irresponsible speech act, because he intentionally denies Jesus before the 
maidservant.  He denies what he has not intended to deny.  It is an undeniable 
imperative. What Peter does is to deny Jesus, who is undeniable.  How hypocritical 
Peter is!  Clearly, it is a human situation.  When it is time to die, Peter is scared.  We 
all may at least have agony and paradox, such that Peter’s previous intention to 
follow has shifted into an internal contradiction of scepticism.  At that moment, 
when he comes back to be a true self, Peter recognises that his speech act was not 
perfect, but defective.  This is something to which we all can relate.  What we have 
learned is that the defective Peter eventually becomes vindicated as a man with the 
Holy Spirit through the process of supplementary substitution of the death of the I.      
     Ironically, through his three denials, Peter begins to think about his responsibility 
for his denial speech.  Eventually, as Jesus intends, Peter becomes the petra of the 
church.  What if Peter had denied the first time, before Jesus?  Would the situation 
have been different?  For answering these questions, we need to notice that the point 
is not Peter’s affirmation or denial, but the khora where God is working.  Even 
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before Peter’s previous affirmation of Jesus and later denial, the supplement was 
there as a trace of his speech act.  This is how the death of the I functions. 
     Also, we need to understand the event of Peter’s denial (Matthew 26:69-75) in 
the context of the promise of God.  His denial traces back to the moment of Jesus 
assigning him a leadership role (episcopacy, Matthew 16:18, John 21:15-16), 
holding keys to the Kingdom of Heaven (Matthew 16:19).  The event of Peter’s 
denial needs to reconcile with and anticipate the promise of Jesus.  Peter’s life is to 
make the promise desirable or to desire it.  When we trace back the three denials of 
Peter, there is an older event or a ‘taking-place’ to come.  If we think of the 
seemingly contradictory events of Peter (the earlier event of being named as the 
‘rock’ and the following event of denial), neither of them is an alternative or a 
contradiction,
195
 because each is reconciled by the promise of God.  
     Theology needs to pay more attention to Peter’s affirmation, denial and re-
affirmation, and to what Peter experiences, not just confirming and taking what God 
provides for granted.  There is a tension between what God intends and Peter 
experiences.  Likewise, we need to think of this tension between what God intends 
and what we experience in our lives.  We know that Hodge’s theological stance is to 
let us know what we ought to do according to the facts (intention of God) of the 
Bible.  However, if the exact knowledge of the Bible and our determined intention to 
follow it do not have any meaning at a certain point in our lives, what ought we to 
do?  
2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile and the Role of the Theology of Charles Hodge 
     Typical criticism of the dualistic and hypocritical nature of Christianity may be 
expressed as: ‘God is good, but the priest, church or theology is bad.’  Dualistic 
understanding of the Bible eventually resulted in a hypocritical Church.  Let us take 
the preaching of a priest as an example.  Criticism comes from the identification of 
the words of God with the preaching of a preacher.  Even if the text of the message 
of a priest is taken from the Word of God, as soon as it is delivered through the 
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mouth of a priest, the priest as well as the congregation should recognise that it 
cannot be the pure words of God any more.  The history of religion has suffered 
from contradictory understandings of institutional Christianity and an 
institutionalised interpretation of the Bible, as well as of God Himself.  This fact 
shows that reading the Bible is not only a matter of the facts in the Bible signifying 
‘what ought to happen’, but also the event, ‘what is happening’ or ‘what would 
happen’ in the experience among the church, people and God, i.e., the experience of 
the Trinitarian God. 
      In book VI of Émile, Rousseau regards priests who have pseudo-authority as 
hypocritical and pretentious, and therefore as wicked.  A priest’s will to knowledge 
is dishonest and wicked because it is not naturally obtained.  The authentic voice of 
God cannot be obtained through the voices of men.  Rousseau’s argument is that 
God’s will is able to be known only through Nature in its original state.  
Accordingly, he argues that the vain systems of human beings in knowing God 
cannot successfully reveal God as He is.  Rousseau concludes that, contrary to the 
benefaction of God, the benefaction of a priest is wicked.  He compares a priest’s 
benefaction to that of a fisherman: 
When the fisherman puts a lure in the water, the fish comes and stays around 
it without distrust. But when caught by the hook hidden under the bait, it 
feels the line being pulled back and tries to flee. Is the fisherman the 
benefactor, and is the fish ungrateful?
196
 
     Compared to the gift of God, the bait of the fisherman cannot be a benefaction at 
all, because the captured fish will not trust him any more and will therefore shy 
away from the bait.  If there is something other than Divine will that is hidden as 
bait in the priest’s preaching of the words of God, it is a wicked manipulation.  True 
benefaction will never produce an ungrateful person.  It is common sense that a 
person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit cannot be ungrateful and 
will not cause ungratitude.  
     This criticism comes from the lack of juxtaposition of human understanding of 
the benefactor (philosophy, reason) and benefaction itself (non-philosophy and 
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facts) in theology.  That is to say: that theology has never tried to distinguish the 
religious self from the Holy Spirit; that theology lacks the capacity to think about the 
empirical intersubjective modes of the object, the facts of the Bible and the subject, 
our life experiences; and, finally, as a response to the above arguments, that 
theology needs to accept the idea of ‘the supplement’ to accommodate the deviation 
of the religious self from the work of the Holy Spirit. 
     For making this argument clearer in the discussion of Hodge’s theology, we need 
to study the origin of Rousseau’s thought.  Rousseau’s description of the ‘Noble 
Savage’ begins with a warning about human manipulation from the very first 
sentence of book I of Émile: ‘everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author 
of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man.’  According to Rousseau, if 
we remain at the very beginning state of Creation (‘Noble Savage’), a natural 
condition, not conforming to habits and societal norms, rules and teachings, we will 
not make errors at the same time.  We will not reproach the ‘Author of things’ for 
the evils we do to ourselves and the enemies we arm against ourselves.
197
  
     Rousseau also argues that we would easily remain masters of ourselves and of 
our passions here and now if our habits were not yet acquired.
198
  His idea is that 
nobody can be pure unless one is originally natural.  In book IV, he challenges and 
criticises priests, whose responsibility is to transfer the words of the supremacy of 
God: ‘O nations, you and your errors are its ministers.’
199
  Further, he argues that 
one should not ask to receive anything from God.  He maintains that one can sense 
what God has already endowed throughout nature.  Therefore, one does not have to 
pray to God to get something done.  According to Rousseau, one meditates  
on the order of the universe, not in order to explain it by vain systems but 
admire it constantly, to worship the wise Author who makes oneself felt in it. 
I converse with Him. I fill all my faculties with His divine essence; I am 
moved by His benefaction.
200
 
     What Rousseau means here is that God has already given everything to him, and 
He will act according to the order established by His Divine decree.  Because of this, 
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there is a possibility of enjoying God’s benefaction through conversing with God.  
To Rousseau, the wicked man is the priest who pretends that he is the centre of all 
things.  As a result, Rousseau distinguishes a good man from a wicked man, in the 
way that the good man orders himself in relation to the whole, and the wicked orders 
the whole in relation to himself: 
The latter makes him the centre of all things and the former measures his 
radius and keeps to the circumference. Then he is ordered in relation to the 
common centre, which is God, and in relation to all concentric circles, which 
are the creatures.
201
 
     At this point, agreeing that noble savagery can be recovered in conversing with 
God, we need to pay attention to how to converse with the common centre: whether 
having a relationship with Nature is by the concentric circles or the circumference, 
and whether Nature itself is understood as a perfect identity.  We need to understand 
firmly that such a ‘concentric’ preaching is wicked, because both a preacher and an 
audience lack the idea of the supplement: neither of them discriminates between 
religious life and the Word of God, and neither understands the intersubjective 
modes between life experience and the Word of God.  
     The problem in Rousseau’s argument lies in the idea of ‘concentring’, not 
‘decentring’, and ‘the perfection of Nature’, not ‘deficient elements of Nature’.  In 
this sense, Rousseau’s argument that God can be perceived only by Nature, so ‘we 
are to live as noble savages’ has serious deficiencies.  It is not just because of the 
fact that the other, the concept of God, is displaced by Rousseau’s Nature, but also 
because of the violence of his philosophical structure, which regards Nature as 
perfect.  According to Derrida, the deficiency of Nature is caused by ‘an accident 
and a deviation’ from the first creation of God, the Transcendental Signified.
202
 
     Peter Hicks has observed that Charles Hodge’s key concept of Christian theism 
comes from Hodge’s belief that a ‘God who was not personal could not 
communicate or save or answer prayer nor could he be known or loved.  Without a 
personal God Hodge’s religion would have been empty.’
203
  This is why Hodge is 
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against the Hegelian left, which denied the existence of an independently existing 
personal God.  In the discussion of pantheism, Hicks concludes that ‘Hodge would 
not merge God in the world or the world in God.  Though God is everywhere 
present in the world, “God is not the world.”’
204
 
     With this implication, we want to recognise Hodge’s argument that pantheists 
deny all dualism.
205
 Concerning the nature of God, Hodge argues that pantheists 
deny that the Infinite and Absolute Being has either intelligence or conscience.
206
 
We have to notice that Hodge’s consistent praise of dualism is due to wanting not to 
fall into pantheism, which has no distinctive dichotomy between God and Nature.  
However, the idea of juxtaposition will do the work of a clear dichotomy that will 
not fall into pantheism, but will clearly discriminate the distinctiveness of each side 
and accomplish universality at the temporal moments of chains of events through 
vibrant intersubjective modes between both of them.  
     This idea is found in the theological discussion of Creation. Colin Gunton 
criticises the dualistic and Platonic understanding of Creation, and argues that 
Nature as Creation is not perfectly static.  Since Creation has to be understood as 
one and not dualistically, like the intellectual and material worlds, we need to grasp 
the once-for-allness of God’s Creation, not as timeless and unchanging, but as 
changing.
207
  This element of changing is well articulated by the ideas of 
‘government’ and ‘preservation’ in Hodge’s doctrine of Providence.
208
 
     The supplement to the deficient, created being naturally leads us to our 
hermeneutic experience.  The idea of Rousseau’s ‘Noble Savage’ is as idealistic as 
the heavenly Kingdom of God.  If such things exist, theology needs to show how to 
experience such noble savagery and the Kingdom of God, rather than describe them.  
The question of how will not deteriorate the ideal status of the ‘Noble Savage’ or the 
Kingdom of God, but is the very tool to understand them.  
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     There are two hermeneutic questions that we can learn from Rousseau.  One is 
how we can converse with the original voice, the other is how we can reach out to 
the concentric circles beyond our knowledge.  Actually, these two relate to the 
question about how we can perceive the original text.  If this question is applied to 
an institutional Church and the Bible, the question would be how both a preacher 
and the audience are able to perceive the original text of God.  The answer, as we 
have studied, is to juxtapose the two, and to discover the supplement of the death of 
the I embedded in a person with the Holy Spirit.  The supplement will provide 
incessant substitutions that will make it possible for us to perceive the original text.  
     As we have seen, the supplement of Derrida is that which appropriates the very 
deficiency of hermeneutics.  Gadamer suggests that the deficiency is caused by 
Nature and the immaturity of a human being.  This immaturity of the self can be 
understood by Gadamer’s concept of prejudice, which we will discuss in chapter IV.  
Because of the prejudice of a human being, Gadamer proposes intersubjective 
modes of the fusion of horizons.  The function of Gadamer’s fusion of horizons is 
similar to the role that Derrida’s supplement plays in khora.  In this space, such 
supplements as habit, tradition, culture and cultivation are to be observed in the 
intersubjective modes of life experiences.  It would be definitely true that if ‘I’ is a 
perfect autonomous figure who has never been immature, then no supplement would 
appear.  However, nobody will agree that such an immature baby does not need 
supplemental care by its parents.  
     The hermeneutic deficiency of Rousseau’s idea of Nature caused criticism of the 
wicked priest.  However, through Gadamer’s intersubjectivity and Derrida’s 
supplement, we can prove that the wickedness is not caused by the revelation of God, 
but by a hermeneutic deficiency of Rousseau himself.  Let us summarise our 
discussion of the deficiency of Nature: there is deficiency in Nature and in a human 
being, since both of them are nothing but created beings; the supplement 
presupposes this deficiency in Nature and human beings; the way in which the 
supplement makes up for the deficiency is through broaching or intersubjective 
relationships, i.e., loving each other unconditionally and incessantly—this is how the 
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death of the I behaves; a chain of supplements itself is hermeneutic, because of 
temporal and spontaneous changes in its levels of relationships.   
 3. The Supplement and the Theology of Charles Hodge 
     With these things in mind, we want to rehabilitate Hodge’s theology, scrutinising 
the empirical experience of intersubjective modes between the religious self and the 
the Holy Spirit.  As we have seen, the supplements of theology will accommodate 
hermeneutic deficiency caused by the immature religious self with the Holy Spirit.  
This will inevitably result in a hermeneutic change in Hodge’s theology.   
     Hodge’s theology is characterised by natural but revealed theology.  His 
theological method is rational, and the contents of his theology are revelatory.  
Natural theology is demonstrated by reason, and revealed theology by particular 
doctrines taught by potentia absoluta, the absolute power of God.  With this said, we 
want to compare Hodge with Rousseau and Derrida.  In this comparison, Hodge’s 
distinctiveness can be seen in several points: God can be perceived by the facts in 
the Bible.  For Rousseau, God can be perceived only by Nature. For Derrida, the 
concept of God is the other.  In Hodge, preaching, theology, and so on, are authentic 
because of the work of the Holy Spirit.  For Rousseau, such a thing as preaching is 
wicked.  For Derrida, is theology possible?  Hodge will not agree that he himself 
needs the supplement for accommodating the deficiency caused by ‘an accident and 
a deviation’ from Nature and the original Creation of God.  However, the reality is 
that Hodge is not the Holy Spirit, his dogma in theology is not perfect.  For 
Rousseau, Nature is perfect.  For Derrida, Nature is defective.  Hodge’s theology 
does not talk about the good and bad of something or someone due to their nature, 
but by virtue of the grace of God which is revealed to them.  Yet we need to 
recognise Hodge’s theological method for dealing with force of Nature as a tool for 
the induction of facts from the Bible is rational not revelatory.   
     We should pay attention to how Derrida deals with Nature.  Rousseau’s Émile 
shows that the essence of the humility of a human being is Nature writing on the 
heart.  Derrida deconstructs this writing.  His argument is that Nature’s writing is 
immediately tied to the voice and to the breath.  Therefore, it is clear that Nature 
writing on the heart is not something that a grammar in language can explain, but 
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that is spiritually perceived.  What is written on our hearts as our profession of faith 
can be heard by retreating into oneself, Derrida argues, and is ‘the full and truthful 
presence of divine voice to our inner senses’:   
The more I retreat into myself, the more I consult myself, the more plainly 
do I read these words written in my soul: be just and you will be happy…. I 
do not derive these rules from the principle of the higher philosophy, I find 
them in the depths of my heart written by nature in characters which nothing 
can efface.
209
  
     It is true that Christian theology takes its root from the proclamation, which is 
heralding (kerygma) a radical shift or change.  The consequence is repentance 
(metanoia), which calls for a radical change of ways of thinking, rather than 
focusing on the natural writing on the heart.  However, strictly speaking, repentance 
is not caused by a priest’s preaching, but by the work of the Holy Spirit.  What if the 
Holy Spirit has already written on a believer’s heart as a person?   
 
F. Translation and Derrida’s Des Tours de Babel    
     The endeavour to build up the tower of Babel for the objective achievement of 
translation was ultimately in vain because it was an improper aspiration for human 
beings to have an objective tool for reaching at Him.  God did not want us to have a 
direct access to it, however, as a substitutable option, He gave us various linguistic 
systems to refer to the Kingdom.  From this time on, our desire for the tower has 
generated the true moments of creation of language. 
     What we can learn in Derrida’s Des Tours de Babel210 is that inability for 
objectivity implies that the place of God is absence (the Transcendental Signified).  
Since God is absent, what we can do is to trace the presence of God’s absence by 
translation.  However, even by translation, God is never able to be objectified 
because the character of the language is both fallen and creative.  Since the human 
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mind cannot be determined all the time, objective understanding of God is 
impossible for us to ‘reach, touch and trod upon’,
 211
 as Paul recognises in Romans 
7:21: ‘Now if I do what I do not want to do, it is no longer I who do it, but it is sin 
living in me that does it.’  In order to understand the Kingdom which is always 
untouchable, Derrida argues that any translation or ‘the desire for translation’ is 
impossible without reference to the thought of God.
212
  The implication is that, even 
though He did not allow direct accessibility, God wants us to use our language 
properly. That is, without God’s guaranty, translation would be absolutely wrong.  
     If we think that the Kingdom cannot be touched objectively, it remains as a 
promise. Since it is only promised, the aim of translation is to look for the truth of 
spontaneity in the process of the reconciliation of languages: 
This promise appeals to a language of truth (Sprache der Warheit), not a 
language that is true but to a true tongue, to a language whose truth would be 
referred only to itself. It would be a matter of truth as authenticity, truth of 
act or event which would belong to the original rather than to the translation, 
even if the original is already in a position of demand or debt.
213
 
     As we can see, the truth of spontaneous act or event designates originality.  With 
this stated, I want to think of what Derrida means by ‘the original is already in a 
position of demand or debt’, and its relationship with ‘truth as authenticity, truth of 
act or event which would belong to the original’ in the last sentence cited above, in 
relation to the sacred.  According to Derrida, the sacred  
surrenders itself to translation, which devotes itself to the sacred. The sacred 
would be nothing without translation, and translation would not take place 
without the sacred; the one and the other are inseparable.
214
 
Even though the language of the sacred pursues the original language, the sacred is 
incapable of pointing out the exact language spoken by God because the only truth is 
that the language of God is referred only to God: Because truth is apparently 
‘beyond every Übertragung (transference) and every possible Übersetzung 
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(translation)’, it would be rather the pure language in which the meaning and the 
letter no longer dissociate.
215
  
     With this in mind, we need to decipher what Derrida means by ‘original is in a 
position of demand or debt’.  Regarding translation as that which is already 
promised, we can think that the original is promised as a contract in the translation 
as a form of debt.  Then, since the only truth is that which is originally spoken by 
God, truth that we recognize is the ‘truth as authenticity, truth of act or event.’
216
 
According to Derrida, truth only can be accessible through experience.  That is, 
translation as an experience signifies that our experience of event is translation.  
Since translation is related with the thoughts of God, it is holy growth of language 
and it announces the messianic end but the tense of the sign of the end and of the 
growth is always present.
217
  At this moment, we need to pay attention to the fact 
that our recognition of truth (authenticity) does not belong to the translation, but to 
the original, even if the original is not yet evident in translation.  
     Since translation demands and desires the very structure of the original,
218
 the 
authenticity that we recognise in translation has to be considered as the very medium 
of the original.  As opposed to such an idea that translation is supplementary only 
when the original does not have the quality of translatability, Derrida argues that the 
original always needs translation and, at the same time, believes that the structure of 
translation has life for sur-vival.   
If the structure of the work is sur-vival, the debt does not engage in relation 
to a hypothetical subject-author of the original text—dead or mortal, the dead 
man, or ‘dummy,’ of the text—but to something else that represents the 
formal law in the immanence. 
219
 
     That is, the sacred translator is always engaged in the event of sur-vival at the 
moment of immanence.  In this sense, as a promise, translation is already an event or 
an act of truth and becomes the decisive signature of a contract that happens here 
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and now.
220
  According to Derrida, since a translation is that which ‘manages to 
promise reconciliation, to talk about it, to desire it or make it desirable’, it is ‘a rare 
and notable event’ which would be the place and date of what is called an original, a 
work.
221
  So, we can conclude that the debt (translation) has to be the work of the 
sacred (hallowed) of the ‘thought of God’,
222
 and God can only be found in the work 
of a sur-vival translation event, not in the written text itself: ‘the king has indeed a 
body… but this body is only promised, announced and dissimulated by the 
translation.’
223
   
          Even though Derrida does not recognise that the body is Jesus Christ, who 
came and is to come, and who has already-not-yet established the Kingdom of God, 
the implication of Derrida—that the translation as the promise of God is the sur-
vival event of work of the sacred—is significant in Christian hermeneutics.  I believe 
that Derrida’s idea of the sacred in the translation—that authenticity (‘truth of act or 
event’) is not human recognition alone, but belongs to the original—designates the 
true transcendental point, the concursus of Hodge and Francis Turretin, when both 
of them maintain that the Bible is written by the sacred in the concursus of 
translation.  Also, the readers of the text of the Bible need to remember Derrida’s 
point that ‘the thought of God’ has to be conceived as the event of the true 
transcendental point if they are to get the truth when they are engaging in the text of 
the Bible.  The sovereignty of God, who is untouchable, always reminds us to 
participate in the promise of translation by being reconciled at the point of 
concursus. 
 
G. Translation and Incarnation  
     At this point, I want to discuss translation and incarnation in the bipolarity of the 
death of the I and the Holy Spirit.  The importance of this juxtaposition can be found 
in the hermeneutic discussion of language and interpretation.  Susan Handelman 
                                                 
220
 Ibid., p. 123. 
221
 Ibid., pp. 123-30. 
222
 Ibid., p. 116. 
223
 Ibid., p. 125. 
  
 
77
observes that there is a transition from proper to figurative interpretation in history 
of hermeneutics.  This is found in the ontological tradition that is based on the 
Platonic transfer of the soul from visible to the invisible world.  Hermeneutic change 
from the ‘proper’ to the ‘figurative’ sense in Heidegger and Derrida is ‘based on a 
metaphysical transfer from the “sensible” to the “nonsensible” realm, a transfer 
crucial for Western thought’.
224
  The shift from the sensible to the nonsensible 
becomes the change from the literal to the figurative; and then, in Christian thought, 
from the letter to the spirit.
225
  This historically established distinction between the 
literal and the figurative, which becomes standard in the Western conception of 
language, also naturally leads to an allegorizing mode of interpretation, not only in 
theology, but in literature as well.
226
 
     However, in the Jewish tradition, the reality in the interpretation lies in a 
linguistic process in understanding the true being of God who speaks, interprets and 
creates texts.  For Jews, the text itself does not designate what something is but for 
interpretation from the very beginning.  The sensible and nonsensible are not 
dualistic but they occur together in the process of interpretation.  The distinctive 
characteristics of Jewish tradition can be found in its foundation ‘on the principles of 
multiple meaning and endless interpretability’ by maintaining that the interpretation 
and text are not only inseparable, but that interpretation—as opposed to 
incarnation—is ‘the central divine act’.
227
   
     In the Jewish tradition, words and things are quite closely related to each other.
228
  
That is to say, according to Handelmann, ‘for the Greeks, following Aristotle, things 
are not exhausted by discourse; for the Rabbis, discourse is not exhausted by 
things.’
229
  The struggle between philosophy and rhetoric in Greece ended in 
philosophy’s conquest.  However, Jewish translation never suffered the schism of 
philosophy and rhetoric.  Jewish Rabbinic concepts of language and interpretation 
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not only preserve but exalt the innate logic of language, for which reason Rabbinic 
logic is branded as unscientific.  
     Handelmann explains Rabbinic tradition: 
One of the most interesting aspects of Rabbinic thought is its development of 
a highly sophisticated system of interpretation based on uncovering and 
expanding the primary concrete meaning and yet drawing a variety of logical 
inferences from these meanings without the abstracting, idealizing 
movement of Western thought.
230
 
     Derrida, in his critique of Aristotle and the entire tradition of Western 
metaphysics, argues that the liberalisation of metaphor is one of the most serious 
problems.
231
  Handelmann observes that Ricoeur and Gadamer will call for a 
restitution of metaphorical consciousness, of the pre-conceptual, spontaneous 
metaphorical conjunction of thoughts and images which is the primordial iconicity 
behind thought, but that Derrida will speak of ‘the primary concrete meaning’ 
anticipating the ‘possibility of restoring or reconstructing beneath the metaphor, 
which at once conceals and is concealed, what was originally represented’.
232
  There 
is the primary meaning which is always sensible, a kind of transparent figure which 
becomes metaphorical when put to philosophical use.  In such cases, the primary 
sensible meaning is not noticed, and the displacement into abstract meaning then 
becomes taken as ‘proper’ meaning.
233
  However, Derrida is looking for the original 
language, the concrete meaning behind the abstract concept, or dream image, or 
narrative.
234
   
     The incarnation of Jesus Christ is tantamount to the Jewish interpretation of the 
text.  Although both of Christianity and Judaism use the same text, the difference 
between them is Christ’s incarnation.  The meaning of incarnation is that the Word 
becomes flesh, a conversion from the linguistic order into the material realm, the 
flesh.  By viewing incarnation as the core divine act, Christianity, especially the 
Princeton theology has a distinct, final and validating interpretation of the Scriptures 
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with its redemptive historical view.  As we know, Derrida has nothing to do with 
Jesus Christ.  The evidence is seen his belief that the ‘debt’ is the thing that 
translation owes to the original: the event in translation (‘truth of act’, ‘authenticity’) 
is always related to the original.   
     As a Christian with these Derridean notions of translation, confirming the 
doctrine of incarnation as a core source of the text, I want to see tremendous sources 
for Christian hermeneutics by adapting the Jewish method of interpretation of the 
text to the doctrine of the Bible.  Especially, in studying Hodge’s view on 
interpretation of the Bible, I want to focus on, following Derrida, the overthrown 
oppositions between what is the proper meaning and what is not, between essence 
and accident, intuition and discourse, thought and language, intelligible and sensible.  
There is no non-metaphysical realm to which one can aspire, or from which one can 
speak or think.  The ideal of language is then no longer to allow the ‘thing-itself’ to 
be known in its essential, proper truth.  For Aristotle, the name can be a proper name 
when it has only one sense.  Derrida would free language from this univocity and 
open it up to an infinite plurality of meaning in the place of khora.235  Then the idea 
of Gadamer’s ‘prejudice’ or ‘presupposition’ will help us to reconcile Derrida’s 
‘truth of act’ and Hodge’s common sense ‘facts’ of the Bible in the work of 
interpretation, which I will discuss in chapter IV and VI.  
 
H. The Death of Derrida 
     Derrida’s life is possible in his death at the spacing of khora, the meaning of 
which he struggled to define when he was here.  I am quite sure that, there and now, 
eventually, the dead Derrida is speaking without reservation what was once written 
on his heart, because the time of the future fulfilment of the promise has already 
been accomplished in his death.  Actually, here and now, in order to speak well, we 
sometimes need to stop or avoid speaking.  Since we are beings in this world with 
limited language, it is impossible to speak of God as He is.  From its origins, 
language has started without us, in us and before us.  Because God is other than a 
                                                 
235
 Ibid., p. 48. 
  
 
80
human being of limited reason, it is common sense that there is no longer any 
question of us not being willing to speak of God with inexact, erroneous, aberrant 
and improper words.  
     Although the world that we know is not our creation, nor merely a synopsis of 
our perspective, it cannot be known except from the point of view that is ours.  All 
our attempts to break through the limits imposed by experience end in self-
contradiction, and will not vindicate our intimations of a transcendental knowledge 
that can never be ours.  That whereof we cannot speak, we must consign to 
silence.
236
 
     Therefore, Derrida asked himself such questions when he was in this world as, 
“Will I do it?” and “Am I in Jerusalem?”  Derrida in Jerusalem will not postpone his 
speaking there and now, where speaking is no longer possible to defer.  However, 
when he was here, assuming responsibility and commitment only while deferring 
speaking, he responded with ‘unavoidable denial of the undeniable provocation’,
237
 
anticipating the true transcendental point.  Deferment of something is not about 
whether something is right or wrong.  What Derrida meant is that it is the action of 
responsibility and commitment.  In khora, Christianity has to learn how to avoid 
speaking of the name of God so that the event of translation of the sacred happens in 
our lives.  Derrida, in death, will review his life when he was in this world whether 
his life here before was a translation of a sacred father or not.  Life does not deceive 
life.  
 
I. In Sum 
     On the basis of the universality of hermeneutics that we discussed in chapter I 
and the juxtaposition of the death of the I and the Holy Spirit in this chapter, I have 
scrutinised postmodern philosophical backgrounds for understanding the theology of 
Charles Hodge.  Examining the complexities of the hermeneutic conscience of the 
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death of the I in comparison with ‘the autonomy of “I”’ in the previous chapter, I 
established a Derridean hermeneutic foundation in dealing with Hodge’s theological 
method, which we are going to study in the following chapter.      
     In khora, the death of the I, embedded in a person with the Holy Spirit, will not 
only rehabilitate Christian identity of faith and knowledge, but will also show itself 
to be sensitive to the distinctive identities living together in a providential space.  
We have found that the juxtaposition of the death of the I and the Holy Spirit 
enables us to use such ideas as textuality and ‘the supplement’ for finding the true 
transcendental point in practising theology.  This juxtaposition is especially 
imperative when we think about the relationship between the first and second causes 
happening at the event of concursus. 
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CHAPTER III 
SCOTTISH COMMON SENSE REALISM AND KANT 
IN THE THEOLOGY OF CHARLES HODGE 
 
     In this chapter, I want to examine how such Enlightenment ideas as Scottish 
Common Sense Realism and those of Immanuel Kant function in the theology of 
Charles Hodge.  We will then critically discuss Hodge’s theological method and 
question whether his nineteenth-century methodology is adaptable to the context of 
a diverse and plural society in the twenty-first century.  First of all, I will investigate 
what Hodge means by the inductive method and how it is influenced by Scottish 
Common Sense Realism and Kant on an historical basis.  Then I will suggest how 
Hodge’s theological method should be understood in khora, and will argue that the 
context of his theology should reside there, where the universality of hermeneutics is 
achieved.  While respecting Hodge’s priority on ‘facts’ over ‘theories’ as important 
tools for a proper theologian, I want to argue that the concept of ‘facts’ should not 
be confined to the Bible alone, but extended to the realm where the death of the I is 
embedded in a theologian with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.   
     Hodge is dogmatically and theologically clear in using the facts of the Bible as 
major sources of his theology.  However, when we have to discuss his theology in 
the space of our experience of faith and knowledge, we cannot but think of the 
adaptability of a theology.  I believe that if there is no adaptability in a given 
theology, it remains dead, no matter how brilliant its ideas.  With this adaptability in 
mind, I want to scrutinise the inductive theological method that Hodge presents and 
discuss its adaptability in the context of khora.  Even the dynamic discussion of 
theological adaptability will not distort the priority of Hodge’s values in his method.  
Then this study will inevitability show us how hermeneutic change of a theology in 
the space of khora, where we live together, is possible without losing the theology’s 
essential values and important functions. 
     Through a critical understanding of the inductive method in Hodge’s theology, I 
dream of Hodge revisiting us to help us trace faith in a providential space of now.  If 
we are successful in reinterpreting Hodge’s theology and proposing a theology of 
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action, we give validity to the Christianity of the two-thirds of the world that is 
tremendously influenced by thousands of Princetonian descendents of Hodge—
missionaries around the turn of the twentieth century—and to Western Christianity, 
as well, and we enjoy and re-affirm their theologies of action here and now without 
losing their Reformed confessionalism. 
 
A. The Theology of Charles Hodge in the Context of the Death of the I  
     Hodge has a two-fold view of knowledge: on the one hand is innate knowledge, 
which is based on our sentient, rational and moral constitution; on the other is that 
knowledge founded on experience.
238
  Here, there is a juxtaposition between his 
‘meta-narrative’, based on Kantian pure reason, and the observed facts in life 
experience, based on practical reason.  With this juxtaposition of rational and 
experiential knowledge, we want to scrutinise the inductive method in Hodge’s 
theology.  First, he argues that the innate knowledge of pure reason was born with 
us.
239
  We need to recall that, as Derrida and Appiah noted in chapter II, the 
historicity of innate knowledge that traces back even before existence is what the 
death of the I assumes.  I therefore want to examine how knowledge of self in the 
theology of Hodge, whether innate or experiential, plays a role in the space of khora.  
Secondly, as W. Andrew Hoffecker proposes, we must understand Hodge not only 
from his intellect, but from his whole person in his life experiences.
240
  
     Hodge’s recognition of the modes of life experience can be seen in his views on 
religious immediacy.
241
  This immediacy is nothing other than a strong driving force 
in the occurrence of our genuine faith and knowledge here and now.  In the event of 
khora, this immediacy is derived when the death of the I defers to identify what 
something is but traces with the function of ‘the supplement’ as we have seen in 
chapter II.  According to Derrida, only the death of the I can perceive the illusion ‘of 
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the thing itself, of immediate presence, of originary perception’, because ‘the 
supplement’ works as an infinite chain of ineluctable multiplying events.
242
  
Therefore, as we affirmed in chapter II, such a thing as an immediate event 
(religious immediacy) cannot be conceived by reason.
243
  
      The task of this chapter in dealing with Hodge’s theology in view of the death of 
the I then becomes clear.  If we are to understand Hodge’s theology with the 
perspective of religious immediacy, we should ask what would happen to Hodge’s 
reason-based inductive theological method when the God of potentia absoluta and 
potentia ordinata are working as we examined in the event of faith and knowledge 
from the narrative of John 8:1-11 in section F of chapter I.  With this in mind, we 
will examine Hodge’s religious immediacy with the Derridean perspective of the 
event happening in ‘the chains of supplements’.
244
 In addition to his three-volume 
Systematic Theology, we can also find inexhaustible sources on religious immediacy, 
through which we can trace intersubjective modes of life experiences, especially in 
his writings on religious life and pietism.  
     Hodge’s view on knowledge of the self can be seen in the way that he deals with 
‘facts’ and ‘theories’ in his inductive theological method and how these ideas are 
related to such philosophies as Scottish Common Sense Realism and those of Kant.  
It is clear that Hodge does not confuse philosophy (scientific method) with theology.  
While using philosophy in his theological method (induction), he argues that a 
theologian has a right to demand that the facts in the Bible should be verified 
beyond the possibility of doubt.
245
  Hodge would say that when a theologian is to 
research the Bible as a philosopher, he would still focus on the Bible, because 
Hodge believed that ‘the facts are all in the Bible.’  Hodge’s method of interpreting 
the Bible is based on the idea that ‘the Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of 
Protestants.’
246
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     Hodge believes that the duty of theology is to collect the facts in the Bible, to 
exhibit their internal coherence, and to show their harmony and consistency with 
cognate truths.
247
  His mission for theology clearly shows that the Scriptures are the 
only source of theology.  Then he uses the philosophical language of his time and 
space to prove that the written narrative of the Scriptures has cognate truths for the 
readers in studying God (theology) and applying the teachings of God in their lives.  
In Hodge’s theology, whatever and however Hodge uses philosophy is subordinated 
to the ‘cognate truths’ found in the Bible. 
     If we understand Hodge’s theological stance properly, William M. Paxton and 
David Wells are right that Hodge does not confuse philosophy with the truth.  
Paxton, one of his students—who believed it very dangerous to mingle God’s truth 
with secularised philosophical theology—evaluated Hodge as the one who ‘did not 
teach a philosophy, but a theology’.  Paxton’s argument is that neither the whole nor 
any part of Hodge’s theology is based upon philosophical principles apart from the 
Word of God.
248
  It is true that the way in which Hodge uses scientific method in 
understanding the Scriptures does not show that he is saturated by science or 
philosophy.  Agreeing with Paxton, Wells puts it that Hodge’s ‘inductive method 
had little or nothing to do with natural theology, but was merely his way of 
describing, in the scientific language of his generation, the proper attitude of a 
biblical theologian’.
249
   
     Hodge clearly distinguishes the role of philosophy in his theological 
methodology and system from what he calls the facts of the Bible.  Even when 
Hodge speaks of philosophical methods and ideas, he explicitly means that the 
authority of the Bible is higher than that of philosophy: ‘philosophy must yield to 
revelation; man must yield to God.’
250
  From this statement, we can conclude that 
Hodge holds to the facts of the Bible while using a philosophical method in his 
theology. 
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     In discussing Hodge’s theological methodology, it is meaningless to debate 
whether Hodge’s use of philosophy is antithetical to the way in which he prioritises 
the authority of the Bible, whether Hodge’s philosophy contradicts what he means 
by truth.  Because simply studying the philosophy that Hodge uses and its function 
in relationship with the Bible cannot give us any proper clue to understanding what 
he wants to tell us in that space and time.  Rather, it is a matter of why and how 
Hodge uses philosophy in his theological argument.  That is, first, we need to study 
Hodge’s intention in using philosophy and how that philosophy is understood in his 
theology.  And then we want to know how Hodge’s values and conviction will take 
a place in a new paradigm of the death of the I.  Hence in the discussion of 
philosophy and Hodge’s Biblical priority, the question whether his ways of using 
philosophy in his theology is proper is outside the scope of our inquiry.  The matter 
at stake is how his Biblical theology is possible in our space and time: how it has 
changed hermeneutically in the context of khora.   
     That is, I want to explore the adaptability of Hodge’s assumptions about 
universal morality and common-sense rationality by changing his hermeneutical 
foundations, assumptions which did not work among Presbyterians during the 
American Civil War, when Presbyterians split along Union and Confederate lines in 
1860-1, and ended up murdering each other.
251
  In this case, John Stewart 
determines that the inadaptability of Hodge’s theology is due to Hodge not being at 
all comfortable with the ‘process-oriented rather than static, more evolving than 
established’ paradigm that surrounded him.
252
  However, we find that Hodge is not 
at all against the idea of ‘process’ when he distinguishes between Darwinism and 
evolution, and explicates Christian experience in terms of innate knowledge.  Rather, 
the lack of the idea of khora in Hodge’s theology might have been the result of 
schism and war.  I now want to begin investigating Hodge and his inductive method 
in view of Scholastic Humanism, Scottish Common Sense Realism and Kantian 
ideas. 
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B. Charles Hodge: A Theologian and Teacher 
     Hodge (1797-1878) was born in Philadelphia, and educated at Princeton 
(graduated 1815) and the Princeton Theological Seminary (graduated 1819).  He 
became professor of Oriental and Biblical literature at Princeton Theological 
Seminary in 1822, and taught there for more than 50 years, except for two years of 
study in France and Germany between 1826 and 1828.  In 1840, he became 
professor of exegetical and didactic theology.  The semi-centennial celebration of 
his professorship at Princeton was held in 1872, around the time his Systematic 
Theology was published.  
     The contents and structure of the three volumes of Systematic Theology were the 
first comprehensive compilation of a distinctively American Reformed theology in 
the nineteenth century.  Hodge’s approach to theology was described as 
characteristically American:  
Hodge’s philosophical underpinnings, his attempts to place faith claims in 
America’s public arena, his ecclesiastical definitions and polemics, his 
designs for a substantial educational institution, and his linkage of piety and 
public faith expression are telltale signs of his deep roots in the soil of 
American culture and society.
253
 
     In Systematic Theology, we find two distinctive heritages, the seventeenth-
century Scholastic Calvinism of Francis Turretin, and the eighteenth-century 
Scottish Common Sense Realism of Thomas Reid.  These are crucial to 
understanding Hodge’s philosophical and theological background.  Through 
scrutinising the way in which Hodge was influenced by the philosophy of Reid and 
the theology of Turretin, we will get hints of why and how Hodge deals and 
corresponds with contemporary American cultural and historical contexts. 
     The first three professors at the Princeton Theological Seminary, Archibald 
Alexander, Samuel Miller and Charles Hodge, were all influenced by the Realism of 
the Scottish school of John Witherspoon (1723-94), a graduate of the University of 
Edinburgh from Gifford, who became the sixth president of the College of New 
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Jersey (later Princeton University) in 1766.
254
  Hoffecker specifically analyses how 
these Princetonians used Scottish Realism:  
Alexander used it [Scottish Common Sense Realism] to certify Scripture, 
Hodge developed it to construct an inductive method in theology, and 
Warfield carefully refined it into a rational apologetic system.
255
 
     However, Hodge himself does not identify Scottish Realism in his theology 
because it is tacitly accepted in America as a social, political, intellectual and 
cultural norm.
256
  Historians, following Sydney E. Ahlstrom, begin to agree that this 
Realism plays an important role in Princeton theology, as well as in American 
culture.
257
 
     We also need to pay attention to the influence on Hodge of the Scholastic 
Humanism of Francis Turretin, a Calvinist in Geneva a century after the death of 
John Calvin.  After being a revival preacher in Virginia, Archibald Alexander 
became the first professor at the Princeton Theological Seminary.  From the 
beginning of his teaching, Alexander used the Turretin’s Institutio Theologiae 
Elencticae (1674).  As a student of Alexander, Hodge studied this book and, after 
teaching exegesis and Biblical literature for 20 years, he began using the Institutio 
for the next 30, until his own Systematic Theology was published.  Hodge’s 
theological approach was generally similar to that of Turretin.
258
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     We can infer from Turretin’s influence on Hodge that Scholastic Humanism is 
part of Hodge’s theology.
259
  His theological method, which is generally based on 
rationalism committed to the Bible as the source of theology, has been derived from 
the scholastic characteristics of post-Reformation Protestant Orthodoxy.
260
  Later, 
many twentieth-century evangelicals in the United States (e.g., Reformed Wesleyan, 
Baptist, dispensationalist, charismatic), as Stanley Grenz and John Franke observe, 
become followers of Hodge’s theological paradigm of Scholastic Rationalism.
261
 
     Even though Scottish Common Sense Realism, along with Turretin’s 
Scholasticism, becomes a core element in Hodge’s theology, neither Turretin nor 
Hodge digresses from the Calvinistic Reformed tradition.
262
  We have a great deal of 
evidence of their keeping Calvinistic Reformed confessionalism by fighting heresies 
with the tools of both philosophies in the 17
th
 and 18
th
-centuries.  As McAllister 
notes, by using Scottish Realism, Hodge is able to give his theology a broader 
philosophical and epistemological basis with which to defend it against scepticism 
and other secular challenges.
263
  Also, through the influence Turretin’s 
Scholasticism, Hodge’s theology naturally continues the tradition of science and 
reason.  Hodge is not at all opposed to empirical findings and the objective analysis 
of data.  The very fact that Hodge pays attention to geology, palaeontology and the 
theory of evolution in his theology shows that he has much concern for such 
disciplines.  Accordingly, Hodge thinks that science, based on human reason, is 
never antithetical to the facts in the Bible.  
        
C. Scottish Common Sense Realism 
                                                 
259
 James L. McAllister agrees that Hodge’s theological tendency in the intellectual conception of 
faith is organised more in Turretin’s Scholastic Rationalism.  James L. McAllister, ‘The Nature of 
Religious Knowledge in the Theology of Charles Hodge,’ Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke 
niversity (1957), p. 245.  Danhof also agrees on Hodge’s humanistic characteristics.  He observes that 
Hodge is not entirely free of the taints of Humanism. Charles Hodge as a Dogmatician, pp. 191-2. 
260
 Grenz and Franke, Beyond Foundationalism, pp. 13-4. 
261
 Ibid. Grenz and Franke owe the discussion of Reformed scholastic tradition to Richard A. Muller, 
Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, v. 1: Prologomena (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book 
House, 1987). 
262
 Mark Noll says that both Hodge and Alexander are followers of ‘John Calvin, the great lights of 
English Puritanism, the Westminster Confession of Faith, and the influential Calvinistic dogmaticians 
of seventeenth-century Europe’.  Charles Hodge: The Way of Life and Other Writings, p. 22.  
263
 McAllister, ‘The Nature of Religious Knowledge in the Theology of Charles Hodge’, p. 358. 
  
 
90
     Scottish Common Sense Realism, which has a tremendous impact on Hodge’s 
theological methodology, has to be understood in the context of the Scottish 
Enlightenment.  Its essential features, according to Alexander Broadie, were 
freedom and tolerance.
264
  This is seen in that the Scots of that time thought for 
themselves, and did not allow themselves ‘to develop the intellectual vice of 
assenting to something’ merely because of a violent authority.  What was distinctive 
in their society was that ‘people are able to put their ideas into the public domain 
without fear of retribution from political, religious or other such authorities that have 
the power to punish those whose ideas they disapprove of.’
265
  
     The free and tolerant atmosphere of the Scottish Enlightenment motivated people 
to think innovatively on every aspect of life, and the period is regarded as one of the 
greatest moments in the history of European culture.
266
  The intellectual movement 
was, naturally, focused on the Scottish universities and developed as the philosophy 
called Scottish Common Sense Realism.  Thomas Reid (1710-96), the son of a 
Church of Scotland minister, served as a preacher in his early career, and then taught 
at Aberdeen (1752-63) and later at the University of Glasgow, where he went on to 
be the champion of this philosophy.  Adam Smith (1723-90), the founder professor 
of political economy at Glasgow; James Beattie (1735-1802), the poet; Alexander 
Campbell (1716-96), the author of Philosophy of Rhetoric; Dugald Stewart 
(1753-1828) of Edinburgh; and Sir William Hamilton (1791-1856), who tried to link 
the philosophy of Kant with Thomas Reid; all were powerful figures of Scottish 
Common Sense Realists.  
     Scottish Enlightenment thinkers were more accustomed to the doctrines of 
Protestant Reformers on the Continent than to the sceptical philosophy of John 
Locke and the subjective idealism of George Berkeley.  Naturally, the teaching of 
Common Sense Realism, as opposed to scepticism and idealism, appealed to 
universal experience, through which human beings could realistically know true 
things about the world outside their minds.
267
  The applications of this philosophy to 
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Scottish society were: belles-lettres, including history and literary criticism; 
revitalisation of university education; rethinking political problems in economic 
terms, rather than natural terms; and liberalising and naturalising religion.
268
   
     In 1786, John Witherspoon became president of the College of New Jersey in 
Princeton.  With the advantage of not being of American origin and thus 
uncommitted to the New Side or the Old Side, he could provide the new energy of 
the Scottish Enlightenment to American Presbyterianism.  At first, his career in 
Princeton was a disappointment to both Old and New sides.  However, gradually, he 
became a figure who could encourage harmony among the Calvinists, indulging the 
German colonists and the Dutch Reformed, and thus propelled the project of 
unifying Presbyterianism in the United States.
269
  Bruce Kuklick observes that 
Princeton was the university most influenced by the Scottish philosophy through 
Witherspoon’s philosophical connections.
270
    
     From Witherspoon’s time on, the Scottish Enlightenment philosophy began to 
function as a prevailing idea, not only for establishing the United States as a newly 
independent nation, but also for American Christianity, especially for 
Presbyterianism.  As a sociological influence, says Mark Noll, the Scottish Common 
Sense philosophy was useful in the United States in the following three ways: for 
justifying the revolution against Britain, for establishing new principles of social 
order in place of British rule and for re-establishing the truths of Christianity.
271
  As 
an intellectual influence at American universities, this philosophy was dominant at 
Harvard and Yale, as well as at the College of New Jersey.
272
  
     Yet its influence was ‘dominant’ in various ways for different people.  Regarding 
its theological influence, John Woodbridge, Nathan Hatch and Mark Noll all agree 
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that the contemporary theologians adopted ‘common sense’, but that their 
perspectives were different: 
For Nathaniel Taylor, it was merely ‘common sense’ that human guilt arose 
from the individual who had sinned. For Charles Hodge, it was ‘common 
sense’ that true theology came into existence by taking individual pieces of 
scriptural revelation and building them into a common whole. For Alexander 
Campbell, it was ‘common sense’ to root Christian life in the New 
Testament era rather than in later church history.
273
   
     Ahlstrom, an American historian, argues that through the powerful advocacy of 
Archibald Alexander and Charles Hodge, ‘the Scottish philosophy was carried by 
Princeton graduates to academies, colleges, seminaries, and churches all over the 
country.’
274
  With an extensive study, Noll also argues that early Princetonians, such 
as William Graham, Archibald Alexander and Ashbel Green, were strongly 
committed to Scottish Realism, and that Hodge, who followed them, naturally might 
also have been influenced by it.
275
  
     So far, we have addressed how Scottish Common Sense Realism sprang out of 
the Scottish Enlightenment and influenced American society, as well as Princeton 
theologians.  Princetonians, including Hodge, accepted Scottish Common Sense 
Realism with the progressive spirit of the time.  What people thought of as common 
sense—‘the reality of the self, the law of non-contradiction, reliability of sense 
perception, and basic cause-and-effect connections’—allowed them to have a 
progressive and democratic knowledge about nature and human nature.
276
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     The effects of Scottish Common Sense Realism on the intellectual foundation of 
Hodge’s theology are distinctive in his defense of the authority of the Bible.  In The 
Way of Life, for instance, Hodge uses common-sense principles for combating 
‘sophistical objections against the doctrine of the Bible’. In Noll’s words, ‘to Hodge 
it was folly for supposedly intelligent people to deny the evidence supporting the 
divine character of Scripture, evidence which came from external proofs and internal 
intuitions.’
277
 
  
D. The Relationship between Reidean Common Sense Realism and Kant 
     Manfred Kuehn argues that such philosophical scholars as Hans Vaihinger, 
Wilhelm Windelband, Julius Janitsch and Benno Erdmann have shown that Kant is 
indebted to the Scottish Common Sense Realism of Reid and Beattie.
278
 Building on 
extensive evidence, Kuehn observes that common sense is a central guiding concept 
for all the German Enlightenment thinkers, and argues that Kant is influenced by 
‘the Scots in much greater detail than most historians are willing to admit’.
279
  He 
points out that the only difference between Kant and Common Sense Realism is the 
perspective on the ‘ideas’.  What distinguishes Scottish Common Sense Realism is 
that it regards representationalism as an untenable hypothesis.
280
  
     The ‘reality’ of our life experience is a distinctive characteristic of Scottish 
Common Sense Realism. That means, for Reid, that we can know things as they 
really are.  However, in Kant, what appears to us is not exactly what it really is.
281
  
Since Kant teaches that facts are only determined by our own judgement or our 
opinions, our knowledge is apt to fall into scepticism.  The Scots argue that the 
theory of ideas necessarily leads to scepticism concerning the reality of external 
objects, and thus to idealism.  But the Germans, including Kant, want to save 
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representationalism
282
 while developing the philosophy of the Scots in their own 
direction.  When we refer to Alexander Broadie’s observation,
283
 Scottish Common 
Sense Realism is in some sense Kantian in its idea of freedom of reformation against 
despotism.  We need to keep in mind that the priority of ‘facts’ to ‘theories’ in 
Scottish Common Sense Realism is not antithetical to a Kantian philosophy.  At the 
same time, we want to examine how Hodge deals with such a concept of Kantian 
representationalism, or ideas. 
     In the American context, Witherspoon’s philosophy, spreading rapidly, replaced 
the idealistic metaphysical philosophy of Jonathan Edwards.
284
  The different 
theological stance of the Princetonians to Edwards was typically caused by Scottish 
Realism, introduced by Witherspoon’s trusting in the external senses rather than 
Lockean representationalism.
285
  Furthermore, Princetonians including Hodge, as 
followers of Witherspoon, emphasised exploring the evidence of Christianity, while 
Edwardseans perceived it with their ideal minds.  Elwyn Smith provides a good 
comparison of the two schools: 
Edwardseans had affirmed the intimate bond between the reality of the 
divine and its impression on man, but they did not elevate impressions to the 
rank of evidence for the existence of God. But at Princeton, impressions 
were precisely regarded as evidence of divine operations on the individual 
affected. Thus Princeton realism elevated experience to a role never 
contemplated by the Edwardsean awakening. For Edwards, God would exist 
in his own excellence—and the mind could know it—if the world contained 
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not one shred of holiness. For the Scottish realist, such a circumstance would 
call into question the existence of God.
286
 
Similarly, while Edwards made the free will issue the axiom of his theology, 
Witherspoon regarded this problem as a small matter.  For Witherspoon, it was 
nothing but a metaphysical problem.  
     Following the Scots, Hodge also uses an evidential scientific approach instead of 
the metaphysical speculations in Edwards’s theological method.  This scientific 
approach is effective as a basic ethos throughout Systematic Theology.  The 
influence of Scottish Common Sense Realism on Hodge is conspicuous when he 
gives a basis for the rational and scientific structure of the truths of the Scriptures 
and for the religious life in his theologising, especially in the so-called Princeton 
theology.  
 
E. Antirepresentationalism  
     According to Richard Rorty, antirepresentationalism is based on the adaptation of 
ideas to the environment, instead of being ‘quasi-pictures’ presupposed by the idea 
of ‘our minds’ or ‘our language’ as an ‘inside’ that is contrasted to something very 
different ‘outside’.
287
  Rorty argues that antirepresentationalism is distinctive in 
Charles Darwin, a contemporary of Hodge, by evaluating Darwin’s view on the 
aesthetic experience as a ‘component of cognitive and practical forms of experience’.  
That is, the continuity of aesthetic experience is relevant to the rest of life.
288
  An 
antirepresentationalist like John Dewey thinks of belief as a habit of acting, rather 
than as part of a ‘model’ of the world constructed by the organism to help it deal 
with the world.
289
  What antirepresentationalists argue is that ‘there is simply no way 
to give sense to the idea of our minds or our language as systematically out of phase 
with what lies beyond our skins.’
290
 In other words, subjectively intended ideas are 
incapable of being objectively understood, if they are not really expressed. 
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     How, then, does Rorty’s antirepresentationalism not fall into self-destructive 
relativism?  Edward J. Grippe analyses well the answer of this question in Richard 
Rorty’s New Pragmatism.291  Grippe says that such an ethnocentric destiny (what 
Hans-Georg Gadamer calls prejudice) is not a limit due to its bias, but it is ‘the heart 
of Rortyan Pragmatism’.
292
 This logic is the very tool for defending the charges that 
Rorty’s idea is relative.  Rorty’s objectivity can be seen when a biased agent is 
involved in life experiences by his own point of view, using a ‘conceptual system at 
hand when he is engaging in a practical activity (understood broadly).’
293
 Grippe 
evaluates what Rorty thinks: 
It is impossible to decide whether some descriptions of an object capture its 
‘intrinsic features’ (how the thing is under all conditions), and others merely 
identify its description-relative ‘extrinsic qualities’ (i.e., how we depict it). 
Therefore Rorty encourages us to discard the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction 
altogether, along with any claim that beliefs do or do not represent what is 
real.
294
 
We need to keep in mind that the characteristic of antirepresentationalism is 
distinctive in the Scottish Common Sense Realism which influenced Hodge’s 
theology. 
 
F. Thomas Reid and the Common-Sense Place Where We Are Living Together 
     What is common is universal.  Therefore, what is common in our mind produces 
understanding among differences.  Commonality among differences begins with 
understanding what is happening now.  Thomas Reid praised common sense, citing 
Locke: 
Five or six friends (says [Locke]) meeting at my chamber, and discoursing 
on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by 
the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had for a while puzzled 
ourselves, without coming any nearer to a resolution of those doubts that 
perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that 
before we set ourselves upon enquiries of that nature, it was necessary to 
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examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were 
fitted or not fitted to deal with.
295
 
     Here, consensus comes from the common ground that there is no agreement in 
their conversation.  What they readily assented to was found to be functionally 
agreed, and this agreement became the foundation of their new inquiries.  This 
common foundation would lead to what Locke calls the ‘right course’.  This course 
must be uncovered by trial and error, not by theories.  Therefore, common sense 
among different people always assumes the responsibility of an ‘I’ to find out what 
is common with the immediacy of sense.  Accordingly, ‘I’, as an empirical subject, 
needs to examine its own ability to see if its understanding is appropriate or not in a 
certain situation.  Therefore, the existence of ‘I’ is the core principle of Common 
Sense Realism.  So what is ‘sense’?  How can we find the ‘right course’?   
      These questions assume the immediate sense of a man. ‘Sense’ means the 
immediacy of our knowledge, and quickens us to know what is present.  This 
common sense knowledge is based on scientific facts and human beings’ experience 
with them.  The presupposition of Scottish Common Sense philosophers is that God 
is omnipresent with the facts and happenings of the world.  The reason that Thomas 
Reid’s philosophy was adopted by theologies is due to this Calvinistic world-view.  
What he sensed is that the world is embedded with the present Divinity and 
controlled by the providence of God.  This is the place that we call khora, which we 
will study in detail in chapter V. 
 
G. The Inductive Method of Charles Hodge 
     Induction was introduced as a scientific method by the seventeenth-century 
scientists and philosophers Galileo Galilei in Italy, Francis Bacon in England and 
Tycho Brahe in Denmark.  It flourished in the eighteenth century among Scottish 
Common Sense Realists.  Later, through the channel of the Scots, Hodge adopted 
this method.  Induction is the opposite of deduction.  While the deductive method 
wants to prove conclusions based on whether they logically follow from the known 
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facts (premises), the inductive method begins with observations of nature, with the 
goal of finding a law that can explain how nature works.  Hodge affirms the 
inductive method by saying that it is fundamental to all sciences and theology, and 
that theories should be determined by facts, rather than facts by theories.   
     Hodge’s priority in theology is seen in several aspects of his use of the inductive 
method: the Bible is the source of truth; a theologian has to respect the authority of 
the Bible; Christian experience also has to be Biblical; and, finally, science and 
philosophy are nothing but tools to form a theology.  In order to preserve these 
convictions, Hodge finds that the inductive method is suitable for building his 
theological structure. 
     In order to discuss Hodge’s theology, we want to understand why and how he 
uses the inductive method.  As pointed out above, it is effective as a basic ethos 
throughout his Systematic Theology, as well as in the beginning part of it.  His 
method is always related to the Bible.  He distinguishes false methods from a true 
method: 
If a man adopts a false method, he is like one who takes a wrong road which 
will never lead him to his destination. The two great comprehensive methods 
are the a priori and the a posteriori. The one argues from cause to effect, the 
other from effect to cause. The former was for ages applied even to the 
investigation of nature. Men sought to determine what the facts of nature 
must be from the laws of mind or assumed necessary laws. Even in our own 
day we have Rational Cosmogonies, which undertake to construct a theory of 
the universe from the nature of absolute being and its necessary modes of 
development. Everyone knows how much it cost to establish the method of 
induction on a firm basis, and to secure a general recognition of its authority. 
According to this method, we begin with collecting well-established facts, 
and from them infer the general laws which determine their occurrence. 
From the fact that bodies fall toward the centre of the earth, has been inferred 
the general law of gravitation, which we are authorized to apply for beyond 
the limit of actual experience.
296
  
     Hodge regards speculative and mystical methods as false: speculation is a process 
of thought and mysticism is matter of feeling.
297
  The one believes that the thinking 
faculty is that by which we attain knowledge of faith, and the other does not believe 
                                                 
296
 ST, v. I, pp. 3-4. 
297
 ST, v. I, p. 6. 
  
 
99
in reason at all, but assumes that feelings alone are to be relied upon, at least in the 
sphere of religion.
298
  According to Hodge, speculation assumes certain principles in 
an a priori manner, and from them undertakes to determine what is and what must 
be.
299
  He shows three representative forms in which the speculative method has 
been applied to theology: the Deistic and Rationalistic form; the Dogmatic form; and 
the Transcendentalist form.  He also points out three problems with the speculative 
method: first, nothing contrary to reason is true; second, nothing contrary to our 
moral nature is true; and third, conscience is much less liable to err than reason.
300
  
     The problems with the mystical method, according to Hodge, are: there are no 
such things as revelation and inspiration; the Bible has no infallible authority in 
matters of doctrine; and Christianity, therefore, neither consists of a system of 
doctrine, nor does it contain any such system.  Hodge argues that, according to this 
method, there is no such thing as a revelation that is a supernatural objective 
presentation or communication of truth to the mind from the Spirit of God. 
Inspiration is the supernatural guidance of the Spirit, which renders its subjects 
infallible in communicating truth to others.  Based on these reasons, Hodge criticises 
the principle (Glaubenslehre) of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s theology as mystical:   
the duty of a [mystical] theologian is not to interpret Scripture, but to 
interpret his own Christian consciousness; to ascertain and exhibit what 
truths concerning God are implied in his feelings toward God; what truths 
concerning Christ are involved in his feelings toward Christ; what the 
feelings teach concerning sin, redemption, eternal life, etc., etc.
301
 
1. The Method for Biblical Theology 
     Carl Raschke argues that theology and science are considered equivalent in 
Hodge’s theology because ‘“the external world,” like God himself, is revealed as 
exactly what it is.  Divine revelation is at the same time commensurate with 
common sense.’
302
  This means that the potentia ordinata and potentia absoluta are 
to be explained by common sense in Hodge’s theology.  According to Raschke, 
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‘Hodge held that sin had darkened the human intellect, he was convinced that the 
regenerate mind would invariably see things clearly—both natural phenomena and 
the supernatural realm laid bare through the proper reading of the biblical text.’
303
 
     In the first part of Systematic Theology, Hodge accepts some philosophical tenets 
of Scottish Common Sense Realism when he draws a parallel between his 
theological method and scientific method.  With reasonable scientific assumptions, 
he observes facts in the Bible and proves the facts based on evidence.  Theology as 
science, according to Hodge, collects the facts in the Bible, exhibits the internal 
coherence of the facts, and shows their harmony and consistency with cognate 
truths.
304
  Therefore, in theology, he considers the inductive method superior to the 
speculative and mystical methods.  Theology, he says, ‘agrees in everything 
essential with the inductive method as applied to the natural sciences’.
305
  As the 
natural philosopher adopts the teaching of nature with certain assumptions, a 
theologian ‘must assume the validity of those laws of belief which God has 
impressed upon our nature’.
306
  As we can see, Hodge uses an evidential scientific 
approach in his theological method, as opposed to the metaphysical speculations of 
Edwards.  However, in spite of the fact that Hodge borrows scientific method, he 
believes that his theology is thoroughly Biblical.  As George Marsden writes, 
Princetonians thought of themselves as champions of ‘impartiality’ in the careful 
examination of the facts.
307
   
2. Facts and Theories in Hodge’s Theological Method 
     It is fundamental to all sciences and theology that theories should be determined 
by facts, not facts by theories. The dynamic interplay between facts and theories can 
be observed in Hodge’s stance on use of the inductive method in the interpretation 
of the Bible.  First of all, Hodge clearly distinguishes facts from theories early in 
Systematic Theology with the recognition that ‘in every science there are two 
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factors: facts and ideas.’
308
  He adds that ‘there is a great distinction between 
theories and facts.  Theories are of men.  Facts are of God.  The Bible often 
contradicts the former, never the latter.’
309
  Since facts, for Hodge, are the truths of 
the Bible, facts substantiated by science have a higher value than theological 
theories.  Both categories of facts have ultimate authority.  Therefore, to deny facts 
is to deny what God affirms to be true.  The priority of facts over theories originated 
in the empirical tendency of Scottish Realism’s search for facts.    
     Since Hodge believes that God knows everything and is the truth, and is the 
author of both the Scriptures and Creation, he is convinced that the Bible, properly 
interpreted, cannot conflict with the facts of nature, properly understood.  This truth 
is revealed in the form of facts in the scientific and philosophical field, as well as in 
the Bible.  While we can imagine, and have found, that some scientific and 
philosophical theories have been wrong, the truth or facts are always right.  In the 
same way, Hodge argues that ‘theologians are not infallible, in the interpretation of 
the Scriptures.  It may, therefore, happen in the future, as it has in the past, that 
interpretations of the Bible, long confidently received, must be modified or 
abandoned, to bring revelation into harmony with what God teaches in his works.’
310
  
     When we scrutinise Hodge, we find that the term ‘facts’ has two different 
connotations.  One is that facts are found to be written in the Bible concerning God 
and Christ, ourselves and our relations to our Maker and Redeemer.
311
  For example, 
the facts concerning human beings are believed to be revealed vividly in the Bible as 
ignorant beings that still need to progress intellectually through their relationship 
with the omniscience of Christ.
312
  The other connotation of ‘facts’ is  ‘deduced 
facts’, of which established facts of science and philosophy, such as the properties of 
matter and the laws of motion, of magnetism, of light, etc., are characteristic.  These 
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facts are not formulated by the mind and are not laws of thought, but are deductions 
of facts.
313
  
     Accordingly, Hodge concludes that if a theology does not adopt this principle of 
induction, it is a jumble of human speculations.
314
  Hodge observes that facts are 
determined by the will of God, but theories, which have human origins, often 
conflict with each other and cannot be accepted as Biblical truth.  However, Hodge 
maintains that if theories of philosophical speculation coincide with the Bible, then 
they are true, and so far as they do not agree with it, they are false.
315
  
     With the above understanding, Hodge sets up rules to interpreting the Scriptures:  
1. The words of Scripture are to be taken in their historical sense…. 2. If the 
Scriptures be what they claim to be, the word of God, they are the work of 
one mind, and that mind divine….  Hence Scripture must explain Scripture.  
3. The Scriptures are to be interpreted under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, 
which guidance is to be humbly and earnestly sought.
316
 
     In summarising what Hodge means by facts and theories, we need to pay 
attention to how he deals with the ‘speculative theories’ and ‘facts’ in determining 
whether they be true or false.  Hodge’s tool is to check the evidence of ‘coinciding 
with the Bible’ by induction from it.  We find that Hodge’s position is, on the one 
hand, that ‘facts’ are true because they are written in the Bible, and on the other 
hand, that ‘speculative theories’ may be true if they are ‘inducted facts’, being 
corroborated by the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the process of interpretation.  The 
questions from Hodge’s position are: who decides that an interpretation is guided by 
the Holy Spirit, and who clarifies that ‘inducted facts’ are true?  If it is nobody but 
the God of the Holy Spirit, we should pay attention to the identity of the death of the 
I embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, which I 
discussed in chapter II.    
 
H. Christian Experience as the Effect of the Cause  
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     Hodge also believes that not only the sources of theology, but also Christian life 
experience, are objectively revealed in the facts of the Bible.  When he digs up the 
facts of religious knowledge from the contents of the Bible itself, he also inducts 
norms and standards of daily religious life.  For Hodge, all theological discussions, 
including the religious life of a believer, are inducted from the facts of the Bible.  
Since facts are from the Bible, as far as Hodge’s theology is concerned, facts are 
regarded as truth.  He wants to show that the Bible has the only authority in 
practising theology and in proving the evidence of the Trinitarian personhood of the 
Holy Spirit in life experiences (pietistic ways to religious life), as well by using the 
modern concept of the relationship between objectivity and subjectivity. 
     As James L. McAllister argues, Hodge follows Thomas Reid’s philosophy on the 
duality of subject and object in the intellectual apprehension of truth,
317
 that every 
effect has an efficient cause.  Hodge explains religious experience as the effect, with 
truth as the cause: ‘The Scriptures teach not only the truth, but what are the effects 
of the truth on the heart and conscience, when applied with saving power by the 
Holy Ghost.’
318
  Hodge continues that all ‘the truths taught by the constitution of our 
nature or by religious experience, are recognized and authenticated in the 
Scriptures.’
319
  In this way, religious experience is able to be described as the Word 
of God because Hodge believes that ‘the Bible records the legitimate effects of those 
truths on the minds of believers.’
320
  Hodge strongly argues that our own feelings or 
inward experiences can be possible only when they agree with the experiences of 
holy men recorded in the Scriptures.
321
  Thus, he concludes that the true method of 
theology is ‘inductive’: 
[The inductive method] assumes that the Bible contains all the facts or truths 
which form the contents of theology, just as the facts of nature are the 
contents of the natural sciences.  It is also assumed that the relation of these 
Biblical facts to each other, the principles involved in them, the laws which 
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determine them, are in the facts themselves, and are to be deduced from them, 
just as the laws of nature are deduced from the facts of nature.
322
 
However, I believe that our experience can be the cause of the effect, interpretation 
of the Bible.  As we have seen in F of chapter II, and as I will detail in chapter IV, 
interpretation has always been and has to be accompanied by the ‘process’, 
‘intersubjectivity’, and the ‘event’.  Hodge’s view that our experience should be the 
effect of the facts of the Bible, the cause, does not take hermeneutic process into 
account at all.  The idea of cause and effect may well present proofs of the existence 
of God, however in khora, we pursue proofs of God “by His effects,” precisely as 
the proofs of the name of God ‘by effects without cause.”
323
  
 
I. Process and Intuition (Innate Knowledge) in Religious Feeling 
     Intuition in Scottish Common Sense Realism enables Hodge to rely on the role of 
the Holy Spirit for Christian life.  The subjectivity of the intellect and morality, 
which is the basis of Christian life, is considered by Hodge as innate knowledge or 
intuitive truths.  When he argues that the knowledge of God is innate, he is 
maintaining that innate knowledge is opposed to that acquired by a process of 
research and reasoning.
324
  By Hodge’s definition, intuition means immediate 
perceptions, such as primary truths, laws of belief, innate knowledge, or ideas.  He 
argues that intuition comes from the constituted mind perceiving certain things to be 
true without proof and without instruction.
325
  That is, Hodge’s innate knowledge, as 
opposed to the knowledge obtained from experience, enables us to know directly all 
of the facts about ourselves and about our surroundings without any help from 
reason.   
     Hodge notes that these, intuitive truths (innate knowledge) belong to several 
departments, such as the senses, understanding and our moral nature: 
In the first place, all our sense perceptions are intuitions….  In the second 
place, there are intuitions of the intellect….  In the third place, there are 
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moral truths which the mind intuitively recognizes as true….  The more that 
nature is purified and exalted, the clearer is its vision, and the wider the 
scope of its intuitions.
326
  
He goes on to teach that our intuitive knowledge involves the following processes:   
Our senses give us immediate knowledge of their appropriate objects; the 
understanding perceives intuitively primary truths; our moral and aesthetic 
nature gives us the immediate cognition of things right or wrong, and 
beautiful or deformed.
327
 
Through this process, a human being may have a clear and certain knowledge of the 
operation of his own mind.  Hodge tries to explain Christian experience in terms of 
the marriage of scientific inductive method and intuition.  However, scientific truths 
are not without presuppositions. I want to introduce Hans-Georg Gadamer’s critique 
of Enlightenment ideas on science. (I will discuss Gadamer in detail, in relationship 
with Habermas, in chapter IV.) 
     Affirming the judgement of a human being as a holder of prejudices, Gadamer 
says that the Enlightenment theories are without presupposition: they just want to be 
the concrete in the ideal of presuppositionless science.328  Rather than treating 
scientific method as truth, Gadamer argues that we need to think of the common 
sense of public opinion (presupposition) in practising science.  That is, scientific 
research needs to devise a scientific means of guiding the formation of opinions.
329
  
If we apply Gadamer’s critique to Hodge, Hodge’s inductive method can be 
understood as ‘scientific means’ with the presuppositions of nineteenth-century 
Princeton.  Then, Hodge’s teaching of the process of intuitive knowledge cited 
above becomes resonant with Gadamer’s argument that science exists and is 
important because it is ‘beautiful’.
330
  For Gadamer, ‘the Beautiful’ is defined as 
something that enjoys universal recognition and assent. Thus it belongs to 
our natural sense of the beautiful that we cannot ask why it pleases us. We 
cannot expect any advantage from the beautiful since it serves no purpose. 
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The beautiful fulfils itself in a kind of self determination and enjoys its own 
self-representation.
331
   
In Hodge’s words, ‘the beautiful’ is a ‘fact’ that overcomes the boundary of 
‘theories’.  Since ‘the speculative theories’ that have to be determined by ‘facts’ in 
section G.2. of this chapter are not definitely true—due to the fact that human 
practice in science is still an ongoing process of opening up the capacity for 
dominating Nature, and inventing and making necessary and beautiful things—as 
Gadamer argues, ‘theories’ (theoria) should no longer be seen as ‘above all of 
that.’
332
  Gadamer’s implication about Hodge is that the ‘method’ of a theology 
should deal with what is beautiful and hence serves no ends.  That is, Hodge’s 
inductive method should not be regarded as the only right one that prevents the 
‘facts’ of the Bible from being distorted by ‘theories’. 
     Gadamer means that hermeneutics has significance, as it is in the process of 
experience.
333
  For Gadamer, through hermeneutic reflection, prejudices (methods 
formed by a certain time and space) will be reformed by themselves.  However, such 
a thing as tradition, a by-product of the prejudices of a certain era, plays an 
important role in knowing how we understand.  This is why we have studied the 
historical and philosophical background of Hodge’s theology in this chapter.       
     I want to go back to Hodge’s process of intuitive truth.  He extends intuitive 
truths of reason to the existence of God, to His providence and to the immortality of 
the soul.
334
  All of these: the intuitions of reason, the a priori judgements of moral 
nature, and the immediate apprehensions of the religious consciousness are, Hodge 
affirms, ‘absolutely infallible and of paramount authority’.
335
  The Common Sense 
philosophy acts as a contribution to Hodge’s concept of intuition, rather than as a 
threat, because the philosophy’s concept of intuitive power helps to describe the 
work of the Holy Spirit in everyday Christian life.  Using his concept of innate 
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knowledge, Hodge explains faith as a commitment to God based on internal 
religious experiences. 
     Generally, Hodge has been criticised as being too rationalistic.  Critics say that 
his theology is different to that of the Reformers because it is based on the 
propositions of external experiences.  But as we have seen, his concept of intuition 
helps us to understand his explication of religious feeling.  The distinctive element 
in Hodge’s view of a personhood is ‘feeling’.  Hodge’s understanding of the self as 
the Image of God is Calvinistic: 
‘… If we were not like God we could not know Him.’ Over and against the 
Greek theologians who made the image of God ‘consist exclusively in [our] 
rational nature’ and Lutherans who claimed that it was that which was lost 
by the fall and restored by redemption, Hodge followed the Calvinist 
tradition in holding that the image of God included both rational and moral 
elements.  God is a spirit; as such he is capable of thought, feeling and will; 
he has made us in his image; we too are capable of thought, feeling and 
will.
336
  
For Hodge, the essential attributes of a spirit, whether human or divine, are 
threefold: thought, will and feeling, the latter of which was either rejected or ignored 
by Calvin and Francis Turretin.
337
  The difference is probably due to Hodge’s 
Schleiermacherian connection and desiring to move away from a “Greek” concept 
of the philosopher’s God to a more dynamic one.
338
  Knowledge of God also 
involves our spiritual and religious nature that comes from our feeling.  However, 
Hodge thinks that our own feelings or inward experiences are possible only when 
they agree with the experiences of holy men recorded in the Scriptures.
339
  That is, 
Hodge is rationalistic primarily in relation to Schleiermacher and the mystics, but 
when he confronts Rationalists, he emphasises and relies on faith in the Scriptures 
and on religious experiences with this intuitive knowledge.  In this sense, Hodge’s 
emphasis on ‘feeling’ in the self as an image of God has to be understood in the 
category of an event in relation to others and our individual responsibility before 
God. 
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     For Hodge, the basic source of all religious knowledge is the Bible.  Although he 
pursues the proofs for evidence and intuitions of what happens in this world, he 
finally clings to the facts (truth) in the Bible.  In developing a doctrine, Hodge thinks 
the content of the whole Bible must be carefully considered, omitting nothing 
relevant to a given topic.  Because Hodge believes that religious truth often goes 
against the consciences of men, there is a much greater temptation in theology than 
in science for a person to ignore or deny unwelcome data in order to avoid their 
implications.  For this reason, Hodge argues that a theologian must, therefore, 
exercise special care to avoid such results by considering all the relevant data.
340
  
For Hodge, a theologian’s goal of knowledge should be the whole Bible. 
     In this way, Hodge argues that facts in the Bible (truth) are then the standard of 
Christian doctrine and individual life: the truth of holiness in life is objectively 
revealed in the Bible.  It is common sense for Hodge to tell us more directly that the 
Bible is confirmed to be truth.  Therefore, for him, the Bible is the most reliable 
source of religious knowledge because it cannot conflict with the facts of nature as 
they are properly understood according to the Bible.  Hence Hodge argues that 
religious knowledge that comes from the Bible is essential in forming man’s 
character.
341
   
     In Derridean khora, such an event of immediacy points to a true transcendental 
point.  Such ideas as subjectivity and objectivity that Hodge understood have to be 
conceived by the idea of gift.  Derrida said: 
There where there is subject and object, the gift would be excluded. A 
subject will never give an object to another subject. But the subject and the 
object are arrested effects of the gift, arrests of the gift. At the zero or infinite 
speed of the circle.
342
 
    According to Derrida, the question of the gift is related to its space, khora, ‘before 
any relation to the subject, before any conscious or unconscious relation to self of 
the subject’, which is exactly what happens with Heidegger’s Dasein.343  As we saw 
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in chapters I and II, as a bearer of responsibility, gift, faith and humility, the death of  
the I will understand the subject/object dichotomy with the idea of juxtaposition of 
the bipolarity in the event.  
     The task of this thesis is clear.  How can we overcome Hodge’s reason-based 
methodology and relate his perspective of religious immediacy to the event of 
khora?  The Derridean view of ‘the chains of supplements’344 that we studied in 
chapter II can explain the continuity of Hodge’s religious immediacy.  In addition to 
Systematic Theology, we can find inexhaustible sources in Hodge’s religious life and 
pietism through which we can trace the intersubjective modes of life experiences.  In 
chapters IV and V, we will discuss religious immediacy in more detail 
philosophically and theologically in terms of ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘the 
event’.   
 
J. Kantian Epistemology in the Inductive Method of Charles Hodge 
     1. ‘Facts’ in Kant and Hodge 
     Immanuel Kant wants a clear, objective understanding, either in science or 
religion.  In Kantian epistemology, religious knowledge is construed in the same 
way as that of science.  Following Kant, Hodge uses equal epistemology in seeking 
the value of science and religion through his theological methodology.  As we have 
seen, the Kantian concept of ‘facts’ plays an important role in Hodge’s account of 
cognate truths written in the Bible.  As does Kant, Hodge wants ‘facts’ (facts of the 
Bible) to be clear objective ‘things’.  To both Kant and Hodge, ‘a “fact” is objective’ 
means that there is neither controversy nor dispute, neither prejudice nor bias about 
it.  Then a fact becomes a finalised truth.  In science, a scientist is objective means 
that his research on the facts including experiment and observation, and reasoning 
has to be brought to effect by a verifiable scientific method.  With this definition, 
Hodge’s theology can be called objective because Hodge’s objectivity on a fact has 
always been verified by inductive method which is based on scientific reasoning.   
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     However, when they identify objectivity of facts and truth, we can find that their 
truth claims appear to be different, I believe, due to the way how they perceive what 
objectivity is.  While Kantian a priori knowledge on the absolute is speculative, 
Hodge gets absolute knowledge from the representations of the Scriptures and from 
the constitution of man as the image of God.
345
  In the Kantian premise, since truth 
is determined by man’s consciousness, the very fact that there are differences in 
opinion means that we cannot claim truth without agreement.  That is, in Kant, facts 
cannot be objectively true if there is no agreement, since truth requires that we are 
all prepared to accept an idea without argument.  While not identifying facts as truth, 
Kant argues that even the most obvious fact is relegated to the status of a ‘best 
guess’.  Also, Kant argues that we are not justified in assuming that what ‘it appears’ 
to us is identical to what ‘it is in itself’.
346
  That is, we cannot know reality ‘as it 
really is’, only as it ‘appears to us’, given the innate structure of our mind that is 
common to all human beings.  In this way, we cannot have our theoretical 
knowledge enable us to reach conclusions about reality.  However, there might be 
practical reasons for us to believe in God or immaterial souls.
347
  The facts of 
Hodge’s Christian experience, in this view, are socially subjective.   
     On the other hand, Hodge believes that ‘facts’ written in the Bible are 
undoubtedly true, he presupposes that they (the facts of the Bible) are objective 
truths, therefore we ought to believe them regardless of our viewpoints and opinions.  
In Hodge, ‘facts’, whether people agree with them or not, are true.  Accordingly, in 
his theology, we ought to be prepared to accept what he believes to be true without 
any suspicion or argument.  As Peter Hicks observes, Hodge is very clear that the 
contents of the Scriptures are not mere regulative truths: for Christians, the Bible is 
the Word of God.
348
  Without any self-evidencing hermeneutic process in knowing 
truth at all, in Hodge ‘facts’ are truths, and vice versa.  Consequently, there is no 
distinction between truths and facts in Hodge’s theology, because he regards facts as 
those written in the Bible are already objective.   
                                                 
345
 ST, v. I, p. 394. 
346
 Acton, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, p. 7. 
347
 Ibid.  
348
 Hicks, Philosophy of Charles Hodge, p. 79. 
  
 
111 
2.  The Limit of Hodge’s Methodology 
     Hodge, while using Scottish Realism or Kantian ideas in his theological method 
of induction, comments that ‘theories are of men’, and ‘facts are of God’ and ‘the 
Bible often contradicts the former, never the latter.’
349
  However, we need to confess 
that Hodge’s use of this philosophy as a fact in his Biblical theology contradicts his 
argument that it is based on the facts of the Bible.  His Scottish Common Sense 
Realism in his theology seems to contradict his ambitious conclusions, that 
‘philosophy must yield to revelation’ and ‘man must yield to God.’
350
  He may not 
put off this charge because, as we have studied, his world-view has been Scottish 
Common Sense Realism, which participated in his theology as a norm of the society.  
     Speaking in different perspective, Hodge’s inductive theological method has 
limits, due to its use of Kantian epistemology, which deals with science and religion, 
i.e., reason and faith, equally in the way of identifying ‘facts’ happening in Christian 
life with truth.  Hodge’s theological method of scientific induction is a way of 
understanding truth in the Bible, but his scope of interpretation of the Bible cannot 
encompass a total human experience of the world what Gadamer sets 
‘transformation into structure.’
351
  Hodge simply wants to prove how facts (truth) in 
the Bible are possible in theology itself and in Christian life, as well, through the 
inductive method by forcing to place facts of Christian experiences also concur with 
the facts of the text of the Bible.   
     Two other points are abstracted from above argument.  First, Hodge regards the 
effect (religious life) of the cause (the facts in the Bible) as truth.  Because of his 
understanding that religious experience is the effect of the cause, truth is due to the 
limit of a modern methodology that is ‘designed to determine the principles which 
should control scientific investigation’.
352
  Second, Hodge has no sense of 
discriminating truth (facts in the Bible) from his scientific inductive method.  If he 
believes that facts are of God, logically, his inductive method as a fact in his 
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theology has to be of God, too.  However, there is no indication or proof in Hodge’s 
work whether his method can be regarded as a fact of the Bible.  
     If Hodge’s theological method totally followed Kantian epistemology, the truth 
that Hodge really wants to keep would be lost.  However, Hodge keeps truth by 
simply presupposing that the Bible is truth and the induction of it in Christian life is 
true.  Then we can find that the Kantian concept of facts is used as a mere 
methodological tool in Hodge’s inductive theology.  For Hodge, as a scientist 
pursues facts, a theologian has to research the facts written in the Bible.  On the one 
hand, Hodge’s facts are unchangeable truths; on the other hand, Kantian facts are 
self-evident truths.  Yet the problem is that while Hodge follows the logic of Kant in 
his methodology, he not only regards facts as truth, but also the effects of facts on a 
reader, with which Kant would not agree.    
      I do not want to argue about the truth of the Bible, yet I want to recognise a 
serious problem in Hodge’s use of Kantian epistemology with the question of how 
Hodge’s Bible can always be considered to be true for a reader.  Is that just because 
‘facts’ in the Bible are similar to the categorical imperative in that we ought to 
regard them as true, even though our inclinations and desires conflict with what our 
reason requires?  Hodge’s answer would be clear.  He would argue that, through the 
illumination of the Holy Spirit, the Bible becomes true to a reader.  My next 
question is, can a reader dictate to or control the Holy Spirit to experience Biblical 
facts as true?  Isn’t it blasphemous in Hodge’s theology for a reader to control the 
Holy Spirit?  According to Kantian epistemology, as we have seen, truth is always 
self-evident truth.  It is clear that what we know as truth cannot be tantamount to 
God himself. 
3. New Paradigm: Event 
     I have many more questions on the way in which Hodge deals with ‘facts’.  
When Hodge says that religious experience—as well as the message of God—is 
prescribed in the facts of the Bible, the facts as truths in the Bible are normative 
factors that we have to review ourselves, according to the consequences of the facts 
in the Bible.  If we follow Hodge’s logic, our daily experiences ought to be 
confirmed by the facts in the Bible.  In other words, our experience ought to happen 
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according to the Bible.  At this moment, I have a question about how Hodge deals 
with the possibility that our experience at a certain time is not led by the Bible.  
What if our sinful experience does not follow the consequences of the facts of the 
Bible in a time and a space?  Conversely, how are the interrelated facts of the Bible 
as a teaching of our life meaningful to the life experiences of Judas or Peter?  I have 
endless questions.  How do the facts of the Bible function in determining whether I 
would follow Judas or Peter?  Can the facts of the Bible judge my tears in prayer, 
whether for repentance or regret, whether regret becomes repentance or not?  My 
question, in sum, is how are these questions related to the facts of the Bible? 
     The questions arising from the heart of human being have to be understood as 
facts happenings in the event.  Hodge’s inductive theological method may not be 
guaranteed when we experience death, the time when the concept of truth is 
scattered, as in Peter’s experience.  Then, is it possible for the theology of Hodge to 
deal with what would happen?  The only possibility of impossibility is, I believe, to 
overturn philosophical hierarchies in Hodge’s theological method and get rid of the 
violence of philosophy, so as to let Biblical theology be Biblical.  The death of the I 
will do the work by its ‘the supplement’ and the ‘tracing’ of God.  
     The facts of religious experience are the events themselves.  The events can be 
checked by the facts in the Bible, but are not happening according to facts written in 
the Bible.  If Hodge believes that ‘the Scriptures teach not only the truth, but also the 
effects of the truth on the heart and conscience, when applied with saving power by 
the Holy Ghost’,
353
 he should distinguish the effect of the Bible powered by the 
Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, from the facts written in the Bible itself. 
How can a believer’s life experience be regarded as truth in the Bible when the Holy 
Spirit is not applied to a believer’s life?  How do we know the moment when the 
Holy Spirit is being applied?  How on Earth can created human beings assert that 
their life experiences are tantamount to the facts (truth) in the Bible?  Hodge’s 
assertion that life experiences are the effects of the facts in the Bible is difficult to 
nail down.  This is nothing but a ‘theory of man’ of the type that Hodge worried 
about the most.  What he is doing here is to subordinate religious experience to the 
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facts of the Bible in the name of the Holy Spirit.  In this sense, Bruce Kuklick is 
right that Hodge lacks the ability to juxtapose the sacred texts of his tradition with 
his own life experience and the knowledge of his culture.
354
 
     In other words, contradictions in Hodge’s theology are observed in his inability 
to deal with intersubjective modes in believers’ faith and knowledge in their life 
experiences.  In this mode, when the death of the I, embedded in a person with the 
Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, is understanding the Bible, Hodge’s 
‘facts’ in the Bible are already interpreted by the spirituality working in the life 
experience of the death of the I.  Without knowing this, as Mark Noll observes, 
Hodge is contradicting himself in practising theology—on the one hand, confining 
the work of the Holy Spirit exclusively to the narrative of the Bible, and, on the 
other hand, developing a theology led by Scottish Common Sense Realism, which is 
not the Holy Spirit.
355
  In this sense, Hodge’s theology may be subject to the 
criticism that his theology is not Biblical, but philosophically dogmatised.      
     Let us discuss the philosophical violence in Hodge’s theological method some 
more.  As a Biblical theologian, it is proper for him to regard facts as written 
cognate truths.  For example, the temporary denial of Peter and the permanent 
deviation of Judas can be sources for theology.  But it is difficult for a reason-based 
philosophical method to theologise unreasonable spontaneous conflicts, agonies and 
contradictions of the Biblical narrative.  Genuinely true Biblical narrative cannot be 
Biblically interpreted due to the misuse of philosophy.  Because of this ignorance 
and misuse or abuse, Christianity sometimes has been under criticism for being 
dualistic and hypocritical.  The contradiction between the life experience of a 
believer and the knowledge of a believer is caused by the violence of philosophy 
over the facts in the Bible.  
     We do not have to undervalue Hodge’s success in showing that the authority of 
the Bible comes from the facts of the Bible.  However, in religious experience and 
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Christian theology, as well, especially when using philosophy in practising theology, 
‘facts’ should not only be confined to the truth in the Bible, but should be observed 
in the believers’ religious lives.  That is, theology should deal with not only the text 
itself, but also textuality, where Christian believers are experiencing God, the world 
and revelation.  As far as there are diversity and plurality in khora, the responsibility, 
gift, faith and humility of the death of the I cannot function with objective scientific 
certainty, because we know that khora cannot be perceived by the logic of reason.  
To put it another way, so long as there are differences with each other, there is no 
one universal, objective and scientific guide to resolve problems caused by them. 
  
K. In Sum 
     The inductive theological method of Hodge is an example of the marriage of the 
Kantian categorical imperative (‘we ought to do…’) and Calvinism.
356
  It is 
categorical when Hodge maintains the authority of the Bible by placing our religious 
experience the effect of the cause, the Bible.  He believes that the Holy Spirit 
illuminates and convinces such that the religious experiences are the effects of the 
Bible.  Hodge’s belief as a Calvinist is that a human being’s will to knowledge is so 
totally depraved that we should not produce controversy or dispute over the truths 
written in the Bible. 
     If we are critical to the cause and effect relationship in Hodge’s methodology that 
presupposes the Bible is always the cause of everything, we need to think that 
theology has to put God as cause and the effect as our life experience as well as the 
Bible.  This is what contextual theology does.  The reality is that our religious 
experience happens in the intersubjective modes of our daily life for the pursuit of 
objectivity.  Furthermore, even when we do not say anything and not pretend to 
know anything, God works through us as an event in His providence.  Even if we 
say that we have the purely pure truth, the expression of it does not mean that we are 
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truth, or that listeners to our speech are automatically to be involved in the truth, just 
because it is said to be truth.   
     However, truth remains as the object of knowledge in the epistemology of 
Hodge’s theology.  In Hodge, all theological arguments are discussed following an 
objective inductive method, and are eventually resolved in the accounted facts of the 
Bible.  What if we do not get any sense of truth after reading what he says about 
truth in his theology?  Is it due to his lack of faith or knowledge?  I believe it is not 
due to Hodge himself, but to the epistemological problem of his theology that he 
might not have recognised in his nineteenth-century philosophical context.  Actually, 
this is not Hodge’s problem, but the metaphysical epistemology that cosigns a strong 
theology. 
     Here, the intention and purpose of dealing with Hodge’s theology is clear. He is a 
distinctive nineteenth-century theologian who is still tremendously influential on the 
so-called Reformed and Evangelical traditions of American theology.  Even though 
his theological structure is limited in embracing a diverse and pluralistic society, 
Hodge’s theological confession as an uncompromising standard of the unique value 
of Christianity has to be shown.  The task of the Reformed and Evangelical circle of 
this era is to show a theology that is context-sensitive at the same time that it is a 
unique Christian conviction of faith.  For this reason, I want to show Evangelicals 
how we can practise theology in another way, without losing Evangelical value at all. 
Hodge’s value can be found in Fundamentalism and Calvinism.  
     So we want to keep the value of Hodge that came out of his religious freedom. 
The doctrinal value of Old Princeton Theology and Hodge are clear.  First, the old 
Princetonians’ doctrinal basis, including that of Hodge, was here and there indicated 
in their theologies, in which certain doctrines such as the infallibility of the Bible, 
the Trinity, the Virgin birth, the bodily resurrection, the substitutionary atonement, 
and the coming again of Jesus Christ, were declared essential to Christianity.  
Second, their theologies were based on traditional Calvinism and the TULIP 
teachings.
357
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     We can and have to practise a theology of universality as I have consistently 
argued in this thesis, to be together, to be in khora, to practise theology without 
losing Hodge’s particular religious conviction. This is not an ambiguous synthetic 
theology at all, but being together, at the same time, warns Christian circles with the 
message of what the priorities of our theology, faith and institutions are to be.  In 
this theology, all kinds of doctrinal debates are possible, because it allows freedom 
to all, freedom to each of them, freedom to each signifier—a particular conviction of 
faith.  Since the very foundation of truth is freedom, if you really believe what you 
believe is truth, you have to respect the freedom of others.  Because you believe, the 
truth that you know to be true will eventually be fulfilled.  We have been too 
impatient to be harmonised with others and are too negligent of others’ freedoms.  If 
you think what you know is true, khora would be the only place to exercise what 
you believe to be true.   
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CHAPTER IV 
PROCESS, INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND EVENT  
IN THE UNIVERSALITY OF HERMENEUTICS 
 
A. Preface 
     As we saw in the previous chapter, Kantian philosophy and Scottish Common 
Sense Realism give Charles Hodge the intellectual ammunition that enables him to 
claim that inductive (scientific) method will certify and verify the facts of the 
mystical revelations of the Bible.  As far as theological method is concerned, Hodge 
believes in an equal epistemology for science and theology.  What is distinctive in 
Hodge is that the Scientific method becomes the very tool to expound the revelation 
of God presupposing that all facts of the text are already interpreted by God as a 
means of a divine eternal plan.
358
  For Hodge, then the inductive method is the 
vehicle that makes possible the facts of the Bible to be truth.  However, since we 
recognise the reality that the scientific method cannot be truth itself, but a passage 
for understanding truth, we have a pertinent inquiry of how we can discover the 
proper conditions for understanding the truth of ‘facts’ written in the Bible in 
Hodge's theology. 
     How Hodge's concept of objectivity has to be construed especially when what he 
believes to be an objective truth produces meaning?  For the answer of this question, 
in this chapter, I want to observe how Hodge's reason-based scientific epistemology 
has been evolved in the context of  Enlightenment ideas and what kind of tension it 
has with such methods as ‘process', ‘intersubjectivity' and ‘event' in knowing truth.  
I believe that these three context-sensitive modes in understanding will enable us to 
think of textuality
359
 where the facts in Hodge's theology proliferate meaning.  For 
the discussion of ‘process' as an antidualism, we need John Dewey's ‘habit and 
reason'; for intersubjectivity as a substitution of objectivity, Habermas and 
Gadamer's debate on the ‘subject-object relationship'; and for the event as a truth of 
act, Derrida's khora.   
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     With the results of this chapter, in chapter V, we will discuss universality in 
khora in comparison with the ‘genius' of Ralph Waldo Emerson and the ‘ironist' of 
Richard Rorty, and observe how khora works in Leo Tolstoy and Søren Kierkegaard, 
in search of the righteous in this era—the proper attitude in practising theology.  
These ideas will be the backbone for the reinterpretation of the theology of Hodge, a 
father of American Evangelicalism.  I believe an event has the capacity to resolve all 
the hermeneutic problems caused by dualism, antidualism and intersubjectivity even 
though it captures a spontaneous moment.  Ultimately, reminding that this 
spontaneous event has the passage of history of religion with responsibility, gift, 
faith and humility, we will have the ideas to reconstruct Hodge's nineteenth-century 
American Calvinist theological method. 
 
B.  In Search of the True Transcendental Point 
     If we regard hermeneutics as a communication between subject and object, 
transcendence and immanence, visible and invisible, and spoken and unspoken, we 
first need to understand the hermeneutic conscience of a human being in the context 
of universality and particularity.  The implication of universality and particularity 
discussed in chapter I shows that Christian theology has to accomplish hermeneutic 
universality by recognising the reality of the plurality and diversity of created beings. 
     In this thesis, we have frequently discussed the transcendental inquiry in the 
context of the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit in the manner when it is 
applied to the intersubjective modes of a believer’s life experience, where 
independent objective knowledge of God, Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, and the 
particular faith of a believer, are occurring.  Consequently, this transcendental 
inquiry comes from the question of how to resolve the dichotomy of faith and 
knowledge.  In chapter II, after discussing the necessity of juxtaposition of the 
universality, the death of the I, and the particularity, ‘the Trinitarian personhood of 
the Holy Spirit’, we found that the death of the I embedded in a person with the 
Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit will achieve universality at the moment 
when the true transcendental point occurs.  The supplemental death of the I is 
temporal, but necessary to a whole.   
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     From this point on, it is imperative for us to begin with to know how the 
Enlightenment ideas of reason have evolved.  First of all, we want to study how the 
Kantian ‘transcendental deduction’ deals with the dichotomy of the object and 
subject, and how it has developed for the true transcendental synthesis as a means to 
achieve the true transcendental point.  Accordingly, we will follow up our prospect 
for universality by Kant’s transcendental deduction, and as a result we will discuss 
how real truth claims are possible. 
     However, as I have argued, the prospect for Kantian synthetic universality in 
Christianity or any religion cannot be true universality, because true universality 
cannot be achieved in a synthetic way, as we affirmed in chapter I that Jesus as the 
Son of Man and the Son of God cannot be understood in the idea of synthesis.  A 
true transcendental point cannot be achieved by synthesis because God cannot be 
synthesised by any of His creatures.  False teachings, heresies and false gods that 
claim that ‘I am God’ are good examples of synthetic understandings of universality.  
The hope for a transcendental synthesis in Kantian philosophy will result either in 
violence in philosophy or in a misbelief in a religious world.  Synthetic 
understanding of universality as a matter of overcoming the subject/object duality 
cannot but produce a repercussion from each side. 
      We believe the impossible true universality may be possible only as an event in 
khora.  As we have seen in chapter I, khora as the third species (triton genos), 
neither sensible nor intelligible, is always participating everywhere and every time 
in an intelligible and enigmatic way.
360
  ‘An intelligible and enigmatic way’ means 
that we need to understand khora in view of the two types of being: immutable and 
intelligible/corruptible, in the process of becoming sensible.  For this reason, I 
propose that Derridean khora will facilitate a space where Hodge’s reason-based 
inductive theological method could not have articulated.  Then khora becomes the 
exact space where the value of Hodge’s theology is intended, but it is not the space 
of a given whole.  An event in a chain of the context-sensitive modes in khora will 
not lose universality, but remind us that we are nothing but a particular dust of 
temporal life.    
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     On the one hand, it is true that, without respecting and identifying a particular 
personhood, no true universality is possible because God is and works with every 
particular created being with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.  Every 
particular created child of God is a distinct individual human being whom God has 
created and blessed.  Even an identical twin has a different shape and character.  
God has given a personal mandate to each of them, ‘Be fruitful and increase in 
number; fill the earth and subdue it.  Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the 
air and over every living creature that moves on the ground.’ (Genesis 1:28)  A 
particular, a signifier, is the very source of the universality by living what God wants 
us to live.  
     On the other hand, the idea of temporal life does not simply refer to a short life, 
but a genuine expression of an event that implies a passage of life in the past, 
present and future. Peter equates a day with 1,000 years.  II Peter 3:8-9 says: 
8
 But do not forget this one thing, dear friends: With the Lord a day is like a 
thousand years, and a thousand years are like a day. 
9
 The Lord is not slow in 
keeping his promise, as some understand slowness. Instead he is patient with 
you, not wanting anyone to perish, but everyone to come to repentance.   
That is, even an event seems to be temporal, it has the power of revealing divine 
providential authority encompassing yesterday, today and tomorrow. 
     As we have seen in chapter II, we will not discuss the Trinity or the Trinitarian 
personhood of the Holy Spirit.  We would rather focus on a person with the 
Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit and on the effect of the juxtaposition of 
them.  The function of the juxtaposition should be observed in the image of God as 
we studied in chapter I and II.  Such Biblical figures as Abraham, Paul and Peter are 
exemplars of an image of God where our discussion of juxtaposition happens.  
     As we will discuss in the next chapter about Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, 
the lesson that we can learn from the dilemma of Abraham’s faith is that our 
transcendental faith becomes a sort of universal medium through which the separate 
empirical selves are construed.  If we regard a transcendental object as a real thing, 
we will definitely make mistakes in understanding it because of our own 
manipulations of judgement in knowing it, since our understanding is posited only 
as a point of view.  Our judgement is a manipulation when we think that the 
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principles of pure understanding can apply only to objects of the senses, never to 
things in general, without regard to the mode.
361
  
     This universality happens at the space of khora to which the key is ‘textuality’.  
Universality of hermeneutics is possible when textuality, not the text itself, becomes 
a medium of understanding.  Since khora is not an identity, we approach it with 
elusive and negative anticipation.  However, in order to get at it as an impossibility 
of a possible a priori, we need to trace its historical and philosophical background 
from Kant.  
 
C. The Significance of Enlightenment in Kantian Reason and Derridean Khora 
     Enlightenment, according to Kant, is a human being’s emergence from his self.  
If we regarded human consciousness as exclusively related to the awareness of God, 
we might still have been in confusion about the intrinsic attributes of human thought. 
The endeavour of René Descartes to discover self-evident knowledge by doubting 
everything initiated the study of critical thinking about self-consciousness. 
Following Descartes’s doubt, the Kantian motto of Enlightenment, ‘have the 
courage to make use of your own understanding (dare to be wise; i.e., sapere 
aude!)’,362 turns on our courage to be wise with taking risks in our thinking.  
 1. Practical Reason Is Based on Enlightenment Ethics 
     Kant believes that our practical reason
363
 will secure the freedom of self-
consciousness with the awareness of our responsibility.  Gadamer establishes the 
idea of universality of hermeneutics using practical reason because it is not technical 
reason, but universal.
364
 According to Gadamer: 
reason always consists not in blindly insisting on what one believes is true, 
but in engaging critically with one’s belief. This is still what enlightenment 
does, but not in the dogmatic form of a new, absolute rationality that always 
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knows better. Therefore, reason also needs to be grappled with in respect to 
itself and its own contingency in a process of constant self-enlightenment.
365
 
Gadamer also explains the role of practical knowledge, that we are living together in 
this world as a guiding light of reason in human action and behaviour:  
As a practical knowledge of practical reason, this knowledge teaches the 
conditions under which reason becomes practical. It points out the forces that 
derive from the very fact that we live together as people, without thereby 
limiting reason’s critical capacity for distinguishing the better from the worse. 
For this practical reason is certainly not, as Aristotle of course occasionally 
has it, limited to just the means of bringing about given ends.
366
 
      While Kant argues that a man’s reason must always be free, he sees that 
prejudices—like the ones that allow people, following a revolution, to become a 
great unthinking mass—will ultimately serve as a restraint on the freedom to think 
wisely.
367
 However, Gadamer overturns this Kantian formula that reason is above 
prejudice, and eventually involves himself in an intense debate with Habermas.  
    The hermeneutic process through practical reason presupposes the fact that we are 
living together in this world, and that one perspective is not better than the other, but 
each of them is prejudiced.  With this presupposition, Gadamer’s understanding 
begins.  As we have seen above, Human reason, already conditioned by prejudice, 
authority and the tradition of a certain time and space, cannot decide which is better 
or worse, but becomes a necessary source of our understanding.  Therefore, 
according to Gadamer, we are always so prepossessed by prejudices that we 
desperately need Kantian courage to be wise:  
Here we recall another Kantian description of the Enlightenment: it is hardly 
as though there were still blind faith in authority or an over-dominant 
priesthood in modern industrial society. I think it is our prepossession with 
the technological dream and our obsession with emancipatory utopia that 
represent the prejudices of our time and from which reflection, as the 
courage to think, needs to free us.
368
  
In Gadamer, hermeneutic universality—not in the manner of dominion, but of 
aesthetics—is possible through Enlightenment freedom.  Gadamer’s tool of freedom 
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is language.  In Derrida, khora is the place where the idea of freedom of self-
consciousness concurs with the awareness of responsibility.  The freedom of khora 
is beyond our logic of reason.  However, we need to notice that such a ‘revolution 
against reason, from the moment it is articulated’ is able to be perceived only ‘within 
reason’ being observed in the ‘language of a department of internal affairs, a 
disturbance.’
369
  Despite the fact that khora is beyond reason, we need to adopt the 
language of Kantian reason and begin to study khora within it.  
     In the following section, we want to talk about the role of Kantian transcendental 
deduction in such ideas as ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’, in search of the 
philosophical background of the death of the I embedded in a person with the 
Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.  Then we will sketch out how 
Enlightenment ideas function in these concepts through Kant, and discuss each one 
of them in its philosophical context. 
2. Kant’s Critical Thinking and ‘Process’ 
     According to Kant, courageous wisdom is reforming by itself, not like a once-
and-for-all revolution.
370
  A revolution may well put an end to autocratic despotism 
and to predatory or power-seeking oppression, but it will never produce a true 
reform in ways of thinking, because changing a human being’s mindset is more 
difficult than social revolution.  That is, revolution may change the structure of a 
society dramatically, but it does not have the ability to reform a human being’s ways 
of thinking.  A human mind tends not to be changed radically without reasonable 
agreement.  The revolutionary ideology may suddenly haunt almost all the people, 
but it suppresses their courage and wisdom.  
     The public use of one’s reason has to be free, only with which true 
Enlightenment is possible.
371
  In Kant’s idea of practical reason, the autonomous 
self-consciousness rests on a sublime self-certainty about our moral freedom.  
Actually, our freedom tends to fall into self-indulgence due to its characteristic 
contingency.  However, Kantian freedom does not involve self-indulgence or 
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leading a dissolute life because it is a purely formal intellectual principle detached 
from action, affection and dialogue with others.  Kant writes that freedom is ‘a pure 
transcendental idea, which, in the first place, contains nothing borrowed from 
experience’.
372
 Hence, freedom comes from thinking freely, and accordingly, it is 
contiguous with gradual process:  
Thus when the nature has unwrapped, from under this hard shell, the seed for 
which she cares most tenderly, namely the propensity and calling to think 
freely, the latter works back upon the mentality of the people.
373
 
The freely enlightened man with gradual process of critical thinking then, has ‘a 
well-disciplined and numerous army’ for public peace without afraid of anything.
374
  
Also, khora is recognised as a space where human beings dare to be wise, as 
Kantian Enlightenment teaches.    
     As we have seen, the Kantian idea of freedom in critical thinking and wisdom 
enables a gradual process of understanding.
 375
 This understanding is seen in the 
Copernican discovery of the phenomena of planetary astronomy.  Copernicus argued 
that we can understand astronomy by considering the movement of the Earth.  The 
movement of every perceiving subject must be reckoned with the movements 
observed, in order to discover the real motion of the object one is observing.
376
  This 
phenomenon is regarded as an endless experience of the understanding of an 
observer.  In this way, an observer understands things and he gives meaning to them.  
Without understanding modes, the thing out there is meaningless.  
3. A Priori and Transcendental Deduction in Kant 
     According to Kant, ‘understanding derives its laws not from nature, but rather 
prescribes them to nature.’
377
  Since understanding is the medium between our 
thought and the nature of a thing, the laws that understanding drives are a priori 
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knowledge.  A priori means that a past object is not merely past, but can ideally be 
present.  It is abiding in a present consciousness, neither assuming that anything 
actually exists nor using any empirical premise.
378
  In Kant, knowledge is regarded 
as a priori if it is ‘independent of experience and even of all impressions of the 
senses’.
379
  Kant’s a priori proof is well-adopted in proving the existence of God 
when Kant says, ‘[I]f it is possible that God exists, and it is possible, then God must 
exist.’
380
  Hodge, following Kant, also understands God as possible a priori.  When 
Hodge argues that the knowledge of God is innate, as we saw in chapter III, he 
maintains that innate knowledge was opposed to that acquired through a process of 
research and reasoning.
381
 
     According to Roger Scruton, synthetic a priori knowledge is possible through 
subjective and objective deduction.
382
  Here, deduction stands for ‘a proof that we 
have the right to something; the right to apply certain concepts or categories’.
383
  If 
understanding is possible as modes of knowledge in our life experience, then this is 
what Kant means by transcendental deduction.  That is to say, an argument is 
transcendental ‘if it transcends the limits of empirical enquiry, so as to establish the 
a priori conditions of experience’.384  What Kant wants to do is to determine 
universally necessary transcendental deductions from purely formal first principles 
that determine the a priori possibility of natural science and moral law.  Then 
understanding as the faculty of judgement is not about the origin of experience, but 
about what is embedded in it. 
     Therefore, according to Kant, we need to distinguish transcendental from 
empirical argument.  A transcendental argument is different from an empirical one 
                                                 
378
 Acton, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, p. 3. 
379
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 2. 
380
 Acton, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, p. 3. 
381
 ST, v. I, p. 192. 
382
 According to Scruton, ‘objective deduction consists in a positive attempt to establish the content 
of a priori knowledge. What are the presuppositions of experience? What has to be true if we are to 
have even that bare point of view that the skeptics ascribe to us? If we can identify these 
presuppositions, then they will be established as true a priori—the truth of presuppositions follows, 
not from the fact that we have this and that experience, but from the fact that we have experience at 
all—by reasoning alone.  I cannot conceive of their falsehood, since I cannot conceive of myself as 
part of a world that refutes them.’  Kant: A Very Short Introduction, p. 33. 
383
 Ibid. 
384
 Ibid. 
  
 
127 
in the sense that it leads us to ‘knowledge which is occupied not so much with 
objects as with the mode of our knowledge in so far as this mode of knowledge is 
possible a priori’.385  That is to say, a priori knowledge of Kant eliminates the 
metaphysical realm as an area of possible knowledge.  In comparison with Kant’s 
transcendental deduction, as Kevin Hart points out, Derridean différance plays a role 
in enabling metaphysics, yet disables the tantalisation in knowing by metaphysics.
386
  
Hart explains that, in Derrida, the end of metaphysics (the true transcendental point) 
is seen as a ‘particular event, almost, it seems, as part of salvation history’.
387
 
4. Kant and the Derridean Event 
      So far we have seen that the Kantian reformation happens through 
intersubjective modes of transcendental deduction, which synthesise the dichotomy 
of objectivity and subjectivity as far as a priori understanding is possible.  However, 
as it has nothing to do with Kantian reformation and revolution, such a thing as a 
sudden enlightenment can happen when our courage and wisdom is not suppressed, 
but freed.  How can we explain this temporal moment of change?  Does the Kantian 
a priori make our understanding possible?  
     The Kantian transcendental deduction has a limit when the a priori is to 
understand something secretive, like what happens at a certain spontaneous moment.  
In chapter one of Acts, the Holy Spirit comes to those waiting for the realisation of 
the promise at Mark’s attic.  This event cannot be perceived by transcendental 
deduction because it is a secret to the a priori.  As far as the promise is concerned, it 
is impossible for the a priori to understand this kind of event that is nonhuman, 
atheological and ahistorical, because nothing happens through it and nothing 
happens to it.
388
 
     Due to the unpredictability and achronicity of the event, the very otherness of the 
third species (triton genos) occurs at the moment of thinking, speaking and acting. 
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Nobody knows the exact time and place of this event.  Khora, then, is the place as 
event which remains the place of waiting, waiting for the realisation of the 
promise.
389
  When the time is fulfilled, then event will take place fully.  But nothing 
guarantees the cause and effect of the event.  According to John Caputo, an event is 
not something that has an essential quality: 
An event is not an inner essence, like Hegelian Wesen, the essential being of 
a thing that is unfolding more or less inevitably in time, but it is the endless 
possibilities of linking of what the name is capable.
390
 
In this way, Caputo thinks of theology in the event of the logos of the name of God.   
That is, theology is the hermeneutics of the event or the ‘deconstruction of the name 
of God’, which releases an ‘unconditional event’ sheltered by the name of God.
391
 
5. The Meaning of Kant in Derridean Khora 
     Philosophy in metaphysics is not ready to answer the questions that fail to 
recognise the truth.  For Derrida, the retreat, or re-trait, from the truth itself, is but a 
word in which a certain formlessness or namelessness has left its mark, something 
which philosophy cannot philosophise, something that resists philosophy, that 
withdraws from philosophy’s view and grasp.  In the space of khora, there is neither 
a being nor a non-being, but traces within which both are inscribed.  
     With Kant, Derrida exposes a reflecting faith that is non-dogmatic and 
independent of historical revelation: it does not depend essentially upon any 
historical revelation, and thus agrees with the rationality of pure practical reason, 
reflecting that faith favours good will beyond all knowledge.  It is thus opposed to 
dogmatic faith and thereby ignores the difference between faith and knowledge.
392
  
This idea is very much similar to that of John Calvin, when he explains faith as the 
knowledge of God.  In Calvin, faith and knowledge are not antitheses, but faith itself 
is knowledge of God.  Unlike Calvin, Derrida—as well as Kierkegaard—enters the 
realms of ethics and morality by following Kantian faith, which favours a good will.  
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However, we should not dismiss the fact that Calvin’s doctrine of Providence places 
election under Christian life, i.e., the courage to persevere.  
     The idea of freedom of self-consciousness is related to Kantian ‘maxims of 
human understanding’ originated from ‘common sense’.
393
  Kant believes that our 
practical reason will enable the freedom of self-consciousness neither by being 
desired nor caused by our moral responsibility.
394
  Rather, an open-ended freedom 
(‘right to liberty’) perfects our responsibility to respect other’s right.
395
  With this 
concept of freedom with awareness of responsibility, I identified the death of the I in 
chapter I:  Unlike Kant’s categorical imperative, the duty or responsibility of the 
death of the I binds us to the absolute other.  
     A faith act in khora is also beyond Kantian reason.  As we shall see in chapter V, 
in the section on Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, it is impossible to work 
through Abraham’s dilemma simply by using Kant’s faculty of reason because 
God’s commandment moves beyond the borders of what can be cognitively 
understood.  If one decides to think of what the commandment means, it might be 
too late.  In faith, responding to the call of the other has to be an immediate event, 
without hesitation.  This implies that a faith act in the perseverance of Christian life, 
i.e., sacrifice, is not only related to our aesthetic feeling of freedom and courage, 
which comes from innate knowledge, but directly to an event happens with it.   
     It is an event of a faith act because an actualised possibility of perseverance 
happens when the death of some other possibility.  We are not able to respond to the 
call or to the love of another without having the sense of ‘perseverance’ and 
deciding to sacrifice ourselves to the other that requires a disruption of the horizon 
that Kantian ethics requires.  There is no space for the Derridean ‘messianic’ within 
Kantian ideas, for messianicity has nothing to do with ‘how one would act’ in a 
reasonable and esthetical sense.   Rather, it is the sudden disruption of any 
boundaries, thereby providing a secretive gap for the impossibility to appear. 
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     In sum, the role of Kantian reason in Derrida is a powerful vehicle to think of the 
Derridean X (trace, the supplement, différance and so on) that we discussed in 
chapter II.   Here, too, reason is intrinsically constituted by the lack of power 
because the object of reason (X) is not perfect.
396
  That is, Kantian reason is 
incapable of thinking of X because it is ‘the irrational and the non-natural’.
397
   
     With these things in mind, in the following sections, through an evaluation of 
Dewey’s idea of ‘process’ and Gadamer’s and Habermas’s ideas of 
‘intersubjectivity’, we want to find out how the imperfect Derridean X functions in 
spontaneous and temporal happenings.  The paradox here is that the inability of 
Kantian Enlightenment reason can be resolved by non-dualistic ways of critical 
thinking that the Enlightenment also provides.  Through this study, we will know 
that first, Dewey’s reason and Gadamer’s practical reason are not antithetical to 
Enlightenment ideas, but that neither blindly insists on what one believes is true or 
not.  Instead, they engage in the process of questioning how one would know truth 
by being critical of one’s belief.  Therefore, second, both reasons are to be 
understood in the intersubjective mode.  Third, spontaneity and temporality are 
observable because we understand them not in dualism, but an event happens in a 
certain point of an anti-dualistic mode.  Later, in the next chapter, with these results, 
I will argue that these three ideas are the components of the death of the I, which is 
working as the supplements in khora and are to be major factors in interpreting the 
theology of Charles Hodge. 
 
D. ‘Process’: Charles Hodge on Darwinism and John Dewey 
     Hodge’s theology has nothing to do with Dewey’s pragmatism.  It is not true that 
Hodge’s theology is not process-oriented.
398
  He is not opposed to the evolving 
process observed in life experience.  Especially when we study Hodge’s view on 
Darwinism, we can see that he recognises what is going on in the process of 
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evolution. When he understands evolution in terms of the providence of God and 
God’s design, he is open to the theory of evolution defined as ‘the assumption that 
all organic forms, vegetable and animal, have been evolved or developed from one, 
or a few, primordial living germs’.
399
 With these things in mind, we want to study 
the pragmatism of Dewey (1859-1952), especially his view on reason and habit in 
comparison with Hodge. 
     In his lifelong philosophical research, Dewey tried to develop pragmatic views of 
William James (1842-1910) and aimed to overcome Hegelian idealism.  In Dewey, 
supernaturalism is interpreted as ‘the religious phase of experience’.
400
  Throughout 
his life, he wished to dispense with the metaphysical and anti-empirical category of 
religion, but to retain the potential of religious experience for nurturing ‘the sense of 
values which carry one through periods of darkness and despair’.
401
  With Dewey’s 
point in mind, we want to study Hodge’s views on Darwinism.  This study will also 
show how Hodge’s Biblical theology responds to the process modes of religious 
experience between the objective truth of God in the Bible and the subjective 
particular faith and knowledge in the nineteenth-century American context.  
1. Hodge on Darwinism 
     On the issue of Darwinism, Hodge sees no conflict between science and religion 
because he feels that the facts in science cannot contradict the truth.  Scientific facts 
are the result of God’s activity in every part of Creation.  Hodge’s belief that God 
purposely designed the essence and the substance of materials and living things 
reminds us, on the one hand, that the idea of intelligent design is Kantian and on the 
other hand, Darwin’s theory of evolution is different to Kantian metaphysical 
epistemologies.  What Hodge is doing is to reconcile Darwinian evolution with 
Kantian ideas of design.  Believing that the process of evolution happens under 
God’s design in His providence, he wants to situate the process-oriented evolution in 
Kantian theological epistemology.  For Hodge, since God is the originator of the 
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facts, the facts of evolution are God’s, thus, one can be a Christian and still endorse 
evolution.
402
 
      Hodge is confident that science and religion will ultimately be in harmony if 
science is based on fact.  What he rejects is ‘Darwinism’, a human theory that 
‘natural selection is without design, being conducted by unintelligent physical 
causes.’
403
   Even though he does not show how it could be harmonised with the 
Scriptures, he anticipates that ‘others may see it, and be able to reconcile their 
allegiance to the Bible.’
404
  I believe that others may endorse it if they overcome 
Kantian epistemology. 
      On Hodge’s identification of scientific facts with the facts in the Bible, Ronald 
Numbers claims that the rule of engagement in theology and science is different: 
Interpreters of the Bible and interpreters of nature do no longer use common method 
in knowing facts; they now employed ‘different rules of evidence’ that inevitably led 
to ‘different conclusions’:’
405
 
To make matters worse, Hodge noted bitterly, scientific men tended to 
denigrate metaphysicians and theologians. In such strained circumstances, 
Hodge felt disinclined to continue granting men of science the benefit of 
doubt in their encounters with religion. Though he desired peace, he feared it 
would prove elusive. Religion, he concluded, was in a “fight for its life 
against a large class of scientific men”.
406
 
     By observing Numbers’s criticism, we have a question of how to understand 
what Hodge meant by the Bible is to theologian what nature is to the man of science.  
Where are the common grounds shared by science and religion?  I believe that the 
contradictions of Hodge stem from his inductive theological method, which is 
oversimplified in regarding facts both written in the Bible and researched by 
scientists as of God.   In order to resolve the origin of Hodge’s contradictions, we 
need to study the different understandings of reason of Kant and of Dewey. 
2. Kant’s Reason vs. Dewey’s Reason 
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     Like Gadamer, whom we will study later in this chapter, Dewey wants to 
overturn Kantian formulas of reason.  Dewey understands Kant as follows: 
[Kant] saw that the idea of reason could be self-consistent only by stripping 
it naked of these empirical accretions. He then provided, in his critiques, a 
somewhat cumbrous moving van for transferring the resultant pure or naked 
reason out of nature and the objective world, and for locating it in new 
quarters, with a new stock of goods and new customers. The new quarters 
were particular subjects, individuals; the stock of goods were the forms of 
perception and the functions of thought by which empirical flux is woven 
into durable fabrics; the new customers were a society of individuals in 
which all are ends in themselves.
407
 
Dewey wants the primacy of empiricism.  He views the Kantian marriage of 
freedom and authority as always putting ‘sentimental primacy to the former and 
practical control to the latter’.
408
  His argument is that there is not a single power and 
authority that can regulate our freedom, rather, that the freedom which comes from 
our courage to be has to break a singular power to be democratic.  Authoritative 
power always suppresses our freedom only which we can access truth.  Hence 
Dewey deconstructs authority saying that there is no ‘separate’ body of moral rules, 
system of motive powers or subject-matter of moral knowledge.
409
  As an alternative, 
he argues that freedom resides in such a space as poetry and art, which will shine as 
‘humorous irony’ at the moment when ‘the most of the harsh’ glances of moral 
philosophy will turn towards ‘the idea of an experimental basis and career for 
morals’.
410
  
     In order to understand Dewey’s conception of reason, we need to begin with his 
notion of ‘habit’.  According to Dewey, human beings have senses where there are 
habitual dispositions to know.
411
  Habit, then, is an undivided continuous transaction 
or interaction between living human beings and their natural and artificial 
environment, such as thought, feeling, doing, suffering, handling, perceiving and so 
on.  That is to say, human beings are fundamentally and continually attached to their 
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environment, organically related to it, changing it even as it changes them.  
Reasoning, as a mediation of obtaining knowledge, begins to become a habit.  
     Dewey attributes the nature of reason to habit by thinking that as habit is learned, 
acquired and cultivated, so, too, is reason.  If Dewey’s reason is something to be 
learned, there is no original separate impulse behind it: it is antithetical to Kantian 
reason.  That is, Kant’s formalism is incompatible with Dewey’s pragmatism and its 
process-orientation.  Thus, Dewey defines reason differently to Kant.  For Dewey, 
reason is 
as effective as the quality or degree of cultivation it has undergone; it is 
never to be regarded as perfect or finished in its development. Second, as a 
habit, reason is itself projective and urgent; hence it is folly to consider 
reason the cool counter-balance to torrid impulse. If so, reason may be the 
most flexible of habits but it is not devoid of persistent self-assertion in the 
heat of conflict. As fragile as any other habit, reason is as vulnerable to 
excess or weakness as any other habit.
 412
  
     Here, Dewey regards reason as the most flexible form of habits.  Habit is 
regarded not only as the capacity for reason, but also as the material of reason itself.  
Dewey discusses habit in relation to reason and intelligence as a means of 
knowledge: ‘Concrete habits are the means of knowledge and thought’,
413
 and they 
‘do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving and 
reasoning’.
414
  If reason is a form of habit, Dewey’s reason is just a vehicle ‘to know 
“how” by means of our habits’.
415
    
     Dewey’s reason can be summarised as follows: the ability to reason is itself an 
acquired habit, subject to the limitations of the nature of habit; the data on which 
reason works are the products of habits, hence shaped by the nature of habit; habits 
are the means by which we know how.  The net effect of this influence is to render 
the power of reason for determining conduct subject to the conditions of habit.  
     Accordingly, Dewey thinks that knowledge is not absolute, immutable and 
eternal, but relational to the interaction of human beings with the world.  By seeing 
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knowledge as not absolute, Dewey has been allowed to be open-minded in a 
democratic approach in problem solving.  He believes that our cooperation and 
rational tolerance for diverse views within a pluralistic society and culture will 
enable mature development of our living in a space and time.  In re-examining 
Charles Hodge’s theology, we also need to recognise that our knowledge is not 
perfect, but God is.  As Hodge does and anticipates, theology needs to pay attention 
to ‘humorous irony’ in the modes of our life experiences.    
3. Anti-Dualism and Pragmatism in Dewey 
     The problem of dualism, according to Dewey, is that what is called ‘mind or 
consciousness’ is disconnected from ‘the physical organs of activities’: the former is 
purely intellectual and cognitive, and the latter is always considered to be an 
irrelevant and intruding physical matter.
416
  This sort of dualism can never work in 
Dewey’s thought.  In Dewey, there is no independent objectivity and subjectivity 
because both of them are integrated into the modes of process in their experience.
417
 
The examples of anti-dualistic modes for Dewey are ‘growth’, ‘thinking’, ‘habit’ 
and ‘experience’, where both mind as a subject matter and physical action as an 
object are integrally working together as a kind of ‘process’. 
     In other words, the philosophical structure of Dewey is empirical, so 
transcendence, like a subject’s mind, is already reduced to human behaviours such 
as habit and experience.  In Rorty’s terms, non-dualistic, Deweyian culture is a 
‘culture without an ambition of transcendence’, similar to what Heidegger calls 
‘onto-theological tradition’.
418
  The object of Dewey’s philosophical inquiry is 
everyday life experience as a process.  Since experience includes cognition to the 
degree that it is cumulative or amounts to something, or has meaning, Dewey writes 
that ‘an ounce of experience is better than a ton of theory simply because it is only 
in experience that any theory has real and verifiable significance.’
419
  He means that 
experience can generate and carry out a tremendous number of theories.  Richard 
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Rorty sees what Dewey means by theory as what ‘starts off by specifying which bits 
of language tie up with which bits of reality’.
 420
  Rorty adds that Dewey’s paradigm 
of theory is just sense-datum empiricism.
421
 
      As Gadamer praises method in Truth and Method, saying that such subject 
matter as theory is not alienated from method, the Deweyian subject’s mind is 
already seen in the process-oriented ‘habit’, ‘growth’, ‘thinking’ and ‘experience’.  
For Dewey, human conduct needs to be understood as ‘a juxtaposition of 
disconnected reactions to separated situations’.
422
  In his philosophical conception of 
human conduct, the juxtaposition of the two is necessarily accompanied by the idea 
of ‘will’.  Conversely, he interprets ‘will’ as habit, which is determined by a process 
of experience, not a static idea.   
     For example, by habit, Dewey means a ‘special sensitiveness or accessibility to 
certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare 
recurrence of specific acts.  It means will.’
423
  This process-oriented phenomenon of 
habit is executed in the manner as ‘the act must come before the thought,’ and ‘a 
habit before an ability to evoke the thought at will’.
424
  More specifically speaking, 
an experience always precedes our thinking to do something, and a habit formed by 
the repeated experience will enable recall of that experience at will.
425
  For example, 
‘only when a man can already perform an act of standing straight does he know 
what it is like to have a right posture and only then can he summon the idea required 
for proper execution.’
426
  
     The modes as a process are the essence of pragmatism.  But pragmatic ways of 
thinking do not belong to the category of relativism.  Rorty interprets pragmatism as 
intersubjectivity, in that objectivity is reduced to solidarity.  He defines pragmatism, 
citing William James’s idea of pragmatism: 
Pragmatists do not require either a metaphysics or an epistemology. They 
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view truth as, in William James’ phrase, ‘what is good for us to believe’.  So 
they do not need an account of a relation between beliefs and objects called 
‘correspondence’, nor an account of human cognitive abilities which ensures 
that our species is capable of entering into that relation. They see the gap 
between truth and justification not as something to be bridged by isolating a 
natural and trans-cultural sort of rationality which can be used to criticize 
certain cultures and praise others, but simply as the gap between the actual 
good and the possible better. From a pragmatist point of view, to say that 
what is rational for us now to believe may not be true, is simply to say that 
somebody may come up with a better idea. It is to say that there is always 
room for improved belief, since new evidence, or new hypotheses, or a 
whole new vocabulary, may come along.
427
  
     With this definition, Rorty argues that pragmatism is not relativism.  The realist 
may argue that pragmatism is relativism claiming that the pragmatist regards ‘every 
belief is as good as every other’ or ‘true’ is not a definite term, having various 
meanings according to a specific justification.
428
  But Rorty defends the pragmatist 
by pointing the fact that neither truth nor rationalism of a given society can be 
justified for a universal claim.
429
  The pragmatist’s ethnocentric view is not relative 
to the pre-determined idea but a simple view that recognising the reality of different 
contexts is better than nothing.  
 
E. Debate between Gadamer and Habermas on Intersubjectivity 
     According to Rorty, by 1900, the opposite of realism was still idealism, however:   
[B]y now language has replaced mind as that which, supposedly, stands over 
and against ‘reality’.  So discussion has shifted from whether material reality 
is ‘mind-dependent’ to questions about which sorts of true statements, if any, 
stand in representational relations to non-linguistic items. Discussion of 
realism now revolves around whether only the statements of physics can 
correspond to ‘facts of matter’ or whether those of mathematics and ethics 
might also. Nowadays the opposite of realism is called, simply, 
‘antirealism’.
430
 
When we listen to Rorty, and want to consider Scottish Common Sense Realism in 
the space of khora, study of Gadamer’s linguisticality is imperative. 
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     As we can see in the debate between Habermas and Gadamer on intersubjectivity, 
Gadamer views a human being as finitude in its essence.  Accordingly, Hodge’s 
human reason cannot but be historically and personally conditioned and prejudiced.  
With this viewpoint, we should understand that the limit and contradiction in 
Hodge’s theological method in dealing with the Bible is due to the prejudice of the 
nineteenth-century American (and Princetonian) context.  We also want to examine 
Hodge’s theology with Gadamer’s linguisticality, hoping for overcoming its 
historically and philosophically confined contexts, so that his theology is adaptable 
not only for our context, but also for any particular time and space.  For this reason, 
we want to see the limit of Hodge’s scientific inductive method in view of 
intersubjectivity that is related to the immanence of human beings’ hermeneutic 
plurality through the debate between Gadamer and Habermas.   
     The debate between Gadamer and Habermas starts with Habermas’s critique of 
Gadamer, titled ‘A Review of Gadamer’s Truth and Method’431 and On the Logic of 
the Social Sciences.432  In response to Habermas’s critique, Gadamer wrote an article 
titled ‘On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection (1967)’,
433
 the theme 
of which is found in ‘Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem’.
434
  In turn, 
Habermas wrote ‘The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality’,
435
 which overturned 
Gadamer’s presupposition.  This debate dealt with how philosophical hermeneutics 
addresses the issues of the power of reflection, critical reason, prejudice, tradition 
and authority in social and political disciplines, as well as in linguistics in achieving 
hermeneutic universality.  
1. Gadamer’s Intersubjectivity 
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     In Truth and Method, Gadamer says that understanding and interpretation are not 
merely a method, but hermeneutics are a part of the total human experience of the 
world.
436
  Gadamer’s point is that, while wanting to overturn the Kantian hierarchy 
of reason, also retaining an Enlightenment idea, practical reason will resolve the 
problem of philosophical dualism in Enlightenment ideas.  Hence, there is a 
possibility of not to be violent to either the subject or the object.   
     Gadamer does not subscribe Wilhelm Dilthey’s concept of ‘empathy’, for it does 
not explain the historical embeddedness of the knower.  Gadamer wants to show that 
interpretation does not involve the reconstruction of psychic states, as in Dilthey and 
Schleiermacher, but is the process of integration of the object into a totality which 
contains the interpreter, as well as its application to the present.
437
  This idea of 
understanding as an integration of subject and object comes from Heidegger’s 
analyses of Dasein as ‘being-in-the-world’ and of ‘understanding’ as Dasein’s mode 
of being,
438
 the temporal analytics of human existence.  Dasein shows that 
understanding is not just a form of behaviour of a subject, but the mode of being of 
There-being itself.
439
  
1.1 Prejudice, Tradition and Authority in Gadamer 
     While keeping the Enlightenment idea of freedom, Gadamer wants to overturn 
such stereotyped ideas as prejudice, tradition and authority.  We should not deny 
that Hodge’s theology is influenced by such historical and contextual factors as 
prejudice, tradition and authority.  With Gadamer, we need to examine how such 
prejudice, tradition and authority work in Hodge’s theology.  Its contents, influenced 
by seventeenth-century Scholastic Calvinism and eighteenth-century Scottish 
Common Sense Realism, were exposed to a newly emerging nineteenth-century 
American context, as we studied in the previous chapter.  
     John Stewart summarises the particular American context in nineteenth-century 
Princeton in four dimensions: first, the prevalence of Scottish Common Sense 
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Realism and the rise of American pragmatism; second, the introduction of Darwin’s 
theory of evolution; third, the emerging diversity in American life and culture; and 
fourth, the rise of historical criticism of the Bible.
440
  Before examining Hodge with 
Gadamer, I want to show further how Gadamer deals with prejudice, tradition and 
authority.  Actually, he points out that the problem of these three views is due to 
human authority and overhastiness based on the fundamental presupposition of the 
Enlightenment.
441
 
     If we follow Gadamer, a man of reason with ‘sapere aude’ must avoid error due 
to prejudice, tradition and authority, conditioned or perceived by a pre-existing 
space and time.  Likewise, using the practical reason of the Enlightenment, Gadamer 
reinstates prejudice, authority and tradition.  Gadamer wants us to recognise that the 
process of interpretation of an idea by each individual inevitably produces biased 
ways of thinking, because we are historical entities who cannot but be conditioned 
by prejudice, authority and tradition.  In this manner, first of all, Gadamer uses the 
three elements as the very tools for deciphering human understanding. 
     Gadamer also connects authority with tradition, and claims that authority is not 
based on dogmatic forces, but recognition, and that tradition is one form of 
authority.
442
  Since he tries to reconcile authority with reason, for him, the 
preservation of tradition is also an act of reason, as much a freely chosen action as 
revolution and renewal.
443
  Here, we can see that for Gadamer, prejudice, authority 
and tradition are all elements of the historicity of understanding, and that they are 
not antithetical to reason.  Because his reason does not blindly insist that what one 
believes is true or not, but involves engaging critically with one’s belief.
444
  
     Gadamer believes that this is still what the Enlightenment does, but not in the 
dogmatic form of a new, absolute rationality that always knows better.  In this sense, 
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even though Dewey’s reason deviates from Kant’s reason, as we saw in the previous 
section, Dewey, along with Darwin, is also an Enlightenment thinker.  While Dewey 
asserts the ‘process’ character in reason as a habit, Gadamer also argues that reason 
has to be grappled with in respect to itself and its own contingency in a ‘process’ of 
constant self-enlightenment.
445
  While these three figures are Enlightenment thinkers, 
they altogether reject Enlightenment dualism that creates a one-sided metaphysical 
hierarchy.  
     By the same token, Gadamer thinks that Romanticism should be criticised, too, 
because even though it discovers true prejudices seemingly distinct from 
Enlightenment reason, it only replaces Enlightenment reason with ‘the schema of the 
conquest of mythos by logos’.446  This shows that the historicity of Romanticism is 
also operating in the same dualistic way, therefore making violent presuppositions. 
Gadamer, while wanting to keep with Enlightenment tradition, argues that true 
prejudice must still finally be justified by rational knowledge through practical 
reason, even though the task is an ongoing process that may never be fully 
completed.
447
 
1.2. Prejudice, Tradition and Authority in the Interpretation of the Bible 
 Sometimes, a traditional interpretation of the Bible may have difficulty or even 
be in error when it meets with unexpected scientific achievements because 
interpretation of the Bible is a kind of theory tracing truth to its source, not truth 
itself.  Often, a traditional interpretation of the Bible contradicts itself, however, in 
spite of what Hodge would imagine, and finds, that some scientific and 
philosophical theories have been wrong, we need to recognise that he consistently 
argues that the truth or facts are always right.  
     With this argument, Hodge writes that ‘theologians are not infallible, in the 
interpretation of Scriptures.  [Fallible interpretation] may, therefore, happen in the 
future, as it has in the past, that interpretations of the Bible, long confidently 
received, must be modified or abandoned, to bring revelation into harmony with 
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what God teaches in his works.’
448
  For Hodge, ‘the Bible has received no injury’ 
because it is of God, and although ‘theologians have been taught an important 
lesson; that is, to let science take its course, assured that the Scriptures will 
accommodate themselves to all well-authenticated scientific facts in time to come, 
as they have in time past.’
449
  Hodge seems to argue that the Bible is not prejudiced, 
but the interpretation can be.  Therefore, he maintains that as long as a theologian 
refers to the Bible and believes it is the Word of God, a theologian is infallible.  Yet, 
we find that Hodge has a clear dichotomy between theory and practice even if his 
logic is theoretically possible.  Here, also, we find a deficiency of hermeneutic 
conscience.   
     As we have seen, Hodge argues authority of the Bible.  Our question at the 
moment is that, while considering the modes of ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and 
‘event’, can we keep the authority of the Bible?  Then what does ‘authority’ mean?  
The term ‘authority’ is no mere theoretical concept.  According to Anthony 
Thiselton, ‘biblical authority always remains as that which is ontologically given, 
because its basis resides in the sovereignty and grace of God, but also its derivative 
currency resides in its appropriation as an effective communicative event or act 
whereby believing readers live out their response to this authority.’
450
  That is to say, 
the term, ‘authority’ should not be used for authenticating the text as true alone but 
relates Christ’s Lordship in our life and thought.  Thiselton goes on to say that: 
The God of the wisdom literature transcends easily packaged ‘answers’ 
(especially in Job and Ecclesiastes), and regularly deploys exploration, 
dialogue and ‘polyphonic’ discourse. For example in the Book of Job, 
neither he himself, nor any of Job’s ‘friends’, offers a single, pre-packaged 
‘answer’; for each adds to a multiform picture, the whole of which is set 
before us as interactive revelation.
 451
 
With Gadamer, Thiselton argues that the authority of the Bible does not simply 
require ‘“reading off” of a proposition, system, or instruction handed to us on a plate, 
but genuine wrestling, search and struggle, in expectancy of a divine event of 
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“speaking” to a ready heart’.
452
  That is, the Bible is not merely ‘a manipulative 
device to confirm the wishes of the reader, as if “God” were a mere projection of the 
reader’s will’.
453
  We will discuss more on Hodge’s Bible in chapter VI.  
1.3 Theories of Galileo and Copernicus 
     The Copernican revolution in astronomy caused a serious transition of world-
views for theologians, as well as for the secular world.  The theories of Galileo and 
Copernicus eventually modified and abandoned traditional theologies by such 
contemporary theologians as ‘Romanists and Protestants’.
454
  The Ptolemaic system, 
that the Earth is the centre of the universe, orbited by the sun, moon and planets, was 
the standard concept of the universe in the interpretation of the Bible before 
Copernicus.  
     The Biblical view, based on the contemporary interpretation of the Creation, was 
totally proved to be wrong when the Copernican revolution in astronomy occurred.  
What was believed to be Biblical truth based on human reason turned out to be 
fabrication.  Even if we think something is definitely true, as Dewey argues, we 
need to have an open-ended practical mind: claims of truth need to be deferred 
before being authenticated.  When one who is prejudiced due to his limited insight 
speaks in the name of reason, he always contradicts himself.
455
 
     Theologians, prejudiced by the Ptolemaic system before Copernicus, were never 
aware of basing their work on false theories.  Accordingly, they interpreted the Bible 
in a way that contradicted the truth of the universe. The lesson that we learn from 
the Ptolemaic system is that interpretation of the Bible is conditioned by theoretical 
prejudice and traditions that lie in the norms of the society or world-views.  
However, Hodge’s concern with the interpretation of the Bible is not world-views, 
but the facts of the Bible themselves.  According to Hodge, the Bible has authority 
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because its facts are not changed by the perspective (interpretation, world-views) of 
human beings.  At the same time, it is fully in accord with scientific revelation: 
It is impossible that our mode of understanding the Bible should not be 
determined by our views of the subjects of which it treats. So long as men 
believed that the earth was the centre of our system, the sun its satellite, and 
the stars its ornamentation, they of necessity understood the Bible in 
accordance with that hypothesis. But when it was discovered that the earth 
was only one of the smaller satellites of the sun, and that the stars were 
worlds, then, faith, although at first staggered, soon grew strong enough to 
take it all in, and rejoice to find that the Bible, and the Bible alone of all 
ancient books, was in full accord with these stupendous revelations of 
science.
456
 
     Here, Hodge argues that the mode of understanding of interpreters is apt to be 
determined by their views of the subjects of the Bible.  He seems to take the 
prejudice of an interpreter for granted, and concludes that interpretation should not 
be based on hypothetical theories, but on the facts of the Bible.  The prejudice 
should be tested by the facts of the Bible.  For Hodge, the Bible, accordingly, should 
be interpreted under the guidance of the facts of science, not theory.  
     Hodge has confidence that the Bible is of God and that there will be no conflict 
between the teachings of the Bible and the facts of science.
457
  According to Hodge, 
for proper interpretation, the church has to accept the facts of the science and read 
the Bible under its guidance.
458
  Through this process, he argues, even improper 
interpretation does not do violence to the Bible or diminish its authority.
459
  In sum, 
the issue for Hodge is not whether the interpretation of the Bible is proper, but 
whether the facts of the Bible are truths. 
     If the world-view—or ‘presupposition’, in Cornelius Van Til’s words—is quite 
different from that held by others, the interpretation will be different.  However, 
Hodge would agree that proper interpretation happens when theories or world-views 
of philosophy and science coincide with deduced facts.  Thus, those who have false 
world-views cannot but arrive at false conclusions.  In this case, Hodge would argue 
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that those who have misread the Bible because of ignorance should admit their fault 
and that the text of the Bible has been misunderstood.
460
  This shows that he wants 
us to have an adequate viewpoint for the interpretation of the truth.  What he means 
is that the theory should be based on the proper interpretation of our situation.
461
       
     Harvie Conn argues that ‘the Bible and reason and societal relationships can all 
function as “canon” in the search for truth’ in cases when there are deep 
commitments.
462
  Theology is always possible when it is based on the facts and an 
adequate interpretation.  Therefore, both theory and fact in the theologian’s mind 
should have one origin, God.  Hodge is cautious not to commit misinterpretation.  
He seems to be always open to the discoveries of science, with confidence that 
eventually the facts found by science would not digress from the truth of the Bible. 
In this sense, we affirm that Hodge’s view on the truth of science is not static, 
because theory of it should always be substantiated by the facts of the Bible.  In the 
case when he confuses theory and truth, he always goes back to the Bible.  This 
point shows that Hodge also acknowledges prejudice of interpretation.  Now, we 
want to study Habermas’s view on Gadamer. 
2. Habermas’s Evaluation on Gadamer 
     Gadamer argues in Truth and Method that truth cannot be explained by the 
scientific method, but by discovering proper conditions for understanding its 
meaning. Gadamer’s question becomes, ‘What makes truth possible?’, while that of 
Habermas, confirming hermeneutics as a science of methodically trained procedure, 
is, ‘What is truth?’  For Gadamer, a human being is finitude in its essence; therefore 
human reason cannot but be historically and personally conditioned and prejudiced.  
Gadamer wants to rehabilitate such ideas as tradition and authority, which have been 
discarded since the Enlightenment.  On the other hand, for Habermas, charging that 
Gaadamer’s linguistic hermeneutics lacks objectivity-in turn has fallen into relative 
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idealism, reason functions to neutralise tradition, and concomitantly re-affirms 
authority.
463
  
     At this point, we need to notice that their directions of doing philosophy are 
intrinsically different, even though they both spring from the Enlightenment.  While 
Gadamer achieves universality in the mirror of language, where every historically 
situated reflexive thought is reflected, Habermas believes that reflexive knowledge, 
which is the progenitor of the ‘hermeneutic consciousness’, already makes it 
possible for a human being to recognise his ‘specific freedom from, and dependence 
on, language.
464
  With this in mind, let us study Habermas’s critique of Gadamer and 
Gadamer’s response to Habermas for the purpose of knowing what the issues are in 
the discussion of intersubjectivity.   
     In On the Logic of the Social Sciences, Habermas, defines Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics as a third stage of reflection: historical reflection affirms Gadamer’s 
position that conceives intersubjectivity between the subject, the interpreter and the 
object, the text.
 465
  With Gadamer, Habermas says that hermeneutic insights should 
overcome Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’ and ‘empirical-analytical’ conceptions 
of the social sciences by agreeing with Gadamer that language becomes a contingent 
absolute at the level of objective spirit.
466
  Clearly, both are critical to the 
objectivistic self-understanding of the human being.  However, Habermas thinks that 
hermeneutics itself cannot solve the problem of human understanding.  Accordingly, 
Habermas charges Gadamer’s hermeneutics as being relative idealistic by arguing 
that hermeneutics is always radically barred to a transcendental consciousness.
467
  
Here we can see that Habermas has different interests to Gadamer’s concern when 
he says that ‘[l]anguage is also a medium of domination and social power’.
468
  
However, what Habermas accepts from Gadamer is that Gadamer’s real hermeneutic 
accomplishment in perceiving the transcendental level by ‘the articulation of an 
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action-orienting-self-understanding’.
 469
  That is, Habermas cosigns Gadamer’s 
‘immanent connection between understanding and application’ that can also be seen 
in theology and jurisprudence.
 470
  Affirming Gadamer’s view that the connection 
between understanding and its real transformation is not confined to such a tradition 
as the canonical sacred texts, Habermas writes:   
In a sermon, the interpretation of the Bible, like the interpretation of positive 
law in adjudication, serves at the same time as an interpretation of the 
application of the facts in a given situation. Their practical life-relationship 
to the self-understanding of those addressed, the congregation or the legal 
community, is not added to the interpretation afterward. Rather the 
interpretation is realised in its application.
471
 
3. Different Views on the Relationship between Reflection and Pre-Understanding 
     Compared to Gadamer’s Heideggerian ontological method, Habermas has a 
socio-political scientific perspective.  He believes that practical knowledge in 
hermeneutics is apt to be fallen into error in the case when it is initiated by false 
opinions which have ‘the habitual form of false consciousness.’
472
  In order to avoid 
error, Habermas thinks that hermeneutic understanding has to also consider a 
process of socialization so as the practical knowledge to be global in which social 
life form is represented in its communicative action.
473
  Confirming that 
hermeneutics is translation and that it has to transcend the limitations of rhetorical 
art, Habermas has concern on a structure sharing what he calls ‘one life-world’ that 
makes possible to use monological language for ‘the formal construction of theories’ 
and ‘for the organization of purposive rational action.’
474
   
     Like Max Weber, Habermas wants to bring explanatory and hermeneutic 
approaches ‘under one roof’ for grasping the objective interconnections of social 
actions.
475
  That is, Habermas wants objective understanding of the context not only 
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of language but of labour and dominion.
476
  Habermas does not acknowledge 
Gadamer’s Heideggerian ontological hermeneutics in that Gadamer avoids ‘the 
transition from the transcendental conditions of historicity to the universal 
history’.
477
  While maintaining the formative process of hermeneutic understanding 
within science and arguing that the future of history can only be anticipated by the 
reflection from a point of view specific to a given situation, Habermas writes 
hermeneutic experience retains hypothetical moment.
478
  Habermas asserts that 
intersubjectivity is valid only within a social group.
479
 
     In contrast, Gadamer understands that truth and method are not antithetical to 
each other.  That is, hermeneutic experience is more fundamental than every 
exercise of scientific method for obtaining truth.  Gadamer means that understanding 
can function within science, but understanding cannot be confined to the domain of 
science.
480
  He admits that hermeneutics affects scientific research, but it is not to be 
understood as a prescriptive methodology or epistemology, but rather as an 
existential ontology.  It is clear that Gadamer defends his ontological understanding 
of hermeneutics against Habermas’s methodological understanding. 
     On the role of reflection in understanding, Habermas agrees with Gadamer that 
reflection is intrinsically contingent.  However, Habermas criticises Gadamer 
through pointing more directly to Gadamer’s lack of the power of reflection in 
hermeneutics: 
[The power of] reflection is no longer blinded by the illusion of an absolute, 
self-grounded a[u]tonomy, and it does not detach itself from the ground of 
the contingent on which it finds itself. But when reflection understands the 
genesis of the tradition from which it proceeds and to which it returns, the 
dogmatism of life-praxis is shaken.
481
    
     That is, the power of reflection renews itself in the process of understanding, and 
it will eventually change the everyday life of the one who reflects.  Accordingly, 
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Habermas asserts that Gadamer’s prejudice validated by tradition is in conflict with 
the power of reflection that has the intrinsic ability—by breaking and confirming 
dogmatic forces—to reject the demands of tradition.
482
  In this sense, for Habermas, 
Gadamer’s argument that authority is based on recognition, not dogmatic force, only 
shows Gadamer’s conservatism.  He acknowledges Gadamer’s point that knowledge 
is rooted in actual tradition and is bound to contingent conditions, but he also 
believes that ‘reflection does not wear itself out on the ‘facticity’ of traditional 
norms without leaving a trace’.
483
  
     In conclusion, Habermas criticises Gadamer’s hermeneutics because it does not 
limit itself without having a system of reference that transcends the context of 
tradition as such.
484
  Habermas asserts that Gadamer’s hermeneutics, which follows 
the continuous mediation of social tradition through linguisticality, gets lost in the 
irrationalism and fails ‘to acknowledge the transcending force of reflection that is 
also at work in it.’
485
 Habermas concludes that Gadamer’s hermeneutic 
understanding cannot reach beyond to an absolute consciousness.
486
   
     But Gadamer responds with the argument that hermeneutic reflection fulfils the 
function of bringing something that cannot be fully manifest in our modern 
knowledge (pre-understanding) and science by allowing him to perceive something 
that otherwise happens behind his back.
487
  This means that he has a concept of the 
third identity: there is something other which is neither pre-understanding nor 
reflection.  For Gadamer, reflection produces something (third identity) like the 
power of rhetoric in comparison with the power of reflection for Habermas.  The 
process of understanding, for Gadamer, is possible not by the controlled self-
alienation of ‘the autonomy of “I”’ and not by explicit awareness of the rules that 
guide and govern it, but by such a hybrid as rhetoric by bridging distances with 
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temporality with the impact of immediate speaking.
488
  Gadamer explains the power 
of an orator’s rhetoric: 
[T]he orator carries his listeners away with him; the convincing power of his 
arguments overwhelms the listener. While under the persuasive spell of 
speech, the listener for the moment cannot and ought not to indulge in 
critical examination.
489
 
This hermeneutics of an orator can be rapidly and easily absorbed to the common 
consciousness when it is regarded as common sense by the majority.  However, 
Gadamer thinks that it is a problem when it immediately belongs to the central 
heritage, even to the realms of traditional disciplines, which are hard to change.  
     According to Gadamer, hermeneutics generally has to ‘aware of the temporal 
distance that separating us from antiquity and of the relativity of the life-worlds of 
different cultural traditions.’
490
  Here, what Gadamer recognises is the aspects of 
freedom in hermeneutic reflection.  So, Gadamer repudiates idealist-rationalism in 
Habermas’s concept of the power of reflection saying that Habermas is too much 
interested in epistemology (emancipating interest) which distinguishes such a true 
socialists like Habermas from technicians of social structure.
491
  Gadamer answers 
back to Habermas’s refutation—reflection’s ability to change one’s own relation to 
tradition demonstrates a dogmatic objectivism—saying that Habermas is ignorant on 
the function of hermeneutic reflection.
492
  Gadamer thinks Habermas’s pursue of 
scientific objectivism with constant operativeness in his own consciousness can 
never experience true event of concursus.493 
     These different interpretations of the role of the power of reflection in 
understanding are due to their differing judgements on the effectiveness of 
Enlightenment ideas in their hermeneutics.  I think over-emphasis on the power of 
reflection is very dangerous, no matter how effective the power of reflection.  The 
issue at stake is whether reflection is dialectical or rhetorical.  
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     Throughout this section, we find that practical reason will achieve universality of 
hermeneutics.  Gadamer argues that universality should be achieved through rhetoric 
and hermeneutics, and can be applied to any discipline, including sociology.  
According to Gadamer, rhetoric is ‘not mere theory of forms of speech and 
persuasion; rather, it can develop out of a native talent for practical mastery, without 
any theoretical reflection about ways and means.’
494
  Therefore, rhetorical and 
hermeneutical aspects of human linguistics ‘as a limitless medium that carries 
everything within it’, will achieve universality of understanding.495   
     Gadamer establishes the idea of universality of hermeneutics by using practical 
reason because it is not technical reason, but universal.
496
  He defends the 
universality of the hermeneutic dimension by reaffirming the universal phenomenon 
of human linguisticality.  For Gadamer, this linguisticality is not separated from 
other real, social dimensions, such as work and domination. That is why he can 
assert that the claims to universality made by both hermeneutics and sociology are 
equally legitimate and interpenetrating.  
 
F. In Sum 
     The question of hermeneutic universality begins with the enquiry of the 
possibility of true transcendence.  Asking, ‘Is a true transcendental point possible?’ 
implies ‘Can we achieve hermeneutic universality?’  Within the context of 
hermeneutic universality, we have the following accounts of ‘process’, 
‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’.  Dewey observed ‘process’ working in a pragmatic 
and anti-dualistic way.  ‘Intersubjectivity’ for Habermas and Gadamer showed us 
profound and diverse ways of being context-sensitive between one and the other. 
     In the discussion on universality, Habermas wants cognitive-ethical unity with 
critical-ethical reason, while Gadamer proposes a dialogical encounter with effective 
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historical consciousness.  Both Habermas’s ethical and Gadamer’s linguistic 
approaches have a limit in achieving true universality.  However, Gadamer’s 
aesthetic vision towards a holistic and linguistic approach gives us great insights into 
the juxtaposition of the death of the I and the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy 
Spirit: universality/particularity, secular/religious, reason/faith and so on.  
     Even though the limit in Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizon’ still remains in the 
immanent, historical or linguistic realm, and so it cannot be a real point of true 
transcendence, Gadamer was successful in using practical reason (the Aristotelian 
concept of phronesis) for achieving universality, as Gadamer puts it, ‘where the 
whole is intended’.  Also, his zeal to achieve universality with the moral ideal of 
practical wisdom and freedom of Enlightenment guides us in the true direction to 
achieve universality.  In Gadamer, language is the medium in which freedom is 
exercised.  As we have seen, it is aesthetic universality which resists domination by 
a violent power.  Gadamer’s universality is possible by the very source of our daily 
life experience.      
     ‘Event’ in Derrida is something that cannot be understood by reason.  However, 
it shows a true transcendental point spontaneously in a secretive and enigmatic way.  
It just happens as an event, rather than in the modes of process and intersubjectivity.  
In the event, such ideas as subjectivity and objectivity have to be understood by gift, 
along with responsibility and faith. I want to cite Derrida’s point here again.: ‘The 
subject and the object are arrested affects of the gift, arrests of the gift. At the zero or 
infinite speed of the circle.’
497
 
     While admitting the limit of both Gadamer’s and Habermas’s intersubjectivity 
for achieving universality, we want to move on to khora, where universality is 
achieved through the Derridean X.  In Derrida, the true transcendental point is 
understood as the possibility of the impossibility.  In the following chapter, we will 
study what Derridean universality is and how it achieves in the context of Emerson’s 
‘genius’ and Rorty’s ‘ironist’, and we will examine what it means to be a human 
being living in the space of universality in the view of Kierkegaard’s Abraham. 
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CHAPTER V 
A BEING IN THE UNIVERSALITY OF HERMENEUTICS: 
THE GENIUS, THE IRONIST, IVAN ILYICH, ABRAHAM AND  
A THEOLOGIAN IN KHORA 
  
A. Preface 
    ‘Do you live as an individual or as a member of a society?’  This question is as 
complex as the most difficult question of my youth, ‘Do you live in order to eat or 
do you eat in order to live?’  A long time later, I found the answer that human life is 
more than simply living and eating.  Likewise, the first question is no longer a 
question of individuality or solidarity because, for a human being embedded by the 
death of the I, life itself is neither to be or not to be, but a third species (triton genos) 
between life and death that I described in chapter I.  Then, the question whether one 
lives in individuality or in solidarity becomes, ‘Do you recognise that you are 
participating in the death of the I?’  A more concrete question would be, ‘Do you 
think of marginalised people as “us” rather than “them”?’  To construe this question 
is urging us to create a more expansive sense of solidarity than we presently have.  
The wrong way is to think of it as urging us to recognise such a solidarity as 
something that exists before our recognition of it.
498
 
     The Commandments in the Bible are to love God and your neighbours.  In these 
discourses, we cannot but inquire why I should love God.  Even more, why I should 
love her and him.  And how should we love?  We can simply respond by answering 
that the Bible tells you to, however, this kind of answer is not what theology has to 
provide.  Since these inquiries reside in the space between God and us, and theology 
is always reaffirming, reassigning, re-strengthening, renewing and reforming our 
knowledge of God, they should be investigated in the textuality of khora, where the 
Bible produces meaning. 
     A Christian way of knowing God involves the obedience of a human being to a 
command.  However, even a serious Christian must confess that it is impossible to 
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fulfill the external command, as it is in his life experience due to his inability to 
follow the Commandments.  If we are to fulfil the Commandaments, we ought 
frankly to confess our limited ability to obey the command ‘love others’, and ought 
to respond, first of all, by asking God and ourselves why we should love others and 
how we can execute His order.  That is, how can ‘I’ and ‘you’ establish solidarity?  
Is it possible to love others while keeping our distinctive self-creativity, self-
sufficiency and self-reliance?  In sum, our question is twofold: why I should and 
how I can love others, not as ‘the autonomy of the “I”’, which is limited in its reason, 
but as a person embedded by the death of the I, who foresees the possibility of the 
impossibility.  These questions imply two important issues in this chapter.  One is 
how the universality of hermeneutics is achieved and what the function of khora is 
in terms of loving others, i.e., what solidarity is; the other is who the persons are 
achieving universality in that space.  
     In the previous chapter, we studied such philosophers as Kant, Dewey, Habermas 
and Gadamer, in whom the ideas of ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’ are 
construed by reason, habit, the power of reflection and the fusion of horizon in the 
context of the universality of hermeneutics.  We identified the ideas of ‘process’, 
‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’ with the modes that a being with the Holy Spirit 
experiences.  With these understandings, we want to know how these modes of a 
being function in the event of khora in terms of solidarity and individuality. 
     In this chapter, we want to scrutinise how a being, for example, in Charles 
Hodge’s context, ‘a theologian of doing theology here and now’, resides in khora, 
i.e., how beings living in the context of the death of the I achieve solidarity and 
individuality when they are with the Holy Spirit.  Residing in khora is not something 
like dwelling in an already established building but, as Heidegger recognises, the 
process to build is in itself already to dwell.
499
 
     I want to argue that a person embedded by the death of the I is the one who 
achieves solidarity by participating in hermeneutic universality.  The universality of 
hermeneutics of the death of the I is never opposed to the different life-settings of ‘I’, 
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because each different subject already involves intersubjective modes of life 
experiences of ‘I’ and ‘you’.  Therefore, the universal is reducible to its various and 
spontaneous instantiations.  In this sense, the hermeneutic universality of the death 
of the I is always contextual.  Thus, solidarity of the death of the I will be fulfilled in 
the space of khora.  
     In chapter I, we identified the death of the I.  In chapter II, following Derrida, we 
studied the death of the I embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of 
the Holy Spirit as, first, responsibility that passes through the very ordeal of the 
paradox; second, faith that ventures into absolute risk; third, gift that enables the 
relationship with God as if God were, i.e., the transcendental selfless goodness 
through a new experience of death; and fourth, humility as to die to itself.  
     With the above viewpoint of the death of the I, in this chapter, I will discuss the 
universality of hermeneutics in khora in ‘a genius’ for Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘an 
ironist’ for Richard Rorty, Tolstoy’s ‘Ivan Ilyich’, Kierkegaard’s ‘Abraham’ and ‘a 
theologian’ (Hodge).  As beings in khora, all of them will be examined in the 
context of the death of the I: responsibility, gift, faith and humility. Out of the five 
figures, the study of the first four will give us hints to the role of Hodge as a 
‘theologian’.  
     As we will study later, the sacrifice of Isaac will be seen as an event of the death 
of the I embedded in Abraham with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. 
When Abraham was in the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, God was to destroy these 
cities due to the depraved lives of their inhabitants.  Due to Abraham’s supplication 
for saving these cities, God finally decided to search for ten righteous people.  If 
there were ten, God would not destroy Sodom and Gomorrah.  However, God could 
not find them.  What kind of person was righteous in the way that God sought?  The 
righteousness that God sought was probably such a figure as Abraham, since God 
credited him with being righteous (Genesis 15:6).
500
  This sort of belief is what the 
death of the I traces.501  I believe the ‘righteous’ whom God sought at Sodom and 
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Gomorrah are possible when the death of the I is embedded in a person with the 
Holy Spirit.  
     Why could God not find the righteous at Sodom and Gomorrah?  The Reformers’ 
slogan, ‘righteous by faith alone’, means what?  How should this kind of faith 
display itself in those cities?  ‘To live’ to be righteous anywhere is already a 
question of how the death of the I functions in the space between life and death. 
Derrida notes that to live is 
not something that we can learn.  It cannot be learned from oneself, it is not 
learned from one’s life, or taught by another’s life.  Only from the other and 
by death.  In any case from the other at the edge of life.  At the internal 
border or the external border, it is heterodidactics between life and death.
502
 
   Living as a righteous being, whether in solidarity or individuality, is not something 
that we can learn.  It is possible only at the moment when the death of the I is 
embedding. With this understanding, a theologian’s being ‘righteous by faith alone’ 
will be discussed in the sections on Kierkegaard’s Abraham and on Hodge, ‘a 
theologian’.  The importance of the study of the first three figures in this chapter, a 
genius, an ironist and Ivan Ilyich, is that they give us the idea of being righteous in 
everyday life.  At the same time, as contemporaries of Hodge, the study of Emerson 
(1803-82), Kierkegaard (1813-55) and Tolstoy (1828-1910) have significant 
implications in how their ideas of different ‘living’ and ‘thinking’ spaces are 
compatible with the theology of the nineteenth-century Princetonian.  Hoping that 
the study of this chapter will be a good guess about the righteous whom God sought 
at Sodom and Gomorrah, with the viewpoint of solidarity and individuality, or of 
universality and particularity, I want to begin with khora, the space where the events 
of these four individuals are occurring and are being construed. 
 
B. Khora 
     Concerning khora, my questions are: how is a being in the world different from 
one in the monastery?; how is textuality different from sexuality?; what is the 
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difference between life and death?; what would be the relationship, difference and 
similarity between Hodge’s ‘sense’ and Derrida’s ‘happening’?  However, due to the 
fact that what happens ‘here and now’ is intrinsically spontaneous and contingent, 
even if ‘the happening’ is considered to be caused by a human being, we cannot but 
think of the place (khora) where the potentia absoluta operates in a being in this 
world.  
     Derrida specified a place of khora, citing Dionysius: 
To gain access to this place is not yet to contemplate God.  Even Moses must 
retreat.  Moses does not come to be with God Himself; he does not see 
God—for God is unseen—but the place [tôpon] where God is.  This signifies 
to me that the most divine and highest of what is seen and intelligible are 
hypothetical logoi of what is subordinate to that beyond-having-all.  The 
Mystical Theology thus distinguishes between access to the contemplation of 
God and access to the place where God resides.  What is the place?  He is not 
even His most without Being and without place, without being His place.
503
 
Recalling the introductory discussion of khora in chapter I, here we want to study its 
function and application more in detail. 
1. Plato’s ‘Beyond Being’ and ‘Dream’ in Khora 
     In order to study khora, we need to pay attention to Derrida’s analyses on two 
movements of negativity in Plato.  The one is epekeina tes ousias, ‘beyond being’504 
of the Republic, and the khora505 of Timaeus.  Firstly, on the negativity of ‘beyond 
being’, Derrida says that it is such a thing that makes possible the hyper movements 
to produce, attract or guide what is ‘being’.  It first obeys the ‘logic of the sur, of the 
hyper, over and beyond, which heralds all the hyperessentialisms’.
506
  In other words, 
something is defined by that which is more than it is, i.e., ‘what is’ is always defined 
by ‘what is not’ or ‘what is more than is’.  ‘What is’ cannot be spoken of except by 
that which is more than it is.  Since ‘beyond being’ is not being or presence here, it 
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can only be understood or articulated by that which is beyond it and beyond its 
articulation.  
     Derrida observes that, in the Republic, the idea of the Good has its place beyond 
being or essence because the Good is not its place.
507
  Since the Good is beyond 
being, it is inevitable for the ontological grammar to be negative.  If we talk about 
the good in terms of ethics, ‘you are a good man’ always presupposes your ethical 
manner and behaviour.  However, good as ‘beyond being’ is ultimately defined by 
something unsayable.  It is good just because it is something that cannot be 
articulated.  Its essence is beyond it.  As a beyond being, khora is that which 
acknowledges in terms of goodness and being, and could always be defined by that 
which is more than being.  In khora, being is not clearly circumscribable.  Neither is 
the death of the I. 
     In other words, khora is not a place (topos) of a manner of being; it is an 
appropriate place where something is.  As a topos of ‘in between’, according to 
Derrida, khora cannot be defined by ‘the logic of noncontradiction of philosophers’ 
because it derives from ‘logic other than the logic of the logos’.508  
     It looks like a dream that does not have any of the logic of everyday life.  In 
Timaeus, Plato depicts khora as a dream: 
This indeed is what we behold as in a dream and say that anything that is 
must of necessity be in some place and occupy some room, and that what is 
not somewhere on earth or in heaven is nothing. [C] Because of this 
dreaming state we prove unable to bestir ourselves and draw all these and 
other kindred distinctions (even in the case of the waking and truly existing 
nature), and thus to state the truth.
509
 
Actually, God spoke to Joseph and Daniel by showing His promise in their dreams. 
However, since the dreams are only promised, they are to be effective for the futures 
of the dreamers.  No one, including the dreamer, can logically explain the dream. 
Likewise, khora is that kind of space that has a different kind of logic. 
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2. Characteristics of Khora 
2.1 Khora as a Third Species (Triton Genos)510  
     Khora constitutes a third species (triton genos) in view of the two types of being 
which are, respectively, immutable and intelligible, and corruptible.  Since it is 
something other than the two, the discourse on khora does not proceed from a 
natural and legitimate logos, but rather from a hybrid bastard, or even corrupted 
reasoning.
511
  As a third species in the process of becoming and sensibility, it has a 
spatial interval between two types of being that neither dies nor is born.
512
  In this 
interval, khora does not oscillate between the ni ceci,  ni cela (the neither/nor), 
however, it ‘receives all’ and eventually makes possible the formation of the 
cosmos.
513
  Hence, khora is the place where neither/nor may no longer be 
reconverted into both.
514
  In this sense, khora is neither sensible nor intelligible.515  
2.2 Khoral Quality: Textuality  
     The meaning of textuality is more complex than simply ‘one of various meaning-
structures of a text’, for ‘textuality is a differential notion and not a matter of 
identity’.
516
  According to Hugh Silverman, textuality is distinctly different from the 
text itself.  Take autobiographical textuality as an example: 
[A]utobiographical textuality operates throughout the text, along with many 
other textualities (such as philosophical textuality, religious textuality, 
literary textuality, etc.).  What is meant here is that the question of an 
authorial self is written in the text as a possible reading of its textual 
interests.
517
 
     Silverman means that textuality is a mutual residence that allows an authorial self 
and a reader to be spoken about.  That is, since the mutual relationship does not 
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directly come from the other signifier (the authorial self or the reader) and is always 
related to the Other, through tracing of the Other, textuality can be a mutual space.  
When bipolarity is within textuality, textuality impels us to prompt such a question 
as, ‘What is the trace “in between” the authorial self and the reader?’  The tracing in 
mutual residence is what John Caputo means by khoral quality. According to 
Caputo, the quality of khora is the system like ‘boxes inside boxes, containers 
containing containers’, which show ‘a feature of textuality itself’ where a receptacle 
is defined by what is in it.
518
  Therefore, it does not have a specific place, but only 
traces. 
2.3 Khora Is Not Metaphor or Rhetoric, But the Space Where They Occur 
     In the place of khora, metaphor and rhetoric happen, but the nature of khora itself 
is not metaphor or rhetoric at all.  It is a place of deconstruction of which the 
fundamental activity is reading, not interpreting the text—as in hermeneutics—nor 
analysing—as in semiology—by leaving aside all sorts of interpretations of 
artworks.
519
  As we can see, deconstruction is a way of reading texts.  The text is not 
that which is interpreted, but rather, the domain in which the interpretation occurs.  
Therefore, in deconstruction in a space of khora, the text becomes writing.  This 
writing calls for another reading.  As a result, writing is neither the act of producing 
a text nor that which is produced, but rather that which happens at the hinge between 
the two.
520
 
     Derrida says that khora receives everything not as a medium, a container nor 
even a receptacle, because the receptacle is yet a figure inscribed in it.
521
  With this 
recognition, he simply overturns the concept of receptacle in metaphor and rhetoric: 
‘The receptacle is yet a figure inscribed in it’ means that it ‘is neither an intelligible 
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extension, in the Cartesian sense, a receptive subject, in the Kantian sense of intuitus 
derivatives, nor a pure sensible space, as a form of receptivity.’
522
  
     In this sense, khora is rather ‘spacing’ than a space.  The spacing of khora, 
according to Derrida, initiates ‘a dissociation or a difference’ in its proper meaning.   
Therefore it compels ‘tropic detours which are no longer rhetorical figures’.
523
  As 
we can see, khora gives places to rhetoric or to any tropics without giving anything.  
It gives no order and makes no promise in the sense that it neither creates nor 
produces anything, not even an event insofar as it takes place.
524
  Khora is the 
atemporality itself of the spacing: ‘it (a)temporalizes (anachronises), it calls forth 
atemporality, provokes it immutably from the pretemporal already that gives place 
to every inscription.’
525
  Confirming this, Derrida concludes that the so-called 
‘metaphors’ are not inadequate, ‘in that they borrow figures from the sensible forms 
inscribed in the khora, without pertinence for designating the khora itself’.526 
     Since Derrida believes that secret knowledge obviously cannot be determined 
and is nothing, and eventually has no secret, the alleged secret knowledge becomes 
false, mystification, or at best a politics of grammar.
527
  Just as God is beyond Being, 
but as such is more being than Being—‘no more being and being more than Being: 
being more’—God cannot be determined.
528
  It is common sense that what cannot be 
determined is not to be secret at all.  It is just nothing, or ‘other’.  Therefore, 
theologically speaking, khora is not God himself, but the providential space of the 
forgiven sinners and unforgiven sinners in this world, and as their relation to the 
universe.  
     With these understandings of khora, let us consider who would be a proper 
person residing in khora.  Khora is a place of living together without losing one’s 
own identity.  First, let us begin with Emersonian genius.  The study of genius is 
important because it shows how American transcendentalists and the Unitarian 
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Church wanted to have a notion of the righteous self in nineteenth-century New 
England.   
 
C. Emersonian Genius 
     Ralph Waldo Emerson, a writer, poet and speaker, was the leader of the 
Transcendentalist movement in the nineteenth-century United States.  He was born 
in Boston to the Rev. William Emerson, a Unitarian minister.  He himself was a 
Unitarian minister, but left the ministry to be far away from either advocates of or 
adversaries to his thinking.  After resigning, Emerson went to Europe and met 
English Romantics, especially Walter Savage Landor, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
William Wordsworth and Thomas Carlyle, who ‘inspired and sustained’ Emerson 
for the recovery from his ‘crisis of renunciation’.
529
  After he returned from Europe 
with the sense of Romanticism in his heart, he formulated the philosophy of 
Transcendentalism in his 1836 essay ‘Nature’.  
     Transcendentalists believed in the direct relationship between the soul and God.  
They wanted to transcend not only the senses, but also churches, clergy and the 
Scriptures.  Transcendentalists asserted that man has an intuitive capacity for 
grasping ultimate truth, and thus achieves a sure knowledge of a supernatural order, 
beyond the reach of the senses.  This belief was in opposition to the traditional 
Puritan belief of New England. 
     Here, we want to juxtapose Calvinism and Transcendentalism, or total depravity 
and the divinity of human beings.  New England’s religious culture was shaped by 
the Calvinism that Puritan settlers struggled to maintain and defend.  Calvinist 
doctrine teaches the total depravity of human nature, predestination, election by 
irresistible grace, and sinners’ salvation by God’s limited atonement.  However, 
dissatisfaction with Calvinism grew among Transcendentalist theologians when they 
began to have positive views of human nature and to stress the importance of 
individual piety and ethical practice in the process of salvation.  
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     Because of the malicious force of the socially established traditional Calvinism, 
Emerson shied away from the church, and as a result became a leading American 
figure in Romanticism.  He had a question about religion.  In writing ‘Nature’, he 
asked, ‘Why should not we have poetry and philosophy of insight and not of 
tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, and not the history of theirs?’
530
  This 
question naturally led Emerson to put nature first, with the argument that we all 
benefit from it.  He believes that nature provided the first standard of beauty.  
Natural beauty is ‘the constitution of things, or such the plastic power of the human 
eye, that the primary forms, as the sky, the mountain, the tree, the animal, give us a 
delight in and for themselves’.
531
  Building on this insight, Emerson formulates his 
notion of genius in his essay ‘Self-Reliance’.  I want to analyse the characteristics 
and implications of the Emersonian genius with respect to ‘self-reliance’, and how a 
genius achieves universality or solidarity.  
1. The Meaning of Emersonian Genius 
     According to Gadamer, the concept of a genius validated by ‘Kantian aesthetics’ 
is distinctive in the ‘romantic hermeneutics and history’.
532
  Such a figure of 
American Romanticism as Emerson is no exception.  An Emersonian genius is the 
one who uses radical individualistic language of self-reliance.
533
  Self-reliance is not 
simply trusting one’s own self, but rather relying on universal ideas that are already 
applicable to others, because a genius believes that what is true for him in his private 
heart is true for all human beings.  What is common for every human being, for 
Emerson, is one’s pursuit of a transcendental power.  Therefore, being together, i.e., 
universality, is possible if each human being pursues a human utopia in a 
transcendental realm through his intuitive and instinctive will to power with freedom 
that comes from integrity of mind, which Emerson believes sacred.
534
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       Emerson is not praising the external God, because he believes that a united 
identity is already established in the human mind.  He argues that ‘[n]othing is at last 
sacred but the integrity of your own mind.  Absolve you to yourself, and you shall 
have the suffrage of the world.’
535
  He says, ‘To believe your own thought, to 
believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men—that is 
genius.’
536
  The external power can be taken as God; however, not as a 
transcendental God, but as an immanent source of a transcendental human creativity 
which is the only thought of genius that has never existed before.  Even though 
Emerson seems to believe that the certainty or superiority of a genius is direct from 
God, the universality of a genius’s thought cannot but be subjective because it is 
already transcended.  The subjective certainty of a genius, then, is no longer 
knowledge of God.  An Emersonian genius is already autonomous in its integrity. 
     Here, we have a question of how the thought of a genius can be universal truth.  
A genius knows that the light comes from outside, yet he does not try to find the 
source of the light, but depends on the interpreted light which is already immanent 
in man.   As colour and light concur in coloured light, God and the human mind 
concur, in Emersonian terms, in the form of ‘Instinct’ or ‘Intuition’.  This is depicted 
well in Emerson’s view that prayer is vicious if it is for any thing less than good.
537
  
Prayer with a private end is never able to allow access to the light of God.  This 
means that unless the will of God is not totally immanent in the human mind, i.e., if 
they do not coincide as in the coloured light, the prayer is hostile.  
     Emerson says that a genius is not truth themselves, but they just recognise truth.  
To such a question of ‘Where is the master who could have taught Shakspeare?’ 
Emerson answers that human beings can do nothing but allow a passage to the 
beams of truth.’
538
  An Emersonian genius will, then, open up the possibility of 
universal solidarity by doing nothing but being a vehicle of the transcendental truth, 
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i.e., being a passage or being spiritualised by the transformation of genius from 
‘intellect’ into the power of receiving ‘a new gift’.
539
 
2. The Concept of Emersonian Loving Others 
     An Emersonian genius regards others (the object of loving) as ‘I’s (the plural of 
‘I’, not ‘we’).  According to Emerson, these ‘I’s are ‘a class of persons to whom by 
all spiritual affinity I am [he is] bought and sold’.  This ‘spiritual affinity’ is a 
vehicle for a genius to communicate with others.  That is, a genius was bought and 
sold for the people not as a group, but as an individual who is considered to enjoy 
the heavenly realm.  Emerson seems to identify a genius with denying oneself vanity, 
malice, and the hatred of fathers, mothers and others.  In this way, he regards others 
as different ‘I’s.  
     ‘Equality’ is well-supported in the Emersonian genius’s view on ‘hate’.  ‘Hating’ 
others becomes the source of the genius’s sense of equality.  Emerson says that ‘thy 
love afar is spite at home.’
540
  When we refer to Luke 14:26-7, the spite is quickly 
related to Jesus Christ’s command.  Why hate and why love?  In Luke, Jesus calls 
for hating others and bearing our cross.  Emerson, citing the same passages, achieves 
equality in the universality of hermeneutics by situating a genius in the realm of 
hating each other for the sake of transcendental deduction: ‘The doctrine of hatred 
must be preached, as the counter action of the doctrine of love, when in pules 
[whimpers] and wines. I shun father and mother and wife and brother when my 
genius calls me.’
541
  
     For this reason, Emerson evaluates such an activity as giving money to the poor 
is despising other ‘I’s.  To give something to the poor means to have a relationship 
with malice and vanity.  However, according to Emerson, when a genius directly 
perceives the existence of the malice and the vanity rather than the poor, they go 
away suddenly.  Therefore, a genius is one who hates his neighbours living in a 
depraved society because a genius has nothing to do with depravity.  The message of 
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a genius to the poor is clear: ‘You, living with malice and vanity, just get out of the 
society of wrong doings and let’s have identical spirituality as geniuses.’ 
3. Evaluation of Emersonian Genius 
     Joel Porte interprets Emerson’s view on history, that of ‘enhancing our estimate 
of the present’, not as the ‘Hegelian dialectic or logic of events’ in which we are 
‘totally controlled and circumscribed by descent or inheritance’.
542
  Like the death of 
the I, Emerson’s view on history is not what is chronologically interpreted.  He 
writes, ‘Every mind must know the whole lesson for itself, must go over the whole 
ground. What it does not see, what it does not live, it will not know.’
543
  Emerson 
means, echoing the death of the I, that we have to be responsible for the event of 
khora (the whole), even if our life is vulnerable, and so, cannot but be paradoxically 
undecidable.  Emerson wanted the whole as universality to be achieved, and, like 
Gadamer’s ‘taste’, was against autocratic power of fashion and preserved a specific 
freedom and superiority.
544
  I want to cite Gadamer here: universality can only be 
achieved ‘wherever a whole is intended but not given as a whole’.
545
  
      We can now see that while Emerson seems to participate in the death of the I, his 
formulated theory on self-reliance and genius does not seem to fit the category of the 
death of the I.  Especially when Emerson’s transcendentalism is applied to theology, 
it is much worse.  I will take Orestes Brownson (1803-76) as an example of 
transcendental theology.  In seeking to justify ‘the divinity of man’ both 
metaphysically and historically, Brownson criticises Calvinism’s total depravity of 
human nature and asserts the most sublime dignity of man as purely natural.  He 
does not deny the fact of man’s godlike state, but accepts the doctrine that, through 
incarnation, God has graciously elevated man to a sharing in the Divine life.  Man, 
not Christ, is the center of Brownson’s plan of redemption.  
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     However, the Transcendentalists’ intuition is similar in effect to the ‘supernatural 
sense’ of Jonathan Edwards: it leads to the immediate grasp of supernatural reality.  
But where Edwards has maintained that the supernatural sense comes only to the 
elect and is the fruit of God’s grace, the transcendentalists held the more democratic 
view that intuition, the ability to know Divine reality directly, is the birthright of 
every human being.  Because of their common possession of the faculty of reaching 
God, all men have inalienable worth.  All men are spiritually equal and of equal 
dignity in that all men are able to communicate with God.  It is through this 
principle that transcendentalism deeply affected the development of democratic 
ideas in the United States. 
     Calvinism is not at all antithetical to human freedom.  If Calvinism is misused by 
the  dominant power of the church that teaches it, Calvinism may well be deviated 
from the teaching of Calvin.  Actually, the core teaching of Calvinists’ total 
depravity of human being is the very source of the doctrine of the existential being’s 
true freedom.  Emerson’s problem is that he is too possessed by the idea that human 
freedom comes from ‘the autonomy of “I”’.  The death of the I will resolve his 
problem. 
 
D. Rortyian Ironist 
     Rorty defines irony as recognition of the contingency of one’s ‘final vocabulary’, 
because it comes from the ‘past poetic and creative achievement’ that always renews 
space for the self-creation that no human authority can ratify.
546
  Hence, Rorty says 
irony comes from ‘a tension between the clarity of the old languages and the 
crudeness and roughness of new suggestions about how we might think’.
547
  He 
argues that the ironist, with a new language of imagination that eliminates human 
cruelty, would lead to human solidarity: 
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Kant’s idea of justifying human solidarity by reference to ‘pure ideas of 
reason’ was a good try. But I don’t believe it worked. It was no more 
plausible or implausible, no more useful or useless, than the attempt to 
justify human solidarity by saying that we are all children of the same divine 
father.  This also didn’t work. Neither attempt contributed much to the 
elimination of the cruelty with which human communities treat one 
another.
548
  
     According to Rorty, a liberal metaphysician is different from a liberal ironist in 
terms of loving others: the former will ask such questions as, ‘Why should I avoid 
humiliating?’  The latter will ask, ‘What humiliates?’
549
  An ironist will answer the 
first question, ‘You should avoid humiliating because loving others is a human 
virtue.’  A metaphysician will answer the second question, ‘You and they humiliate’, 
and therefore ‘I do not know why I have to love others.’  These different questions 
and answers are caused by a different understanding of solidarity.  An ironist will 
think that recognition of a common susceptibility to humiliation is the only social 
bond that is needed.  However, a metaphysician will think of ‘you’ in relationship to 
a shared power larger than ‘I’.
550
 
     In Rorty, a liberal utopia is not something that explains human nature, the end of 
time or the parousia of God, ‘but is simply the best idea people have had about the 
object for which they work’.  Ironism, then, is similar to antifoundationalism.
551
  
Isn’t it a plausible utopia where you and I are one?  Rorty, with the presupposition 
of every human being’s uniqueness, argues that every human being needs to have 
the zeal to participate in another’s destiny.  That is, a human utopia can be achieved 
through the ironist’s self-creation by increasing sensitivity to the particular details of 
the pain and humiliation of others who are unfamiliar.
552
  In this sense, tolerance and 
flexibility are important virtues for an ironist: ‘Tolerance has to do with people who 
are different.  Flexibility has to do with the ability to redescribe oneself.’
553
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     Rorty believes there are nothing out there to be transcended, but only different 
times and spontaneous chances in space.  He characterizes a liberal ironist as 
someone who activates three presuppositions:  
(1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she 
currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, 
vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she 
realizes that arguments phrased in her present vocabulary can neither 
underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about 
her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than 
others, that it is in touch with a power not herself.
554
 
     According to Rorty, an ironist tries to get to the point of true transcendence 
(Hodge’s concursus) only within her language, conscience and community as a 
product of time and chance.  This self-creation of an ironist seems to enable us to 
reconcile ourselves to the death of the I and also enables us to reside in khora, where 
chance idiosyncrasy turns into distinctive originality.  As we have studied, while the 
characteristic of Emersonian self-reliance, as an act of creation, is happening all at 
once, Rorty’s creation is something like an act of edification, which is an ongoing 
process in the way a metaphor proliferates various meanings.  
     Regarding the issue of loving others, even if both Emerson and Rorty emphasise 
loving others, their ways of loving through self-creations are different: Emerson 
responds to a metaphysical language, Rorty to a metaphoric language.  Rorty says 
that: 
tossing a metaphor into a conversation is like a suddenly breaking off the 
conversation long enough to make a face, or pulling a photograph out of your 
pocket and displaying it, or pointing at a feature of the surroundings, or 
slapping your interlocutor’s face, or kissing him; tossing a metaphor into a 
text is like using italics, or illustrations, or odd production or formats.
555
 
For example, consider Jacques Lacan’s metaphor like, ‘Love is a pebble laughing in 
the sunlight.’
556
  We can substitute one term or expression for another in this 
metaphoric language.  Then, we have the question of how the metaphor functions in 
rhetorical language.  The function has something to do with an event that is 
happening.  It is not in terms of effect.  It is not how it is read, experienced, 
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understood and so forth.  It is, in fact, what is functioning in these languages.  So 
metaphoric structure is established not by facts, but by function.  We substitute love 
for the pebbles’ laughing in the sunlight.  Pebbles have nothing to do with love.  
Actually, pebbles, sunlight and laughing are only marginally connected with love.  
With this metaphor, we can cross the differences easily.  This ability to cross 
differences is solidarity for Rorty, who says, ‘Such increased sensitivity makes it 
more difficult to marginalise people.’
557
  The very vehicle for overcoming marginal 
differences is, for Rorty, increasing sensitivity to others’ destiny. 
1.  Rortyan Solidarity 
     Rorty’s solidarity is possible for ironists, who not only have their own particular 
lives, but also have a connection to the metaphysical spoken language, ‘Love your 
neighbor’.  For the solidarity of ironists, this metaphysical language needs to be 
metaphoric and work through an individuality of an ironist.  Self-creation is only 
promised as a hope to be fulfilled, as Abraham did.  According to Rorty:  
The sort of autonomy which self-creating ironists like Nietzsche, Derrida or 
Foucault seek is not the sort of thing that could ever be embodied in social 
institutions.  Autonomy is not something which all human beings have 
within them and which society can release by ceasing to repress them.  It is 
something which certain particular human beings hope to attain by self-
creation, and which a few actually do.
558
 
     Rorty says ‘the desire for objectivity’ is not a desire to overcome the limit of a 
society, but a simple desire for as much intersubjective agreement as possible, ‘the 
desire to expand the reference of “us” as far as we can’.
559
  If so, then objectivity 
pursues agreement within a given community.  What Rorty means by objectivity is 
intersubjectivity.
560
  
     Rorty’s solidarity is not developed in the way that the irony of a genius is 
strengthened.  Rather, solidarity is possible when ironism becomes universal.  That 
is, solidarity can be achieved when an ironist begins to recognise his limit and 
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inevitably starts to create new languages.  This new language involves increasing 
sensitivity to others’ pain and humiliation.  However, the term ‘sensitivity’ invokes 
many questions, such as: when do we have to be sensitive?  How sensitive do we 
need to be?  Who should take initiative in this sensitivity?  What would be the final 
form of both sides’ being sensitive?  Will both sides be satisfied, or will one strongly 
held opinion dominate another?  
2. The concept of Rortyan Loving Others 
    Rorty says that moral progress is  
in the direction of greater human solidarity. But that solidarity is not thought 
of as recognition of a core self, the human essence, in all human beings. 
Rather, it is thought of as the ability to see more and more traditional 
differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and the like) as unimportant 
when compared with similarities with respect to pain and humiliation—the 
ability to think of people widely different from ourselves as included in the 
range of ‘us’.
 561
   
Rorty’s solidarity recognises that the pain of others is the common ground of ‘we’: 
‘Simply by being human we do not have to have a common bond.  For all we share 
with all other humans is the same thing we share with all other animals—the ability 
to feel pain.’
562
  It is true that differences are unimportant when compared with 
similarities with respect to pain and humiliation.  My question here is: why do we 
have to compare the differences of something with the similarities of pain?  Rorty’s 
scheme may fall into the fallacy of disregarding differences in the pain and 
humiliation experienced by different tribes, races and customs.  That is to say, 
Rorty’s ‘we’, whose common ground is human instinctive universal pain and 
humiliation, may severely neglect the private pain and humiliation of others.  
3. Rortyan Solidarity and Its Limit  
     We are living in this world as individuals and as members of a society.  How can 
an individual have a good relationship with the society?  What should the 
relationship between an individual and a society be?  How can we become one?  We 
cannot avoid the solidarity problem.  Modern ways of thinking show that altruism is 
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the best way to solidarity.  On the one hand, the Emersonian genius is very much an 
individual, and what seems to be common to all human beings is the will to power, 
which is antisocial.  On the other hand, Rorty wants to establish a free society which 
envisages a utopia with an endless process of ‘proliferating realization of Freedom’ 
rather than converging toward pre-existing Truth.
563
  With esthetic zeal, a liberal 
ironist achieves universality by being a sufficient historicist and post-metaphysical 
solidarity by believing that time and chance are out of human reach.
564
  An ironist 
wants to overcome a metaphysician or a theologian who finds out theoretical means 
to resolve moral dilemmas with the answer to the question of human existence and 
of a hierarchy of responsibilities.
565
 
     Re-description of ‘I’ and his relation with others will suggest alternative 
experiential possibilities.  We first closely examined the idea of the ‘I’ in Emerson 
and Rorty.  Emersonian self-reliance, on the one hand, enables transcending the self 
to attain external truth with its will to power.  On the other hand, Rorty’s self-
creation is possible by increasing sensitivity to the humiliation of others, as Paul 
himself did, as we saw in chapter II.
566
  Compared with a genius, an ironist’s truth is 
more evidently experiential in a self. Here we can see differences in Emerson’s and 
Rorty’s ways of pursuing self-creation. Emerson creates the self by levelling up to 
enter the transcendental realm, and he therefore believes that what is out there is 
Divine truth, such that a genius needs to transcend itself.  On the other hand, Rorty 
creates it with imaginative ability by increasing sensitivity to the humiliation of 
others, leveling down to other people.
567
  Rorty’s ironist would say that we should 
respect varieties and differences among human beings. 
     Rorty argues that even if there is innate knowledge, it should be understood by a 
self’s experience.  Solidarity does not depend on the distinctiveness of a self alone.  
Rorty wants each self to have a conversation.  However, we have a question of what 
would happen when one—who is on the margin also has one’s own particularity—
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does not want to have conversation.  In this case, can the marginal be thought of as 
us and included in us?   Rorty’s solidarity targets the marginal, assuming that the 
ability to feel pain is common ground to all people.  In his view, the powerful or the 
rich need to exercise kindness, love and sensitivity.  I have two more questions: who 
are the powerful?  Are the marginal supposed to be open to others’ sensitivity just 
because they are regarded as feeble and weak?  In terms of human dignity and 
equality, the situation of the marginal itself has a significant intrinsic meaning.  I 
think, rather than increasing sensitivity on the part of powerful, increasing the 
weak’s differential ability and maximising it is a better way to achieve solidarity.     
     So far, we have studied Emersonian ‘self-reliance’ and Rorty’s ‘self-creation’, 
and sought to know how they play roles at khora.  By comparing different views of 
solidarity of the Emersonian genius and Rorty’s ironist, we can see the reason why 
we need solidarity and the characteristic of the death of the I, as well.  I want to 
argue that utopian solidarity is possible when an Emersonian transcendental self 
plays a role in Rorty’s language of imagination.  That is, an autonomous human 
being (the ironist) of different expressions (languages), confined to a certain time 
and a space, would increase solidarity with others by beginning to exercise an 
Emersonian transcendental language without language.   
 
E. Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich 
     Gary Jahn observes that Leo Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich is a remarkable 
example of realism and shows ‘Tolstoy’s postconversion philosophical concerns and 
revised understanding of the mission of art and of the artist’, representing the shift of 
Russian intellectual life from materialism towards a renewed emphasis on spiritual 
and religious values.
568
  In this novel, death appears as a presence evoking such 
questions as ‘what is and what ought to be, in a human life’.
569
  The answer would 
be that the nature of life is the experience of death in khora.  In khora, what seems to 
be impossible (death) for those in this world is not secret at all, because in it, the 
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possibility (presence) always reveals itself in relation to what we think to be 
impossible (absence, death).  
     After experiencing a long series of suffering, Ivan listens to the voice of his soul, 
the currents of thought arising within him: ‘What do you want?’  He answers to 
himself that he wants to ‘live and not to suffer’.  As a patient, Ivan is desperate to 
what it means by ‘to live’.   What would be the answer when his inner voice asks 
‘As you lived before, well and pleasantly?’  What would happen to the answer if the 
inner voice of Ivan is given a place in him?  This question is exactly what would 
happen in khora.  What would happen if the entire life was nothing but the ‘display 
of the falseness, insincerity, insensitivity, and consequent spiritual inadequacy of 
that life’?
570
  
     What Ivan has achieved becomes meaningless when he gets ill: ‘I was going up 
in public opinion, but to the same extent life was ebbing away from me.  And now it 
is all done and there is only death.’  Actually, the pleasure, joy and happiness have 
not last long.  The longer it lasts, the more deadly it becomes.  Ivan’s question, 
‘what if my whole life, my conscious life, really was “not right”?’,
571
 inspires him to 
view his life in a quite new way.  As a result, he begins to realise that it is not social 
organisation, family, or any other circumstance but the inner voice, which made him 
happy. 
     The final four chapters of The Death of Ivan Ilyich show the bipolarity of life and 
death, health and sickness. Especially, according to Jahn: 
Chapters 7 and 8 present a juxtaposed account of these two ‘lives’ of Ivan 
Ilych: the nighttime life (with Gerasim) in chapter 7 and the daytime life 
(with family, doctors, visitors) in chapter 8. At the end of chapter 8, night has 
begun once again, and Ivan Ilych asks for Gerasim to be sent to him. This 
suggests that as we embark on the final chapters we may expect to find an 
emphasis on the new, nighttime life of Ivan Ilych and on the question of life 
and death associated with it.
572
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Through the path to death, Ivan could learn how to live.
573
 To live for him is to 
listen to his inner voice.  The inner voice enables him to think that the shadow of 
death for him is not the end, but the beginning of his new life.  Even though ‘death’ 
is the extreme manifestation of human suffering of which he has been afraid, the 
inner voice is still working anytime, even when he is actually dead seen in the 
beginning of this novel.  There is no fear because there is no death in his inner voice.  
What joy!  The inner voice is still heard.  Death is finished.  It is no more.  The inner 
voice makes impossibility possible.  
     The implication of this novel is that the death of Ivan Ilyich allows him to escape 
the bondage of flesh that is determined by a certain time and space.
574
 Accordingly, 
we can infer from this novel that genuine freedom, in true understanding of life, is 
possible when we experience the death of the I, which already surpasses time and 
space while, at the same time, enacting our responsibility, gift, faith and humility.  
 
E. Abraham in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling 
     Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813-55) was born to a prosperous family with an 
intense and dominating father, Michael Pederson Kierkegaard.  His works are 
focused on the individual’s existence.  Echoing the death of the I, John Caputo 
determines that a major theme of Kierkegaard’s work is ‘the right to be an 
“exception to the universal”’, as well as a critique of metaphysical speculation by 
‘substituting for it an acute and subtle description of concrete human experience, of 
what he liked to call the life of the “poor existing individual”’.
575
  For Kierkegaard, 
‘to be a self’, Caputo writes, ‘means to live in the white light of eternity, where there 
is no deceiving God’.
576
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     As we recognised in chapter I, the death of the I as a passage of history of 
religion does not indicate ‘I’ alone: its responsibility is not like the moral self’s 
responsibility, but is combined with gift, faith and humility.  This dynamic way of 
being needs to be reviewed by Kierkegaard’s notion of self (Abraham) in Fear and 
Trembling, in which Kierkegaard asks the meaning and purpose of living of 
Abraham before God and with fellow creatures.  Kierkegaard shows that Abraham, 
as the image of God, should not be understood as a being comprised of fixed 
characteristics such as ethics, aesthetics and faith alone.  Abraham has to be 
understood in relation to God and to the rest of the world.  
     Like the Enlightenment philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Jacques Derrida deals 
with the same philosophical language: responsibility, promise, faith, place and so on. 
However, there are differences in questions about truth between Kant and Derrida: 
the Kantian question is, ‘What is the truth?’  For Derrida, the question in différance 
is, ‘What happens to the answers if the voice of God is given a place (khora)?’ or, 
‘What is a question in différance other than “what is the truth?”’  I believe the 
Providence of God also has to be construed by such questions as Derrida raises.    
     The story of Abraham in Fear and Trembling inspires us to think of the 
universality of hermeneutics, at least in terms of the thesis of this chapter.  
Universality in khora, of which the key is textuality (as we saw early in this chapter), 
not only happens in its space and time but also is achieved in the scope of 
hermeneutics.  Gadamer’s task of demonstrating the ‘interpreter’s belonging to his 
object’
577
 in universality of hermeneutics is possible when textuality, not the text 
itself, becomes a medium of understanding.  Since khora is not an identity, we 
approached it with elusive and negative anticipation.  However, in order to 
understand it as possibly a priori, we studied its historical and philosophical 
background in the section titled ‘Khora’.578 
     Within the context of khora, a person with the Holy Spirit assumes responsibility 
for executing the Commandment of God.  Without recognising the death of the I, the 
work of the Holy Spirit cannot be fully known, and is therefore always pseudo-true 
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to a dust-like man of reason, because the space where the Holy Spirit functions is the 
death of the I.  Knowledge or understanding of the subjectivity and objectivity of a 
human being living in this world is practically intersubjective.  In potentia absoluta, 
the true transcendental point is possible at the moment of event, so the event is 
always beyond our reason and knowledge.  We discussed potentia ordinata in terms 
of the event and potentia absoluta in terms of intersubjectivity in detail when we 
studied concursus in Charles Hodge’s theology in chapter I.  We can conclude that 
while the death of the I makes an event possible, the Holy Spirit makes our faith in 
and knowledge of God possible. 
1. The Theological Implication of the Death of the I in Fear and Trembling 
    The traditional theological interpretation of the story of Abraham’s sacrifice of his 
only son in Genesis 22 is clear: the Providence of God, i.e., God, provides the 
mountain Moriah.  God gives an illustrated proof of His Providence in the salvation 
of Abraham and Isaac.  The substitution of a ram for Isaac at the instigation of God 
is what the Lord provides, and the church claims this symbol as proper and peculiar 
to it.
579
  However, our study on Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling580 will help us 
know how the Providence of God is to be understood in the context of khora. 
       Obedience to God is the exercise of reason and the response to the call of God.  
Even if we know that Christians should obey the Commandments, in reality, we find 
that they are puzzled when they come across the contradictions between God’s 
Commandments (to love) and His Call (to kill).  Christians have to exercise the 
Commandment of love.  Why, then, should Abraham kill his son, Isaac?  With this 
paradox in mind, in this section, I want to discuss this sort of irony occurring in our 
life experiences in the context of the providential space of khora: the sacrifice 
happens when the voice of God (the voice of God and God Himself are different) is 
given a place in khora.  
     In spite of the enigmatic characteristic of khora, its function and application to 
the theology of Charles Hodge are evident because the place of khora provides a 
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true transcendental point.  An examination of Kierkegaard, also an Enlightenment 
philosopher, would be a good object of investigation of the functions of khora with 
the inquiry of how a transcendental point (concursus in Hodge) is achieved in terms 
of responsibility, gift, faith and humility: responsibility with critical decision, faith 
with absolute risk, gift with true transcendental death, and humility with the blood of 
Christ.  
     With the questions concerning the death of the I’s relationship to ethics, 
aesthetics and faith, I want to trace back how those Enlightenment ideas have been 
developed.  Accordingly, we will pursue three relevant inquiries of Kierkegaard in 
Fear and Trembling that will allow us to understand the characteristics of 
temporality of the subject and object, in the intersubjective modes in terms of ethics, 
aesthetics and religion; Can we suspend ethics?; How can we know that there is such 
a thing as an absolute responsibility towards God?; Is Abraham’s keeping silent 
about his purpose to others ethical?
 581
  This study will show us the footprints of the 
death of the I as a passage of history of religion in relation to Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of self, which is conspicuous in its ‘dialectical and existential 
conception of self’.
582
 
     These questions will also lead us on the journey from ‘the autonomy of I’ to the 
death of the I, and show us how the death of the I embedded in a person with the 
Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit exercises its undecidability (paradox or 
irony) without losing its identity.  The intersubjective temporality of the death of the 
I acting in a person with the Holy Spirit, as a condition of the death and resurrection 
of Jesus Christ—which will eventually be played out at the space of khora—can be 
observed by practical reason in our daily experiences in which faith is ethically and 
aesthetically embedded.  The experience of our subjective faith and objective 
knowledge of God, Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, as intersubjective modes of 
Christian life here and now, should be practical and, therefore, acting by itself. 
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2. Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling 
     In the event of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac, the question is whether we live with 
the ethics of Kant, live in a paradox of Kierkegaard, or live in faith?  As we study 
the monstrosity of Kierkegaard, we will also observe how Kantian wisdom with 
courage is working in Abraham in Genesis 22. Throughout our study in search of the 
answers to the three questions of Fear and Trembling, we will also get the insights 
into describing the functions of khora and its theological implications for studying 
Hodge’s Providence in chapter VI.  
     In the four dramatised stories in the prelude to Kierkegaard’s Fear and 
Trembling, based on the sacrifice of Isaac, we can see at least two parts of a 
paradox.
583
  One is that Abraham does not think it was wrong to offer voluntarily to 
God the best thing that he has: his son.  The other part of the paradox is that 
Abraham gets Isaac back.
584
  It is really difficult to understand this paradox with our 
knowledge and reason, or with our highly developed immediate sensory system of 
conscience (i. e., Scottish Common Sense Realism).  How can we understand God’s 
intention with our reason?  Can we unravel this paradox by breaking the limit of our 
rational understanding with our utmost passion?  
     Abraham decides to offer his son and acts by himself, and does not tell anyone 
about what he is going to do.  He does not even seem to assume any responsibility 
for being silent to his family and for his intention to kill his son.  It is common sense 
that the individual behaves according to the universal principle of reason.  However, 
what Abraham does is to destroy this universal criterion; he is captured by his own 
will.  What happens to Abraham’s mind?  He has the conscience to kill his son.  
Abraham is called the father of faith and obedience, but who on earth can have the 
kind of faith to kill his own son?  What does it mean for a man to have faith? 
According to the full story of Abraham in Genesis 22, his acts of faith have nothing 
to do with trial and error, but everything to do with immediacy and consistency.  
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Abraham’s faith seems to be stronger and more consistent than a partisan’s die-hard 
conviction in his ideology. 
     According to Kierkegaard, there is no faith without risk: 
Faith is the contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and the 
objective uncertainty.  If I am able to comprehend God objectively, I do not 
have faith; but because I cannot do this, I must have faith.  If I want to keep 
myself in faith, I must continually see it that I hold fast the objective 
uncertainty, see to it that in the objective uncertainty I am ‘out on 70,000 
fathoms of water’ and still have faith.
585
 
       A man of reason will say that even though one does not have Abraham’s faith, 
at least what one can do is care for and love others.  He will ask whether we regard 
ourselves as having genuine faith, whether we do really have the absolute faith of 
Abraham and Noah.  And he will say that he has never seen this kind of man, and 
therefore will ask that if there is such a thing as genuine faith, to let him know.  The 
responsibility of a man of reason is to exercise his integrity of life based on his 
logical judgement.  That is, ethically, we respond rationally, and we create universal 
truths that are given as a whole by means of philosophy, science and even theology. 
     Aesthetically, we act intuitively and immediately, on a case-by-case basis in our 
experience.  That is, the responsibility of aesthetic judgement is to improvise 
methods to co-determine, supplement and correct an established logic based on 
one’s reflexive judgement.
586
  Such an Emersonian genius, then, has to be 
responsible for aesthetic judgement. 
     At the level of faith, we want to retain the universal level of ethics and respond, 
not at the purely intuitive level of the aesthetic, but in an infinite leap of faith, even a 
surge into the absurd and unintelligible Other.  However, more correctly speaking, 
Christian faith is never certain, for we cannot be brought into the presence of the 
Absolute God.  Since the truth of God cannot be perceived directly by us as it is, the 
act of faith for Kierkegaard cannot be construed as objective, but must be portrayed 
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in an absurd way.
587
  Reasonable and aesthetic ways of determining such a direct 
relationship between us and God will result in vain.  
     This is the dilemma of Kierkegaard, caused by Kantian ethics and aesthetics that 
still holds on to universal criteria based on ‘the autonomy of “I”’ alone.  There is no 
direct synthetic transcendental point, as we studied in chapter IV, even in the modes 
of process and intersubjectivity.  This sort of transcendental point proves to be 
impossible in human capacity.  Clearly recognising this fact, Kierkegaard regards 
Abraham as a monster.
588
  When a man has faith, he already resides beyond the 
ethical level of the rational universal
589
 and the aesthetic level of intuition.  
Kierkegaard calls this the paradox of faith,
590
 because he thinks that faith begins 
from the place where thinking leaves off.
591
  In this sense, the Emersonian genius’s 
‘thought’ cannot be regarded as faith because his thinking is based totally on ‘self-
reliance’.
592
  The paradox of faith that Abraham represents is, according to Kevin 
Hart, a monstrosity of an event of now, when Derrida’s future is revealed and 
presented.
593
 
     Abraham’s infinite abdication on the basis of an individual relationship with God, 
and not on the basis of philosophy, science or theology, is the paradox of faith.  This 
may result in paradoxical consequences because he has exposed himself to the 
dangers of being deceived and of deceiving himself.  This is an absolute decision 
within the undecidability of the death of the I.  The danger of the absolute 
subjectivity that he radically embraced eventually led him to disregard the universal 
common sense of this world.  Suddenly, universal common sense has been 
substituted by the universality of the death of the I, and that temporal experience of 
Abraham makes him a monster.  Because the ‘leap of faith’ is dangerous, we need to 
take a risk; because it is impossible, we need to endure its indecidablity.  Because it 
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is a total gift, we are to experience a new death, the death of Christ, His humility and 
our humility. 
      How could Abraham avoid this tremendous danger of being either deceived or 
self-deceiving?  According to Kierkegaard, Abraham’s faith act could be possible 
only through fear and trembling, an awesome dread and fear of error, i.e., by an 
infinite leap of faith in God.  However, I believe, it is more than by fear and 
trembling.  As we can see in the Biblical narrative, this typical faith act of Abraham 
has nothing to do with the process of trial and error or intersubjective modes of 
understanding; it is shown as an event, unchangeable and as consistent as the once-
and-for-all conviction of a partisan.  However, it is not violent like a partisan’s 
mentality, but looks fragile, temporal, dangerous and impossible.  If it is a leap of 
faith, then it should have been a pure trace, the tracing of God.  We cannot be 
inconsistent if it is inscribed in our faith.  This inscription has the history of a day of 
a thousand years in the death of the I.  Indeed, the leap of faith is a monstrous and 
paradoxical event.    
     Now I want to discuss the relationship between Abraham as a man of 
responsibility and as a man of faith.  As a man of faith, he should take responsibility 
for what he chooses to do to others.  We can infer from the faith act of Abraham in 
that he surely decides to take responsibility for his absurd choices and the life that 
follows from them.  His responsibility for his own choices is definitely due to his 
absurdity, that is to say, his faith in God.  How, then, can we explain his 
irresponsibility in being silent about his purpose for Isaac’s life, in light of the 
concern of other members of his family for what is going to happen to Isaac?
 594 
 
What is his responsibility? 
     Abraham’s silence, keeping the will to kill Isaac to himself, is secret to the others, 
yet it is nothing but a trace of God because it presupposes the space of a promised 
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speech.
595
  Abraham assumes responsibility only while deferring speaking, but 
tracing of God.  Abraham defers speaking because it is an event of the promise of a 
true transcendental point, not because it appears either to be avoidable or 
insignificant.  Since Abraham’s silence is not secret at all, Abraham thinks he is 
responsible to other members of his family.  Therefore, faith in God cannot nullify 
his responsibility to others.  Unlike a man of reason, whose responsibility lies in a 
moral law of categorical imperatives,
596 
Abraham’s responsibility binds him to the 
Other.  Thinking reasonably, irresponsible faith has to be done away with.  On the 
contrary, Abraham’s silence confirms his responsibility as a trace in khora.  This 
fact makes me think of the relationship between our faith and our responsibility, and 
how it may be possible to reconcile them.
597
  
     In order to reconcile them, first of all, we need to analyse Abraham’s faith act.  
His act is to carry out ‘the death of Isaac’. What he is doing ‘now’ is realising what 
he thinks is impossible.  When we say that the death of the I is responsibility, a 
person in khora functions as a medium to facilitate the possibility of such impossible 
actions as sacrificing, giving and forgiving someone or something.  That is, the 
previous self has never been successful in exercising responsibility for his own 
ethical and aesthetic judgement.  This impossible work can be possible at the last 
moment before death, when a self, in whom the previous ‘autonomy of “I”’ had faith 
without God, begins to speak of Him.  The confession of the self becomes that ‘I’ 
am always raising the knife and having the knife raised, not over others, but over ‘I’. 
     What Abraham did and how we apply the story in our lives are inextricably 
related.  How can we engage in his faith?  As we have seen, his execution the death 
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of Isaac and Isaac’s salvation by the atoning sacrifice can be seen as ‘death’ that 
Ivan experienced in Tolstoy in the previous section.  ‘Death’ is an event of a 
temporal moment between life and death.  Actually, for Derrida, ‘death’ is not a 
physical matter, but something happening in between.  That is, Isaac’s life and death 
is not a matter of ‘I’ and ‘you’, but of the ‘Other’.  The commensurability of 
Abraham and Isaac in the one and same reality is only possible by tracing the other.  
The fact that neither of them has any communication shows that they do not trace 
each other.  Life and death only traces the Other.  The faith of Abraham is exactly 
the death of Abraham.  The faith of Abraham is a passage of the life of Abraham, 
whose faith can be recognised in his experience.  But who on Earth has this kind of 
faith that traces of God?  
     When the death of the I assumes responsibility as an intersubjective mode of a 
self, the faith of Abraham—a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy 
Spirit—is dynamically executed.  In the death of the I, a self regards others’ 
situations as its situation, saying that ‘I’ am in the Other and the Other is in ‘I’.  
Therefore, raising the knife over Isaac is definitely raising the knife over Abraham 
himself.  Death of ‘the Other’ becomes death of ‘I’.  This is what I mean by faith: 
the possibility of the impossibility. 
     Yet how can Abraham assume responsibility for his action without having any 
idea whether Isaac will be spared or not?  Can a man be responsible for his action 
without any specific anticipation of the result of his action?  Does Abraham think 
that his willingness to kill his son will be stopped, or does he think that his intention 
to murder is God’s will, so that whatever follows from his action is in accordance 
with God?  No, not at all.  Abraham’s concern is not about his action, Isaac’s destiny, 
his family, or whether he will be stopped, but about the promise of God embedded 
in his conscience.  Abraham should be responsible for what he chooses and the 
consequences of his choices.  The promise he got at the event of 70 years before 
brought about 70 years of waiting for another event of God’s promise to be fulfilled.  
These chains of events always trace the one origin, God.  
     Again, Abraham’s deferral of speaking of God to others is not by fear and 
trembling, but through the tracing of God.  This deferral causes him to assume 
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responsibility towards others and God as well.  Therefore, we can conclude that 
Abraham’s faith is based on the promise that is to be fulfilled.  Even though he is 
vulnerable when he recognises that his son is to be sacrificed, he overcomes his 
anxiety not by the certainty of a genius, but by the experience of ‘new death’, 
responsibility, faith, gift and humility of the death of the I embedded in a person with 
the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.
598
  This ‘new death’ will console our 
fear, trembling, dread and awe.  The promise that nobody knows when, where, what 
and how to be fulfilled causes Abraham to have responsibility through the tracing of 
God.
599
  
     The promise embedded in the word ‘messianic’ seems to combine faith and 
responsibility.  This messianic promise does not give any hints of when, where and 
how it will happen, but I am still waiting for the promise to be fulfilled.  Surely, I do 
not know what is going to happen in the future.  Even if our waiting for the promise 
to be fulfilled may possibly lead us to the wretchedness of our life, after all, the 
promise which is already embedded in us will renew the faith and responsibility of 
‘I’ and ‘you’ because the death of the I is embedded in our faith and responsibility.  
The responsibility of the death of the I is not a simple duty, but is the wretched 
man’s tear and tracing of the blood-stained Cross.  It is not the responsibility of 
‘You’, but of ‘I’ for the abundant lives already inscribed in the death of the I.  This 
inscription in which Abraham’s faith is revealed never ends, but traces God in the 
death of the I. 
      Without recognising whether ‘the seeming wretchedness’ is God’s trial, the 
messianic promise inscribed in Abraham is operating by itself, without attaching 
itself to Abraham, his family, others and us.  It is just here, in this world, now.  Who 
is the one that God is seeking?  Who is the righteous?  
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     Was the voice of God asking for the sacrifice of Isaac the trial of God?  If yes, 
then the promise in the word ‘messianic’ will operate more dynamically and vividly 
in the faith of Abraham.  If we regard the whole of life as a trial, our faith must last 
over the whole of that life, not at some particular moment.  Our faith never remains 
in a confined whole, but manoeuvres to khora, where true universality signifies. 
Again, who is the righteous?  Who can have this kind of faith?  Even a man of 
‘promise’ cannot have this faith as an end.  It is impossible, but as a means to direct 
ends, it becomes a possible secret without secret.  
     We cannot deny that Derrida is very much an Enlightenment thinker, because he 
has nothing to do with secret knowledge.  As he says, the only secret is that there is 
no secret.  It is right that what is impossible is no secret at all.  For us, what is 
impossible is nothing but the very boundary of what can appear as presence.  Who 
experiences the true transcendental point of God?  What is the evidence?  You?  
They? 
     Kierkegaard knows all about faith, but he just cannot act upon it.  But in the level 
of Derridean khora, what one knows is simply acting by itself.  Actually, faith is 
always related to the other.  However, in khora, if the knowledge of God is faith, 
faith acts by itself.  Because being-with-the-Other—i.e., Emmanuel—is fully written 
to a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit in this khora, faith 
will work even at the moment of crying, prayer, mourning, ordeal, risk, death and 
even sinning.  In the space of khora, there are limitless lines of communication of 
signifiers of signifiers, in which nothing but dust-like sinners are sharing love and 
eventually acting upon it.  
 
G. A Theologian 
     Kantian wisdom with courage that as observed in Kierkegaard’s Abraham is 
expressed in the context of the death of the I embedded in a self with the Holy Spirit.  
We also assume that Calvin’s doctrine of the Providence of God is distinctive in the 
courage to persevere in Christian lives.  That is, Calvin’s outline places election not 
under theology proper, but under the Christian life, the courage to persevere.  In 
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Calvin, Providence is read from election that is accompanied by the perseverance of 
the saints, but in Charles Hodge, it is applied to theology.  
     The courage of a self’s perseverance in khora is exercised by: passing through 
paradoxical lives with responsibility; absolute danger with gift; exercising selfless 
goodness with faith; and persevering without speaking with humility.  These four 
characteristics of courage in khora are clear evidence of the possibility of practising 
theology in the context of a ‘leap of faith’.  If a theologian’s priority is the 
transcendental point that is secret no more, and so, operative in our faith act, a 
theologian can suspend ethics only when he assumes absolute responsibility towards 
the Other with courage to persevere.  Since the hypothesis of absolute responsibility 
is impossible to accomplish, a theologian has to learn how to avoid speaking 
transcendental languages so that his faith has to be strengthened.  This statement 
may be the answer to Kierkegaard’s three questions on the suspension of ethics, 
absolute responsibility and keeping silent.    
     Indeed, khora is not a living place.  It is neither a place where a perfect man 
exercises his autonomous strength nor a place to criticise another’s manner of being. 
It is not a place where a metaphysical theologian addresses his theoretical belief.  
However, it is a place where a theologian’s conviction of belief is to be exercised.  
That is, it is a place where a theologian can be inclusive without losing his belief.  It 
is a space of context-sensitivity, where a particular faith is welcome.  We now want 
to explore how Hodge views a theologian. 
     Hodge is a Biblical theologian of Sola Scriptura, who maintains that the authority 
of the Bible comes from the facts of the Bible.  This is why he prioritises what he 
calls Biblical theology.  As a Biblical theologian, he argues that a theologian’s 
knowledge comes from the whole Bible.  Hodge’s ‘theologian’ has to research the 
whole contents of the Bible, omitting nothing relevant to a given theological topic.  
Hodge’s understanding of a theologian is the one who collects the facts in the Bible, 
exhibits the internal coherence of these facts, and shows their harmony and 
consistency with cognate truths,
600
 by arguing that he must always be as 
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conscientious in collecting facts in the Bible as a scientist is in taking facts from 
nature.
601
  Hodge analyses the work of a scientist with three assumptions:   
(1) He [the scientist] assumes the trustworthiness of his sense perceptions.... 
(2) He must also assume the trustworthiness of his mental operations.... (3) 
He must also rely on the certainty of those truths which are not learned from 
experience, but which are given in the constitution of our nature.
602
 
Hodge’s point is that a theology should agree ‘in everything essential with the 
inductive method as applied to the natural sciences’.
603
  The argument is that, as the 
natural philosopher adopts the teaching of nature with certain assumptions, a 
theologian ‘must assume the validity of those laws of belief which God has 
impressed upon our nature’.
604
   
     Identifying the work of a scientist with the duty of a theologian, Hodge concludes 
that the responsibility of a theologian is ‘to ascertain, collect, and combine all the 
facts which God has revealed concerning Himself and our relation to Him’.
605
  Even 
when a theologian is researching the Bible as a philosopher does, he is still focusing 
on the Bible, because he believes that ‘the facts are all in the Bible.’  Hodge's 
method confirms that ‘the Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of 
Protestants.’
606
  In this way, he believes that we can find the norm and standard of 
all genuine religious life in the Bible.  Apparent discrepancies between scientific and 
religious truth arise only because scientists ‘are disposed to demand for their 
theories the authority due only to established facts’, while theologians, because they 
are at liberty to reject theories, are sometimes led to assert their independence from 
facts.
607
  
     In Princetonian theology, including that of Hodge, the language of God has the 
power to enact.  That is, in Hodge, ‘what God said’ plays a fundamental role in 
forging the doctrine of the knowledge of God—in Kant’s terms, constitutive 
knowledge.  In Kant, as opposed to constitutive knowledge, regulative knowledge 
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means that I speak as if God is to exist, providing important guidelines for how 
knowledge should be used, yet not playing any fundamental role in creating that 
knowledge.  However, in the death of the I, this knowledge is only observable at the 
moment of a true transcendental point, concursus.  Hence, the event of a true 
transcendental point has nothing to do with knowledge, but happens naturally.  In 
this sense, when practising theology, we need to focus on textuality. 
     As I have argued, the object and the source of a theologian in practising theology 
are not only the Bible itself, but also textuality, where the text produces meaning.  
Hodge has a strong conviction that without the principle of inductive method, 
‘theology would be a jumble of human speculations, not worth a straw, if a 
theologian refuses to apply the same principle to the study of the Word of God.’
608
  
Yet we also have to think of the fact that a theology will also not be worth a straw 
when it is not sensitively adaptable to the diverse and plural context of this world.  
In khora, context-sensitivity is seen between the juxtaposition of a theologian’s 
particular theology and his universal life experiences.  However, in Hodge’s 
theology, sensitivity is observed in a different perspective.  If we refer to his view on 
the truths of Christian experience and the truths of the Bible that we discussed in 
chapter III, we can also recognise that Hodge’s vision is an ‘already-not-yet’ 
paradigm: we rejoice in the work of the Holy Spirit in our hearts—but that’s what 
creates greater sensitivity to our sin, also.  In this case, so that the sensitivity to our 
sins should not fall into exclusivism, a theologian has to pay more attention to the 
textuality of khora since we believe that our responsibility should not remain in the 
realm of not sinning but to be assumed at the moment of death’s transcendental 
point. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CHARLES HODGE AND THE BIBLE 
 
A. Preface 
     In chapter II, I argued that textuality is a powerful tool in the interpretation of the 
Word of God, because it makes possible that the revelation of God is preserved and 
that Christian life is fully operative at any time and in any place.  That is, textuality 
enables a theology relevant to a changing and diverse world and people, while it 
remains faithful to the contents of the Bible.  The question of textuality in the 
discussion of Hodge’s doctrine of the Bible is, then, how we can interpret the Bible 
without treating its text as merely relative.  The process of interpretation in the 
context of textuality involves not only the application of Biblical doctrine, but 
translation of the text into a social, psychological and cultural structure. 
     According to Hodge’s doctrine of inspiration, since the Bible is inspired by God, 
it is the Word of God.  Hodge believes that the Bible is a genuine product of human 
activity under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, in the way that God’s truth is 
contextualised in the inspiration of the Bible through the concursus between God 
and the human author.  Here, too, we can locate the Providence of God in His 
dealing with a secular or totally depraved people and culture.  Hodge’s point is that 
God fulfils His revelation and inspiration without error through His sovereign 
providential care for His people, who are necessarily fallible.  Given Hodge’s view, 
in this chapter, I want to take note of how our predecessors have dealt with 
secularised creatures in practising theology.  For example, Calvin teaches that 
human intellect is essential in perceiving more profoundly the wisdom of God, since 
God’s Providence shows His glory more clearly to the one who has a higher level of 
intellect.  With this in mind, first, I want to discuss what Hodge’s doctrine of the 
Bible is, and secondly, I want to examine Hodge’s doctrine in view of khora, 
arguing that the authority of the text in the doctrine of the Bible does not only reside 
in the text itself, but depends on textuality.     
 
B. Hodge’s Rules for the Interpretation of the Bible 
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     In this section, I want to examine Hodge’s view on the proper interpretation of 
the Bible as follows: in the Bible, there is a clearer revelation of all that nature 
reveals.  That is, the words written by sacred writers are meant to be understood; 
concerning consciousness and the laws of our nature, everything that can be 
legitimately learned can be found, recognised and authenticated in the Scriptures—
Scripture must explain Scripture; in order that we should not attribute to the teaching 
of the Spirit the operation of our own natural affections, the Scriptures should be 
interpreted under the guidance of the Holy Spirit in finding in the Bible the norm 
and standard of all genuine religious experience.
609
  The foundation of this argument, 
according to Hodge, is that, first, the Spirit is promised as a guide and teacher, and 
second, the Scriptures teach that the unrenewed mind is naturally blind to spiritual 
truth (I Corinthians 2:14).
610
 
     Hodge seems to take it for granted that all the people of God who are historically 
conditioned here and now (in every age and in every part of the church) will enjoy 
the Divine right of private judgement, either in faith or in practice, through proper 
interpretation of the Bible led by the Spirit.
611
  Following Hodge, it is convincing 
that the historical sense of the Bible will allow a reader to have contextual and 
hermeneutical perspectives in the interpretation of the Word of God.  However, in 
the interpretation of the Bible, what Hodge meant by ‘proper’ is very much limited.  
For example, he has no interest in the creative power of imagination in the process 
of reading or interpretation.  When Hodge thought that Horace Bushnell misused 
metaphor, Anthony Thiselton notes, Hodge reacted without hesitation by claiming 
that the whole of the Bible was ‘propositional’, ‘cognitive’ and comprised of ‘facts’, 
‘rather than debating the scope and function of metaphor’.612  The reality is, as we 
studied in chapter IV, that ‘facts’ of the Bible always produce meaning in the form 
of events among intersubjective modes of metaphorical and rhetorical textuality.  
That is, ‘meaning’ is always created by different readers in their spaces and times.  
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We should also recognise that God’s words are not monolithically written language, 
but sets of linguisticality when they are illuminated by the Holy Spirit. 
     Thiselton thinks the dissonance between Hodge and Bushnell as consequences of 
a terminological misunderstanding caused a serious polarisation that has devastated 
‘American theology and hermeneutics for about a century, and damage remains in 
terms of extremism here and there on both sides’.
613
  This seemingly terminological 
misunderstanding was intrinsically caused by the lack of hermeneutic consciousness 
of textuality that teaches that the facts of the Bible are producing tremendous 
meanings when the death of the I is embedded in a reader with the Trinitarian 
personhood of the Holy Spirit.  With this in mind, we want to scrutinise Hodge’s 
‘proper’ interpretation. 
 
C. What does Hodge Mean by ‘Proper’ Interpretation?  
     As we saw in Hodge’s argument in the previous section, that the unrenewed mind 
is naturally blinded to spiritual truth does not mean that the Spirit is not working in 
that mind.  This sort of mind happens to be dramatically changed by potentia 
absoluta.  However, Hodge’s logic shows that the unrenewed mind is not able to get 
access to the truth of the Spirit because it is blinded.  With this stated, ironically, 
Hodge seems to believe that the saving work of the Holy Spirit is possible only 
through proper interpretation of the Gospel, by presupposing that we are to receive 
the words of God as true whatever He has revealed in His Word.  However, we need 
to recognise that the Holy Spirit is not confined to the text, but also works 
throughout the proliferated meanings of readers.  
     Hodge’s logic in defining proper interpretation is seen in his argument that ‘the 
wisdom of men is foolishness with God; and the wisdom of God is foolishness to the 
wise of the world.’
614
  Proper condition is that readers should make their choice 
between the wisdom of men and the wisdom of God.  Hodge is convinced that the 
Bible, properly interpreted, could not conflict with the facts of nature due to the 
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belief that God is the author of both the Scriptures and Creation, therefore God 
knows everything and is the truth.  Consequently, Hodge argues that if a theology 
does not adopt this principle of induction from the facts of the Bible, it is nothing 
but a jumble of human speculations.
615
  If the philosophical speculations coincide 
with the Bible, then they are true, and insofar as they do not agree with it, they are 
false.
616
  In this way, his logic reaches the point of his argument that facts are 
determined by the will of God, but theories, which have human origin, often conflict 
with each other and cannot be accepted by Biblical truth.  So Hodge’s proper 
interpretation means induction of the facts of the Bible. 
     As we discussed in chapter III, Hodge’s logic is a typical modern paradigm.  We 
need to note that Hodge’s identification of the facts in his inductive method with the 
narrative of the Bible is a theory inherited from Thomas Reid and Francis Bacon.  
Theoretically understanding, what Hodge means by facts are not so much the events 
of truth as the contents of the Bible.  At this point, we need to recognise that the 
wisdom of God is not an objective and static concept, but is to be understood 
differently by different readers.  When Hodge interprets the facts of the Bible 
according to his methodological wisdom, how can we guarantee that what he means 
by true induction from the facts is the original voice of God, and not his own 
thinking?  Since we are not God, we only can determine facts (events) of God by 
tracing of Him with responsibility, gift, faith and humility.  The space where 
responsibility, gift, faith and humility are operating is textuality.  Textuality never 
relativise the original voice of God but is an original condition of an effectiveness of 
our responsibility, gift, faith and humility.617 
 
D. Infallibility and the Authority of the Bible 
     According to Hodge, the Bible is the infallible source of facts for theology 
because he believes that it is inspired by God.  The infallibility and Divine authority 
of the Scriptures are due to the fact that the Scriptures are the Word of God, and they 
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are the Word of God because they were given by the inspiration of the Holy 
Ghost.
618
  Hodge’s point is that the authors of the Bible were infallible when they 
were acting as the spokesmen of God,
619
 and when they were endowed by the Holy 
Spirit with the organs of God for the infallible communication of His mind and will: 
‘They were in such a sense the organs of God, that what they said God said.’
620
  It is 
true that the inspiration of the Holy Spirit is a prerequisite for the Scriptures to be 
infallible.  In this way, Hodge attests that the authority of the Bible is the work of 
the Holy Spirit.
621
 
     At the same time, we can recognise that the inspiration of the Holy Spirit is not 
universal, because only certain selected human beings are inspired by the Holy 
Spirit.  However, in Hodge, the effect of the inspiration is universal.  He argues that 
the inspiration ‘is not confined to moral and religious truths, but extends to the 
statements of facts, whether scientific, historical, or geographical….  It extends to 
everything which any sacred writer asserts to be true.’
622
  Hodge’s position is that 
while inspiration is limited to the select, the effect of it is universal.  
     This universal effect is found in Hodge’s doctrine of plenary inspiration.
623
  Here, 
‘plenary’ does not mean to be partial: all parts of the Scriptures are equally inspired, 
therefore all alike are infallible, not only in what they teach, but also in becoming 
sources of facts for theology.  If so, though, how can we explain the universality of 
the effect of the inspiration which is limited to the particular select few?  Hodge 
answers that since the knowledge gained by the method of induction (his inductive 
theological method) from the facts of the Bible is truth, the effect of inspired facts 
will also achieve universality.  However, Hodge’s position is ontologically improper 
because he does not have any conscience on the way in which plenary inspiration 
‘extends to everything which any sacred writer asserts to be true’. 
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     At this point, I want to refer to the debate on ontology between Habermas and 
Gadamer on truth and method.  Habermas notes that the debate is about the 
difference between objective understanding and interpretative understanding.
624
  
Habermas claims that Gadamer’s ontology does not allow his fundamental 
hermeneutic insight (the methodological task of making hermeneutic consciousness) 
to be effective within rationality.
 625
  So, Habermas wants a pattern of rationality 
structure that would prevent us from falling into relativism or naively placing our 
own views as absolute.
626
  Tracing Gadamer’s academic background from Dilthey, 
Hursserl and Heidegger, Habermas accuses Gadamer that he rather promotes the 
dualism between interpreter’s hermeneutic experience and knowledge embodied in 
the text, so Gadamer’s understanding model is one-sided twist.
627
  However, in 
Truth and Method, Gadamer clarifies that he has never intended to counterpose truth 
and method as mutually exclusive alternatives.  He means only to show that the 
hermeneutic experience is more fundamental than every exercise of scientific 
method, and that while Verstehen could function within science, it cannot restrict 
itself to that domain.
628
  He admits that hermeneutics affects scientific research, but 
it is not to be understood as a prescriptive methodology or epistemology, but rather 
as ontology.  
     The limit of Hodge’s epistemological methodology in his argument that the effect 
of plenary inspiration is universal, cannot allow us to fully understand what is going 
on in the process of recognising truth by his inductive method.  As we can see, his 
methodological understanding always fails to catch up with what is happening when 
the Holy Spirit works throughout our life experiences.  This is why Gadamer 
defends his ontological understanding of hermeneutics against Habermas’s 
methodological understanding.  The problem in Hodge is that his understanding on 
the work of the Holy Spirit restricts itself to inductive theological methodology.  
                                                 
624
 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of 
Society (Boston, M. A.: Beacon Press, 2002), p. 53. 
625
 Iibd., p. 135. 
626
 Ibid. 
627
 Ibid., p. 134. 
628
 Gadamer, ‘Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology: Metacritical Comments on Truth 
and Method.’ In Kurt Mueller-Volmer ed., in The Hermeneutic Reader: Texts of the German 
Tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present, p. 280. 
  
 
196 
     With this viewpoint, first of all, we need to study how Hodge wants to keep the 
authority of the Bible so as to revise what he means by authority.  While considering 
the possibility of the fallacy in the hermeneutic process, he argues that even if the 
church can misread the Bible, the Bible itself is infallibly authoritative: 
It is admitted that theologians are fallible in the interpretation of Scripture.  It 
may therefore happen in the future as it has in the past that interpretations of 
the Bible long confidently received must be modified or abandoned to bring 
revelation into harmony with what God teaches in his works.  This change of 
view as to the true meaning of the Bible may be a painful trial to the church 
but it does not in the least impair the authority of the Scriptures.  They 
remain infallible; we are merely convicted of having mistaken their 
meaning.
629
 
As we can see, what Hodge means by authority comes from concursus of the first 
and second causes, the authors of the Bible. 
     In other words, Hodge’s point that the authority of the Bible would not be 
damaged even by the misinterpretation of the Bible signifies that the Bible is 
authoritative because it is inspired.  At this moment, we note that Hodge’s 
discussion of authority is confined to the text itself, not extended to the level that the 
Bible is read or interpreted by the readership.  Here we want to remember 
Thiselton’s argument, developed from Gadamer’s idea which I cited in chapter IV.  
Thiselton said that the authority of the Bible does not simply require ‘“reading off” 
of a proposition, system, or instruction handed to us on a plate, but genuine 
wrestling, search and struggle, in expectancy of a divine event of “speaking” to a 
ready heart’.
630
  This implies that the authority claim has to be extended to the point 
when the text is understood in hermeneutic textuality, as in the ‘process’, 
‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’ that we discussed in chapter IV.  That is, the authority 
of the text is meaningful when it is observed at the realm of textuality, where the 
death of the I’s responsibility, gift, faith and humility establish universality, even to 
the event of Derridean death that we discussed in chapter I.  Since only truth cannot 
conflict with itself, the authority has to extend to the limit even when truth claim 
may conflict with it.  Then the authority should cover the practices of justification of 
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the truth: ‘that while “true” is an absolute term, its conditions of application will 
always be “relative”’.
631
 
     However, in terms of proper interpretation, other than the inspiration of the Bible, 
I want to summarise my questions so far: on inspiration, how can we explain the 
universality of the effect of inspiration, which is limited to the particular select few?; 
on interpretation, how can we know that the interpretation of the Bible is led by the 
Spirit, and how can we discern whether the interpreted words of God are properly 
God’s Word or not?  With these three questions, following Hodge’s procedure, we 
want to go into more detail on Hodge and Benjamin Warfield’s conception of 
inerrancy and the authority of the Bible. 
 
E. The Doctrine of Inspiration in Hodge and Warfield 
     When we think about ‘inspiration’ in Hodge, we need to consider the 
Princetonian intellectual culture that focused on ‘the reality’ that common-sense 
human beings experience.  Scottish Common Sense Realism enabled people to 
regard themselves as competent to reflect on the way they thought because it held 
that reality must be underlying the experience of human perception.  With the 
Scottish philosophy, Hodge’s inductive method becomes a strong vehicle for the 
rational defense of orthodox Calvinism.  George Marsden recognizes the role of 
Common Sense Realism: 
Common Sense Philosophy had much in it that might support an emphasis 
on the humanity of Scripture….  A Common Sense premise was that we can 
understand other people, including those from other times and cultures, 
because the race is simply constituted with faculties that make such 
communication possible.
632
 
     Accordingly, Princetonians indulged themselves in rational scientific study 
according to the Common Sense philosophy.  Influenced by it, Warfield’s apology is 
also inductive and scientific in the way that he applies the scientific method of 
Scottish philosophy to religious truths, especially in his doctrine of the authority of 
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the Bible.  Thus, for Warfield, theology is the science of God, which makes possible 
the following three facts: God, religion and revelation.
633
  In Calvinistic terms, these 
three facts can be regarded as God, sinners and the Scriptures.  On the one hand, 
since these facts rest on the Bible, Warfield naturally believes that all of Christianity 
is based on the authority of the Bible and the creeds as external standards.  When 
Warfield approaches the Scriptures to ascertain the doctrine of inspiration, he 
proceeds by collecting the whole body of relevant facts.  On the other hand, Hodge’s 
view of the Bible is common-sense: ‘The Bible is a plain book.  It is intelligible by 
the people.  And they have the right and are bound to read and interpret it for 
themselves; so that their faith may rest on the testimony of the Scriptures, and not 
that of the Church.’
634
 
     For both Hodge and Warfield, it is needless to say that the teaching of the Spirit 
must be tested by the Scriptures because they are the norm and standard of all 
religious experience.
635
  It is evident that the Old Princetonians could keep up their 
consistent view of human nature by placing their theology under the Providence of 
God guided by the Holy Spirit: ‘theology proper’.  However, as this thesis argues, 
human nature has to be juxtaposed with the Holy Spirit.  We should not take it for 
granted that the inner evidence for the Bible’s authority is always found in the lives 
of human beings.  As we have seen, the reality is that human beings are not always 
Spirit-filled.  For if leading lives led by the true transcendental point (concursus) is 
to be possible in our life experiences (as Abraham experiences in Kierkegaard’s 
Fear and Trembling—see chapter V), we have to assume the effective responsibility 
of the death of the I.     
     At this point, we need to recognise Hodge’s position that inspiration is nothing 
extraordinary; it is a simple instance of God’s Providence.  God merely controls and 
causes the laws of nature to produce whatever effects He sees fit.
636
  Hodge 
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maintains that there is no ‘dictation’, no ‘suspension’ or ‘interruption’ of the 
individuality or intellectual powers of the authors involved.  For Hodge, it is totally 
an event in khora.  Inspiration is simply an occurrence of ‘a supernatural influence’.  
In this sense, he shows that Biblical writers ‘wrote out of the fullness of their own 
thoughts and feelings, and employed the language and modes of expression which to 
them were the most natural and appropriate.   Nevertheless and nonetheless, they 
spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, and their words were his words.’
637
  
For Hodge, this was a once-and-for-all event under the potentia absoluta between 
God and His selected men in His Providence, nothing else.  Yet it is naïve for Hodge 
to believe that the effects of the inspired of the Bible will lead to Christians’ lives 
being Sprit-filled.     
 
F.  Inerrancy Debate 
1.1 Princetonians’ Definition of Inspiration 
     With the above points in mind, let us explore the theme of textuality in the 
inspiration between God and us in Princetonian theology.  According to Warfield, 
inspiration happens exclusively in the text of the Bible, implying that the Scriptures 
are the direct result of God’s breathing out: 
What it says of Scripture is, not that it is ‘breathed into by God’ or that it is 
the product of the Divine ‘inbreathing’ into its human authors, but that it is 
breathed out by God….  When Paul declares, then, that ‘every scripture,’ or 
‘all the product of the divine breath,’ ‘is God-breathed,’ he asserts with as 
much energy as he could employ that Scripture is the product of a 
specifically Divine operation.
638
 
What Warfield means is that even though the Scripture is written by human authors, 
it is the product of Divine operation.  In other words, God chooses to make use of 
human fallibility in inspiration.  Whenever He uses human things, He shows His 
Providence and grace.   
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     Among the Princetonians, Warfield has been recognised as the greatest champion 
of Biblical inspiration, with the reputation of one of the most intellectually gifted 
professors.
639
  Warfield elaborated evangelical thinking on inspiration during his 
lifetime: the first subject of his published articles was ‘Inspiration and Criticism’, 
and the last was ‘Inspiration’.
640
  In his articles on inspiration, he consistently 
defines the term: ‘Inspiration is that extraordinary, supernatural influence (or, 
passively, the result of it) exerted by the Holy Ghost on the writers of our Sacred 
Books, by which their words were also rendered the words of God, and therefore, 
perfectly infallible.’
641
  Here, we need to recognise that Warfield’s doctrine of 
inspiration starts with the assumption of the total depravity of human beings, who 
are finite in their understandings and capacities.  Through its inspiration, Warfield 
insists that the Bible is in a true sense human, but still Divine: 
The Scriptures, in other words, are conceived by the writers of the New 
Testament as through and through God’s book, in every part expressive of 
His mind, given through men after a fashion which does no violence to their 
nature as men, and constitutes the book also men’s book as well as God’s, in 
every part expressive of the mind of its human authors.
642
 
Whatever the instrument of inspiration might be, its end-product is the pure, 
infallible and authoritative Word of God.  The Scriptures were given through men, 
but only through individuals speaking under the control of the Holy Spirit.  
Although all Scripture is given by the ‘inspiration of God’ (II Timothy 3:16), all 
Scripture is written by human beings and from Spirit-guided human points of view.  
With the Princetonians’ understanding of inspiration, from now on, we want to 
discuss the legacy of Princetonian inerrancy in conjunction with debates among 
various scholars.  
1.2. Legacy of Inerrancy and Infallibility 
      The main dispute among later theologians about Hodge’s position of infallibility 
of the Bible has been whether his concept of plenary inspiration is faithful to the 
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Westminster Confession of Faith and the doctrine of Calvin (Presbyterian tradition), 
or whether it is an innovative view of the Bible as the source of propositional truths, 
a view which eventually influenced twentieth-century Fundamentalism.
643
  
American theologians are especially disputatious about the doctrine of the Bible, the 
concepts of ‘inerrancy’ and ‘infallibility’, and whether their doctrine of the Bible has 
been influenced by Scottish Common Sense Realism.   
     First of all, let me explain how the doctrine of inerrancy has been formulated to 
know whether it is for the defence of faith or not.  If not, what then is it for?  As we 
have seen, Hodge’s use of common-sense principles has the purpose of combating 
Sophistical objections against the doctrine of the Bible.  Carl Raschke—recognising 
that the doctrine of inerrancy has been shaped by the Common Sense Realism of 
Reid’s philosophy—observed that before the nineteenth century, there was only a 
triadic structure in the discussion of the authority of the Bible, based on three crucial 
terms: ‘dictation, inspiration, and infallibility’.
644
  It is true that such pillars of 
church history as Augustine, Luther and Calvin took the absolute truthfulness of the 
Bible for granted.  They did not have to defend the Bible against charges that certain 
passages of the Bible were erroneous.  Actually, for Paul, Augustine and Luther, 
what God said was true because God said it, and God meant what he said.  For them, 
the words are simply God’s.  With this sense, Raschke continues his argument that 
the Bible is God’s ‘promissory note’, and it is true because it has been spoken 
ineluctably and decisively as his ‘troth’, as his commitment to us as justified 
sinners.
645
  Hence, the ‘infallibility’ of God’s Word signifies his absolute 
trustworthiness.
646
  But in the context of modernity around the mid-nineteenth 
century, the Bible had to be defended against charges of error.  For this reason, I 
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want to present some of the scholarly debates about Hodge’s position on plenary 
inspiration. 
1.3. Sandeen, Rogers and McKim’s View 
     In the evangelical world, generally, there are two divisions.  Theologians such as 
Ernest Sandeen, Jack Rogers and Donald McKim argue that Common Sense 
Realism created a unique concept of Biblical inerrancy upheld by the 
Princetonians.
647
  Sandeen claims that the ‘unique apologetics’ of the Old 
Princetonians is comprised of three elements: first, the idea that Biblical inspiration 
extends to the very words of the Scriptures; second, that the Bible itself teaches its 
own inerrancy; finally, and for Sandeen the most innovative, that the idea of 
inerrancy extends only to the original autographs of the Scriptures, and not to copies 
or translations.
648
  
     Also, Rogers and McKim, in order to prove that the doctrine of inerrancy is a 
peculiar innovation, criticise the scholastic tint in Hodge’s theology.  In The 
Authority and Interpretation of the Bible, they argue that the post-Reformation 
scholastic tradition obscured awareness of the central teachings of Reformation 
tradition.  Post-Reformation scholastic traditions were followed by contemporaries 
of Luther and Calvin, such as Phillipp Melanchthon and Peter Martyr Vermigli, 
some of Philipp Melanchthon and Pietro Martire Vermigli’s successors, such as 
Girolami Zanchi and Theodore Beza, and developed by Francis Turretin.  Sandeen, 
Rogers and McKim together claim that Hodge and the later Old Princetonians’ 
doctrine of the Bible was innovative due to Scottish Common Sense Realism and 
Scholasticism.    
1.4. The Role of Christian Scholasticism in Reformed Theology 
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     Orthodox thinkers like Peter Van Mastricht, Turretin and Benedict Pictet have 
been criticised in modern times for teaching a doctrine of Divine immutability, in 
which the explicit purpose in maintaining this doctrine was considered to underscore 
the constancy of God’s purpose, the changelessness of His saving will, and His 
faithfulness in all things toward His creations.
649
  But the Scholastic influence in the 
Reformed tradition was important because it was used as the very vehicle to defend 
and develop Reformation theology.  According to Richard Muller’s thorough 
research, Protestant theology proved itself capable of combating Roman Catholics, 
Socinians and other opponents through a critical mastering of the technical language 
and logic of the Scholastic tradition.  Therefore, for the following reasons, Muller 
cannot denounce Scholasticism in the Protestant Reformed tradition:  
First, theology cannot be static.  It must adapt to new historical and 
intellectual circumstances.  This generalization applies to the Reformation 
itself, and it also explains the subsequent development of Protestant theology.  
Second, an embattled theology cannot simply stand upon its first formulation.  
Both Luther and Calvin altered, adapted and refined their positions, as did 
their less-brilliant successors, in answer to issues raised by their opponents.  
Third, no theology or piety can succeed in the intellectual struggle to survive 
unless it can deal with sophisticated logical philosophical questions.  The last 
point will encounter some objections.  But we must remember that Luther’s 
radical revitalization of theology was not accomplished in a vacuum: Luther 
had lectured on Lombard’s Sentences, had learned well the late medieval 
scholastic system, and had attacked the errors of that system only after 
having grasped its inner workings.
650
 
1.5. William Barker’s View 
     A doctrine of the Bible that confirms inerrancy is not original to Princeton 
theology, but stems from the Reformation.  As John D. Woodbridge proved, the 
traces of inerrancy can be found in many documents before Princeton theology.  If 
this is so, it is ridiculous to attack the Old Princetonians’ doctrine of the Bible 
simply because Princeton theology is influenced by Scottish Common Sense 
Realism.  Because of Common Sense Realism and Scholasticism, Princetonians 
were successful in preserving the doctrine of the Bible as progressive and competent 
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in order to practise theology in a way that contextualised both of them.  As David 
Wells has indicated, we must deny the assertion that Biblical inerrancy was a 
creation of the Princeton theology and that it caused an obsessive interest in the 
formulation of the inerrancy doctrine.
651
  
    Against the argument of Sandeen, Rogers and McKim, which criticises the Old 
Princetonians’ view of plenary verbal inspiration and the restriction of inerrancy to 
the original autographs, William S. Barker denies that plenary verbal inspiration is a 
unique doctrine.
652
   
      Barker defends it by illustrating the role that Scholasticism played in late 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theology.  Against Rogers and McKim’s 
negative view, Barker proposes that the Protestant Scholasticism of the late sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries was doing necessary work in overcoming the Catholic 
Counter-Reformation theology and new contemporary thought.  Quoting John H. 
Leith, Barker says that the task that theology faced after 1560 was ‘a necessary stage 
in the development of any community or theology’.
653
  He argues, therefore, that the 
doctrine of inerrancy is not an innovation in substance.  Randall H. Balmer also 
affirms that whether or not the Princetonians’ view of the Bible is correct, it is 
certain that they did not pioneer a new doctrine of Biblical inspiration and that they 
were not part of a ‘minority of Evangelicals’ who held peculiar views about the 
Scriptures.
654
 
1.6. D. A. Carson’s View 
     The second camp argues that the Princetonians were rarely influenced by 
Common Sense Realism.  The representative of this side is D. A. Carson.
655
  While 
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wanting to defend Sandeen’s belief that Princetonian doctrine is innovative, Carson 
argues that Hodge is not influenced by the Common Sense philosophy of Reid, 
William Hamilton and Dugald Stewart.
656
  Carson’s logic is that the influence of 
Common Sense Realism on Princeton theology should be ignored, so as to prove 
that the Princetonians’ doctrine of Biblical authority is not unique to Princeton.  Yet 
on this point, we have to keep in mind that Hodge was a man living in the 
philosophical era of Scottish Common Sense Realism, which strengthens the 
doctrine of the Bible just as Scholasticism plays an important role in 
seventeenth-century Reformed thought.  
1.7. Carl Raschke’s View 
     Carl Raschke is sensitive to the hermeneutic dimension of the inerrancy theory.  
Raschke, seeing Hodge’s theology as based on Gnosticism, argues that Hodge’s 
view on inerrancy is an innovation of a form of the doctrine of language, which 
displaces the doctrine of the Scriptures that Hodge and the Princetonians inherit 
from the past.
657
  While arguing that the truth of Christianity has to be a truth of 
‘plain evidence’, Raschke does not subscribe to Paul Feinberg’s following view of 
inerrancy: 
Inerrancy means that when all facts are known, the Scriptures in the original 
autographs and properly interpreted will be shown to be wholly true in 
everything that they affirm, whether that has to do with doctrine or morality 
or with the social, physical, or life sciences.
658
 
Raschke refutes Feinberg’s view with the proposition that without the Spirit, the 
mind of a human being is blinkered.
659
  Raschke’s point is common-sense when it is 
applied to the process of the interpretation of the Bible.  His position is quite right, 
in view of the fact that Hodge’s theology does not have any concerns with the gap 
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between a reader with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit and the death of 
the I.660  
     I now want to review the three questions that are the focus of this chapter.  On 
interpretation, I had two questions: first, how can we know that the interpretation of 
the Bible is led by the Spirit?  Second, how can we discern that the interpreted 
words of God are properly God’s Word?  We can probably get the answers from 
Raschke: 
There can be no ‘correspondence’ at the spiritual level between word and 
thing unless the ‘thing’ is transparently glimpsed from the perspective of one 
who has received grace through faith.  The ‘revealed’ Word can in no way be 
put into the same epistemological box as our consensual, or common sense, 
experience of the everyday world.
661
 
Raschke means that there is no way that we are able to know that the interpretation 
of the Bible is led by the Holy Spirit, unless we are involved in the passage of the 
history of responsibility, gift, faith and humility given by the grace of God, the trace 
of a true transcendental point at the event of khora.  This transcendental point is the 
event in khora where the death of the I is embedded in the Trinitarian personhood of 
the Holy Spirit.  I call this impossible possibility our faith in God, such as that which 
Abraham had, as we discussed in chapter V.  For the answer of the question of how 
we can discern whether the interpreted words of God are properly God’s Word, we 
need to follow ‘tracing of theology’ that we discussed in the beginning of chapter VI.  
If there are no chains of supplement as a tracing of God, there is no way that we can 
agree that the interpretation is proper. 
     However, I cannot accept Raschke’s argument that Hodge’s doctrine of inerrancy 
is innovative.  Raschke argues that the doctrine of inerrancy does not originate in 
Reformation just because Reformation theology refutes the ‘correspondence theory’ 
of truth, as it has been transmitted in Anglo-American philosophy from the 
eighteenth century onwards.
662
  Since Hodge confines the ‘correspondence theory’ 
to the Biblical level of inspiration and does not apply it to interpretation, I affirm 
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that the doctrine of inerrancy in the Bible is not innovative at all, as Barker and 
Muller prove.  
     Thus, the answer to the question of how we can explain the universality of the 
effect of inspiration, which is limited to the selected few, is explained by potentia 
absoluta in its event of concursus in God’s Providence.  The Bible is the breath of 
God and, as Luther repeatedly argues, only the death of the I embedded in the Holy 
Spirit can unveil and illuminate the text of the Bible.  Having concluded the 
inerrancy debate, I want to study more on the doctrine of inspiration of Hodge in 
relationship to Warfield, as well as Hodge’s son A. A. Hodge in the context of the 
death of the I.  
 
G.  Inspiration as an Event of Concursus in Khora  
     Hodge and Warfield conclude that God superintends the authors as He 
providentially superintends all that happens.  The discussion of the process of 
inspiration is meaningful here, since we have the evidence of the result of how God 
and a fallible man concur through the inspired text: the process whereby God 
infallibly achieves His revelation and inspiration through fallible and defective 
second causes.  Here, second causes can be regarded as a particular person, society, 
culture and so on.  If we thus follow Warfield’s reasoning, this special occasion of 
the once-and-for-all event leads us to conclude that the universality of the 
Transcendental Signified, God, is achieved in the particularity of a sinner, not in a 
synthetic way, but as a concurrence of the first to the second cause.   
     Especially, Warfield explains this care of God by commenting on how God uses 
the human author in revealing His Word: 
As light passes through the colored glass through which it passes; so any 
Word of God which is passed through the mind and soul of a man must come 
out discolored by the personality through which it is given, and just to that 
degree ceases to be the pure Word of God.  But what if this personality has 
itself been formed by God into precisely the personality it is, for the express 
purpose of communicating to the word given through it just the coloring 
which it gives it?  What if the colors of the stained-glass window have been 
designed by the architect for the express purpose of giving to the light that 
floods the cathedral precisely the tone and quality it receives from them?  
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What if the word of God that comes to His people is framed by God into the 
Word of God it is, precisely by means of the qualities of the men formed by 
Him for the purpose, through which it is given?  When we think of God the 
Lord giving by His Spirit a body of authoritative Scriptures to His people, we 
must remember that He is the God of providence and of grace as well as of 
revelation and inspiration, and that He holds all the lines of preparation as 
fully under His direction as He does the specific operation which we call 
technically, in the narrow sense, by the name of ‘inspiration’.
663
 
     With the idea of concursus, Warfield can develop the doctrine of inspiration of 
the Bible without fear of explicating the human aspect of the Scriptures while 
retaining belief in their Divine origin and character.  As we have seen, Warfield, a 
follower of Hodge, articulates inspiration through the example of the sunlight 
passing through coloured glass.  The light remains as light even though it is coloured 
after passing through the glass.  The light and colour occur together at a certain 
juncture (the glass) without losing their essences.  Coloured glass in Hodge’s sense 
of inspiration can be regarded as the authors of the Bible.   
 
H. In Sum: Second Causes and the Death of the I 
     Through concursus, as discussed in chapter VI, and its application in the doctrine 
of inspiration, as discussed in this chapter so far, human beings can exercise their 
full freedom (liberty) in expressing their own linguistic modes, thoughts and feelings 
without fearing the fallibility and sinfulness of human nature.  Needless to say, these 
second causes function as free agency of the death of the I.  When the death of the I 
is embedded in a particular free agent as ‘the supplement’ is, a second cause or a 
free agent traces God in its history with responsibility, gift, faith and humility.  I 
mean that a free agent always reveals concealed characteristics of rays of light while 
keeping its nature, as do the wax, clay, wheat, barley and so on.  That is, in the 
inspiration, we affirm that there are tremendous textualities between such free agents 
as wax, clay, barley, wheat and God.  The signification of free agents and their 
functions in the textualities can be construed by Ferdinand de Saussure’s meaning of 
‘signified’ and ‘signifier’ in linguistics. 
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     In Saussure, the word ‘sign’ (signe) designates the whole in which the bipolar 
components the ‘signifier’ (signifié) and the ‘signified’ (signifiant) are working.664  
These two terms, which replaced ‘sound-image’ and ‘concept’, respectively function 
independently, in the whole of which the two are parts.
665
  That is, a signifier is the 
actual sound that ‘something’ is called, and a signified is the concept of ‘something’.  
Eventually, what the sign points to is a referent that is an object of ‘something’.  
Therefore, the relationship between the signifier (sound, acoustic component) and its 
referent (object) is arbitrary, according to the context of language.  That is to say, 
different sounds designate the same object, depending on the language that is being 
used.  Paul J. Thibault, defining ‘value’ as that ‘language and all other social-
semiological systems [which] are organized on the basis of the relations among the 
terms internal to the system itself’ observes that Saussure’s question is, ‘How do the 
value-producing relations which belong to the internal organization of the language 
system enable language users to construct and construe meaningful relations 
between language form and the world?’
666
  
     However, for Derrida, the signified can neither orient nor stabilise the sign 
because it always already functions as a signifier through the process of chains of 
substitution.
667
  The signified can be grasped only differentially and relationally, 
through its différance from other signifieds, other concepts.  The concept of God is 
considered the Transcendental Signified. 
     The différance between Hodge and Derrida lies in Hodge’s concursus and 
Derrida’s event in khora.  In Hodge, concursus happens on the border of the first 
cause and the second causes.  The causes occur together, as in Warfield’s 
articulation of inspiration, where the light and the colour occur together at a certain 
juncture (coloured glass) without losing their individual essences.  At this point, 
Hodge would say that ‘the efficiency of the first cause is in the second, and not 
                                                 
664
 Ferdinand Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (Columbus, Ohio: McGrow-Hill, 1966, pp. 99, 
67. 
665
 Ibid. 
666
 Paul J. Thibault, Re-reading Saussure: The Dynamics of Signs in Social Life (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1997), p. 164. 
667
 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 124. 
  
 
210 
merely with it.’
668
  Thus, in concursus, although the secondary cause acts according 
to its nature, its efficiency is in the first cause.  
     In Derrida, the event in khora is the place as event, which remains the place of 
waiting for the realisation of the promise.
669
  Accordingly, at the proper time, an 
event, of which the cause and effect guarantee nothing, will take place fully.  
Hodge’s process of cause and effect in concursus is observed in Derrida as gift.  Due 
to the unpredictability and anachronicity of the event, gift as the very otherness of 
triton genos occurs at the moment of the thinking, speaking and acting of a free 
agent.  Nobody can foretell the exact time and the place it will happen.  
     Through this juxtaposition of concursus and event, I want to show how 
Saussure’s signified and signifier function in the event of concursus in khora using 
Warfield’s account of inspiration.  Consider here that the signified is the sun and the 
signifier is the stained glass, wax, clay, barley or wheat.  When the signified sheds 
rays of light and heat, the rays function to melt, harden and help to grow.  They melt 
wax and harden clay, and let some seeds to develop into wheat and some into barley, 
not because of the light and heat of the sun alone, but because of each object’s 
distinct particularity.  These are good examples of the second causes operating 
according to their own natures.  The second causes are, then, the innate values of the 
wax and the clay, or the wheat and the barley.   
     Through this process, we can understand that the ‘truth’ of the rays is focal and 
marginal.  According to their particular ‘understanding’, the free agent of wax 
‘understands’ the rays of the sun as those which melt and that of clay ‘understands’ 
the rays as those which harden.  Here, we can find that the line between the rays of 
the sun and the wax or the clay is marginal. 
     The level of being of the signified is what Heidegger calls ‘ontic’, and that of the 
signifier in Being (signified) of being (signifier) ‘ontological’. That is, at the level of 
being (a signifier: wax, clay, barley or wheat), there are particular distinctions 
(Unterscheidung), such as wax, clay, wheat or barley, and the relation to Being of 
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beings is différance (Differenz).  The death of the I already includes Heidegger’s 
Dasein (one of the beings, a free agent as a second cause) that involves ontic-
ontological differences.  In a Heideggerian diagram, Being (Sein) is signified, and a 
being or an entity (Seinde) constitutes the signifier. 
     In Derridean discourse, a signified (the light and heat of the sun) does not remain 
as a concept, but changes itself into a signifier, as the sun at night does not shed light 
and radiate heat in Seoul, even if it does in Glasgow and New York at the same time.  
Like this, in the event, something always escapes language.  That is, there is a 
nothing that is not there and a nothing that is: all things are signifiers.  Derridean 
différance is the origin or production of differences.  Everything that is and is not, 
all that is known or is knowable, emerges in and through the restless play of 
différance in the event of khora.  Yet the origin or production of différance is 
paradoxically almost nothing but a remnant.  By the same logic, even though the 
Bible is written through human thoughts, feelings, language and expressions, it is 
nothing but God’s Word.   
     However, through the trace of the différance, we can have access to the textually 
of the death of the I in an event.  The event as a remnant has been the focus of our 
practising theology.  It is the possibility of the impossibility, but the God of potentia 
absoluta is always aware of the impossible remnant and allows us access to the 
remnant through tracing of Him.  The nothing of the nothing that produces all things 
achieves true universality.  The remnant can never but be known truly or properly at 
the ontic-ontological level, the true transcendental point. 
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CHAPTER VII 
KHORA AND THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD 
IN THE THEOLOGY OF CHARLES HODGE 
 
A. Preface 
     Adam Smith, (1723-90) a professor of moral philosophy at the University of 
Glasgow and one of the key figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, perceived the 
Providence of God with the aesthetic aspects of Calvin’s theology.  Smith 
understands God’s providence as an invisible hand that sustains the order of the 
world even when God is not revealed as immediately evident.
670
  As Smith implies, 
the belief of Calvinists that God deals with His people by His sovereign providential 
care
671
 means that God can use a secular culture to speak His Word faithfully and 
accurately if He chooses to use it.
672
  By His sovereign providential care of His 
people, society and culture, God reveals Himself to this world.  Following the 
Calvinists in this regard, the death of the I’s embedding in a passage of Hodge’s 
theology will be understood in the context of His Providence.   
     The incomprehensibility of God prevents human reason from trying to penetrate 
His thought.  By the same token, we can conclude that this doctrine cannot be 
sought by scientific method.  Therefore, the study of Hodge’s doctrine of the 
Providence, for which the theological method is scientific and inductive, allows me 
to investigate how Hodge’s method depicts the interplay between the 
incomprehensibility of God and human reason.  Through scrutinising this interplay, 
I want to present that Hodge’s theology, in which Scottish Common Sense Realism 
is embedded, shows the possibility of theology of event in terms of what happens in 
the space of khora.  We affirm that khora is exactly the space where something like 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand of God is dealing with His creatures in His Providence.  
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That is, the Providence of God rules over the space and time of khora and events 
with His potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata.  
     The benefits of the doctrine of Providence, according to Francis Turretin: 
[T]he use of this doctrine is far more fruitful and excellent, both in asserting 
the glory of God [to whom is here ascribed the praise of the highest wisdom, 
power and goodness] and in cherishing our faith and increasing our 
confidence which, when involved in the storms of trial, the persuasion of 
providence strengthens, like a most sure anchor in the sea of this wicked 
world.
673
 
     As Turretin says, Providence plays the role of an anchor for a pious one to live in 
the wicked storms of trial by directing one’s eyes to God— who watches for one’s 
safety in dealing with all the circumstances, as well as for the security of other 
creatures— with the belief that nothing would happen by chance.674  Hence, it 
becomes our ‘duty’ to depend on God totally.  If this is the case, then—as a being, 
not a robot, in this world—I have some questions: Are human beings able to manage 
their duty to be pious all the time?  What about the despair of sinners?  What about 
the tears and cries of sinners?  What about those who fail to accomplish the duty of 
being pious?  Almost all of the narratives of sinners’ suffering in the Psalms begin 
with tears and cries, and develop even into the negation of the existence of God, in 
spite of the fact that the narrative ends with sinners’ rejoicing in God. 
     Whatever happens, we eventually can perceive the outcome as the result of God’s 
Providence.  However, how can we deal with the endless suffering of human 
beings?  It is too harsh if we just take our suffering for granted in the name of 
Providence.   This is the limit of strong theology in the form of metaphysics.  
Theology has to focus on the existential struggle of human beings in this world and 
show the phenomenological process of how such beings in this world have faith. 
     To answer my questions and confirm that the doctrine of Providence presupposes 
our existential struggle in this world, at this point of discussion, I want to examine 
how Turretin’s ‘first duty’ of the pious man has to be understood in the space of 
khora: A pious believer should ‘raise his eyes to God as the first and primary cause 
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and cherish the thought of the singular and special Providence of God’.
675
  If we 
regard piety as coming from the faith and knowledge of a sinner, the ‘singular and 
special providence of God’ should also provoke even the indulgence of seemingly 
impious sinners and take care of them since the Providence of God is an ongoing 
aporia in the history of religion of a humankind and other creatures.  Especially, in 
the discussion of Providence in this chapter, I want to argue that our first duty has to 
be observed as an event of concursus, then, it will engender new freedom in its 
aporia.  My argument will be seen in the discussion of such themes as ‘potentia 
absoluta and ordinata’, ‘first and second causes in concursus’, ‘Deism, Atheism and 
Theism’, ‘human sense and linguisticality’, ‘cognitive process in free agency’ in the 
context of Providence in Turretin and Hodge.  
 
B. Event and Providence of God in Turretin and Hodge  
     Turretin extracts three types of Providence from the Biblical discourse: first (as 
we studied in chapter V, about Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling), the event of 
Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac at Mount Moriah for discussion of Providence in 
salvation and substitution; second, Jacob’s sitting upon the ladder for 
governing/regulating, heavenly/earthly and visible/invisible; and third, the chariot of 
Ezekiel for conservation and the dependence of second causes upon the first.676  
Turretin understands that all things, ‘small as well as great, contingent and free, 
natural and necessary’ happen under His Providence: 
[I]t will be evident that there is a providence in the world by which all things 
(even the smallest) are not only at the same time most wisely and powerfully 
directed, but also so connected with the divinity that it cannot be wholly 
denied without at the same time denying God.
677
 
     What is conspicuous in Turretin is that he explicates Providence with the idea of 
temporality of an event: The Providence of God is a ‘temporal government of all 
things according to the decree’ and as ‘the transitive action out of God’.
678
  And this 
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spontaneity of an event is also related to the contingent and fortuitous characteristic 
of a human being.
679
  Turretin cites illustrations from the Bible: 
Scripture in many places asserts that contingent and fortuitous events fall 
under providence. Nothing is more contingent than the killing of a man by a 
woodcutter contrary to his own intention, and yet this is ascribed to God, 
who is said to deliever him into the hand of the slayer. [Es 21:12, 13, Dt. 
19:4f.]  ‘The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing thereof is of the 
Lord[.]’ [Prov. 16:33] …. The selling of Joseph and his incarceration and 
exaltation, yet Joseph himself testifies that these were all orders in the 
providence of God: ‘So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God[.]’ 
[Gen. 45:8]
680
 
     Turretin affirms the contingency of a human being, saying that ‘it must not on 
this account be supposed that all contingency is removed from the world.’
681
  He has 
clearly recognition on contingency of an event in between God and us.  With the 
concept of ‘the condition of second causes’
682
, he keeps free contingency for the 
world by understanding the modes of action ‘in which there is always an intrinsic 
faculty and indifference to the opposite’.
683
  At this moment, we need to notice that 
Turretin understands total free contingency of the world in terms of conservation: 
Rather [God] keeps, conserves and permits them also to exercise and act out 
their own motions [As the prime mover may be considered so to hurl along the 
lower spheres that nevertheless their own proper and special motion remains 
to them and that does not cease to be considered contingent with respect to the 
second cause, from which the denomination and specification of the act is 
taken, whose mode of action is contingent and not determined to one direction, 
which still happens certainly and infallibly from the immutable disposition of 
divine providence].
684
 
     Turretin discriminates eventual necessity from the hypothetical necessity of God.  
All the events in our life experience are eventually necessity in view of preservation 
in his doctrine of the Providence of God: 
So it was necessary for Joseph to be sold by his bretheren and to go down to 
Egypt because it had been so determined by God for the preservation of 
Jacob’s family.  Yet, it was contingent with respect to the brothers of Joseph 
who might either have killed him or not have sold him.  Therefore things 
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which are absolutely and in every way necessary [both as to their fruition 
and as to the mode in which they are done and produced] differ from those 
which are of hypothetical necessity from the divine ordination.
685
 
Turretin wants us to believe that all the happenings of our lives are necessary 
whether they are eventual or hypothetical, however, he clearly recognises that the 
mode they are done are absolutely contingent.   
      Hodge’s understanding of Providence is more comprehensive than Turretin’s. 
While regarding Providence as the foundation of all practical religion, Hodge says 
that Providence shows the evidence that all the happenings of our lives are under the 
operation of God whenever and wherever we are.
686
 Hodge simply excludes both 
necessity and chance from the universe and substitutes for them ‘the intelligent and 
universal control’ of an infinite, omnipresent God.  That is, the whole universe 
exhibits evidence of God’s omnipresent intelligence and control.  Therefore, the 
general religious nature of man inevitably demands an instinctive and necessary 
belief when it comes to think of this universal Providence.
687
  Human intelligence 
and the fundamental convictions of the human mind have an important role in 
Hodge’s doctrine: 
These religious feelings have a self-evidencing as well as an informing light.  
We know that they are right, and we know that the doctrine which accords 
with them and produces them, must be true.  It is therefore, a valid argument 
for the doctrine of a universal providence that it meets the demands of our 
moral and religious nature.
688
 
For Hodge, the events of all creatures are understood as the ‘most holy, wise, 
powerful preserving and governing of all His creatures and all their actions’.  With 
this understanding, Hodge includes preservation and government in his doctrine of 
Providence
 689
 by which Hodge discriminates the function of Creation from that of 
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Preservation and Government.  Hodge wants to keep Creation as once-for-all event 
and explain Providence with the gradual process of government and preservation.   
     At the moment of discussion of Providence in Turretin and Hodge, I want to 
argue that what Turretin means by what is necessary and what Hodge means by the 
intelligent and universal control of God are only observable at the point when the 
event of concursus happens in the modes of our vulnerable life experiences.  Since 
we are nothing but limited creatures, we have no way to confirm whether something 
is absolutely necessary or not, and how God’s intelligence is executed.  Because 
event is the meeting point of the bipolar—divine and human—relationship and 
happens spontaneously with the freedom of truth as an act of truth, it should capture 
sudden transformation of a human being’s freedom into an absolute responsibility 
and conversely, that responsibility into total freedom. 
     In khora, the contingent event is neither absolutely necessary nor intelligible, but 
undecidable (neither/nor).  However, it ‘receives all’, and eventually makes possible 
‘the hypothetical necessity of divine ordination’.
690
  If we understand metaphysically, 
we can have a priori knowledge that the event might be necessary, but in the space 
of khora, if the necessity is necessary, then we need to understand that ‘free and 
voluntary things, which are in our power and are done with purpose, are governed 
by providence’.
691
  Since khora is not what can be understood by our knowledge, it 
is neither sensible nor intelligible.
692
  
     According to Derrida, human beings tend to ‘believe, quite simply and literally, 
in absolute knowledge as the closure’.693  However, if it is not the end of history, we 
need to recognise that there is such a thing what is beyond absolute knowledge that 
is unheard-of thoughts, which requires being ‘sought for across the memory of old 
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signs’.
694
  In Turretin, the ‘function’ and ‘mode’ of the life experiences of Joseph 
and his brothers are tracing ‘the memory of old signs’ of ‘hypothetical necessity of 
divine ordination’.  Hence while acknowledging that Turretin is correct to 
distinguish human experience from the hypothetical necessity, we should remember 
that the ‘function’ and ‘mode’ of life experience are ‘vacillating terribly between 
chance and predestination’.
695
  ‘The hypothetical necessity’, then, should happen as 
an event in our ‘tracing of God’.  In khora, the necessity is not the object of our 
knowledge, but should be revealed as an event.  The issue at stake in the discussion 
of the Providence of God in this chapter is what would happen in the event in His 
Providence.   
 
C. Potentia Absoluta and Potentia Ordinata 
     God, as a Creator of the laws of nature, acts according to them with His ordinary 
power, but in certain cases He acts independently of them with His absolute power.  
These two powers are called Potentia Ordinata and Potentia absoluta. 696  In Hodge, 
there are strong opposition between the two, however, are reconciled in the event of 
concursus.  While Potentia absoluta—which is the supernatural operation of God’s 
grace—is the efficiency of God as exercised without the use of the second causes, 
Potentia ordinata is natural and is called Providence, i.e, the ‘providential agency of 
God in the government of free agents’ towards the ordinary acts of men.
697
  Hence, 
Potentia ordinata is the efficiency of God’s wisdom as exercised uniformly in the 
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ordered operation of second causes.
698
  On the one hand, we see that potentia 
ordinata applies God’s providence to physical forces with His ‘design and control’ 
by supposing an end to be attained, and the disposition and direction of means for its 
accomplishment.  Substances, forms, essences, qualities, properties, powers and acts 
of individual living creatures are operated by His ordinary power.  On the other hand, 
by His gracious operation with potentia absoluta, God directly initiates supernatural 
events such as Creation, miracles, immediate revelation, prophecy, inspiration, acts 
of faith, holy affections and regeneration.   
     This juxtaposition is clear when Hodge does not want to synthesize human ability 
and God’s will by simply regarding a human being’s activity as the result of 
secondary causes.  With this juxtaposition, Hodge prohibits us from falling into 
Arminianism, Pelagianism and Rationalism.  Hodge explains the different function 
of these two powers: 
(1) In the ordinary operations [potentia ordinata], the ability to perform 
belongs to the agent and arises out of his nature as a rational creature… 
whereas the acts of faith, repentance, and other holy affections [potentia 
absoluta]… [arise] from a new principle of life supernaturally communicated 
and maintained. (2) The ordinary acts of men… are determined by their own 
natural inclinations and feelings….  On the other hand, all gracious or holy 
affections are thus infused or excited by the Spirit of God. (3) The 
providential government of God over free agents is exercised as much in 
accordance with the laws of mind, as his providential government over the 
material world is in accordance with the established laws of matter.  Both 
belong to the potentia ordinata, or ordered efficiency of God.699  
     The functional opposition of the two powers is conspicuous when Hodge 
discriminates Creation from Providence (Preservation and Government).  For 
example, in the beginning, God created the substance of the world ex nihilo, an act 
which was neither metaphysically nor normally necessary but was done out of 
perfect freedom without any specific designed purpose.
700
  The world was not 
formed from any existent substance or out of the substance of God.  It was created 
only according to the pleasure of His will.  On the basis of Genesis chapter one, 
Hodge wants that theologians should make a distinction between this immediate 
                                                 
698
 ST, v. I, p. 410. 
699
 ST, v. I, p. 615. 
700 ST, v. I, pp. 553-6. 
  
 
220 
instantaneous Creation ex nihilo, and the mediate gradual Creation in which ‘the 
power of God [works] in union with second causes’
701
 so as to use the previously 
created matter to bring the universe into the desired form.  This concept implies that 
God continues to work in the preservation and government of what He created by 
means of His potentia ordinata. 702  If the universe is not supported by potentia 
ordinata, it cannot continue to exist of itself and would cease to exist.  This applies 
both to its substance and form, to its essence, qualities, properties and powers, and to 
all individual living creatures, for these are not held in existence by an inherent 
principle of life but by the will of God.
703
 Then, it might be clear that all the events 
in the universe cannot happen without reference of the thought of God, i.e., without 
tracing of God. 
 
D.  Trace and the Providence  
     Trace is that which is like a footprint of the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy 
Spirit.  It may be a paradoxical or monstrous hint
704
 that has been there or might be 
there.  The notion of the trace in the Providence of God, then, generates the idea of 
khora.  The providential space where we are given the trace is not simply governed 
by physical and natural phenomena, but under God’s care.  As we have seen, since 
Providence—as an ordinary power—is the efficiency or condition of God, it does 
not directly point God but the God named in the second cause of a person, a place, 
and a time.  Since the second cause has a distinctive singularity, the place of the 
name of God is not like a community of ‘fusion’ but is ‘another gathering-together 
singularities’ or ‘another friendship’.
705
  A friendship, not made by this or that 
signified name, i.e., homogeneous ways of thinking, faith system or ideology, but by 
the trace of God as the topos of Providence.  Providence is trace.  
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     The validity of khora in the discussion of God’s Providence is that secret 
knowledge of God is observable at the moment when we perceive that we are living 
in it.  ‘The supplement’ and ‘tracing of God’ will reveal secrets of God not as the 
natural course of events, but the events of true transcendental point in its concursus 
in the space of khora.  Since the nature of theology is trace and revelation, the object 
is not only facts of theology, but khora, which functionally inhabits it.  So as to 
avoid an inexact, erroneous, aberrant and improper explanation of God and neither 
to rupture all talk about God nor to assume that the Transcendental Signified is 
metaphysical, we need to focuses on the event now as the time and here as the space 
in khora where the transcendental knowledge cannot be secret at all.  Theologically 
speaking, ‘trace’ as Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ is human beings’ recognition of what is 
earned from experience between knowledge of the self and knowledge of God.  In 
the terms of Calvinism, our faith as the knowledge of God is executed in this trace.  
     For example, the doctrine of divine election, reprobation and our destination is 
meaningful when we think of Divine Providence in the trace between God and us, 
because we ourselves are never able to affirm whether we are elected or not.  If we 
are honest, as beings living in this trace, we cannot but ponder ourselves as limited 
creatures.  As sinners living in the trace, the doctrine of reprobation begins to make 
us think of being humble as human beings living in the space and event of the 
Providence of God.  
     If it is so, the doctrine of Providence embedded with ‘the supplement’ will have a 
different function from a traditional (strong) theology based on metaphysics.  We 
need to think of theology not simply as an object, but as that which also depends on 
the way in which we practise it.  That is, we need to think of the functional value, 
not facts alone, in practising theology.  Theology depends on how I promote myself 
in the context of the Providence of God.  The death of the I makes us practise 
theology by denying the fact that metaphysical theology is possible.  That is, the 
Providence of God allows me to practise theology in the context of the death of the I, 
not ‘the death of God’, since practising theology is not my will to be done, but His 
will to be done.  In this sense, Providence of God has to be understood as an event. 
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E. First and Second Cause in Concursus 
     As we have seen in Chapter I, the doctrine of concursus is a core part of 
Reformed Confessionalism, found in the Westminster Confession of Faith.
706
  This 
Reformed idea, in Turretin’s view one of the most difficult in theology, was passed 
along to many Reformed American theologians, including Hodge.
707
  In this section, 
I will delineate not only what concursus means, but also the relevance of concursus 
to our discussion of the event in khora.  Our discussion of concursus is important 
when we are engaged in a Kierkegaardian monstrous, wicked and paradoxical life 
experience, with such a vague vision between the confusion of a believer’s objective 
knowledge and subjective faith in a space and time of khora.  Especially Hodge’s 
concursus,708 whether in free, contingent, or necessary modes of the experience of 
first and second causes—which captures the religious immediacy of Hodge’s 
theology in chapter III—shows us that intersubjective modes of religious experience 
are in operation. 
    According to Turretin, the Providence of God affirms the contingency of things 
that is totally indifferent with respect to the second cause, and the liberty of the will 
to exercise its own movement most freely, although inevitably.
709
  The first cause 
draws the second cause after itself since God decreed such an effect by the action of 
Providence.
710
  As the definition implies, concursus is a particular and simultaneous 
occurrence of the first and second causes.  Susan Handelman traces the idea of 
concursus in the first and the second causes back to Aristotle: 
Although ousia, primary being, the essential what of a thing, is the subject of 
discourse, the formations of discourse are not themselves what is (ousia).  [It 
should be noted that Aristotle makes a key distinction between ‘first being’, 
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the what which denotes ousia, and all other things, which are secondary 
being, and are said to be because they are either qualities or quantities, etc., 
of the first being.]
711
  
This order can be found in Duns Scotus’s concept of de primo principio as the order 
of eminence and the order of dependence: 
[O]rder is a relation of mutual comparison predicted of the prior with regard 
to the posterior….  I say the first essential order seems to be divided by a 
primary division, as an equivocal term into its equivocates, namely, into the 
order of eminence and the order of dependence.
712
  
     Following Aristotle and Duns Scotus, Turretin also wanted a specific and 
accurate discussion of concursus that explains how God concurs with second causes, 
not only in a particular and simultaneous way, but also in a previous concursus.713  
However, predetermination of the second cause does not destroy, but preserves, the 
liberty of the will of the second cause: 
By [predetermination], God does not compel rational creatures or make them 
act by a physical or brute necessity.  Rather he only effects this—that they 
act both consistent with themselves and in accordance with their own nature, 
i.e., from preference and spontaneously (to wit, they are so determined by 
God that they also determine themselves).
714
 
According to Turretin, the first is caused by the Creator, as a universal and 
hyperphysical cause, and the second by the creature, as a particular and physical 
cause.  Without the second cause, neither can exist nor be even imagined.
715
  
Turretin articulates that God secures freedom of a human being in the contingent 
event of concursus: 
That God on the one hand by his providence not only decreed but most 
certainly secures the event of all things, whether free or contingent; on the 
other hand, however, man is always free in acting and many effects are 
contingent. Although I[Turretin] cannot understand how these can be 
mutually connected together, yet (on account of the ignorance of the mode) 
the thing itself is (which is certain from another source, i.e., from the word) 
not either to be called in question or wholly denied.
716
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          However, we also need to listen to Turretin’s warning of the danger of great 
reliance upon second causes:  
By a too great reliance upon second causes; for as they who entirely neglect 
them tempt God, seeking whether he will even without means to conserve 
them, no less do they also sin against him who ascribe too much to them, 
placing their confidence in them and clinging to these certain means as it 
were to a spike, leave no room for divine providence on account of their 
distrust.(2 Ch 16:12).  For although we ought to love and honor creatures, yet 
we are permitted to trust in God alone and to rest upon him as their most 
wise and provident Father.
717
 
Turretin believes that, since the second cause is the effect of the first, the second 
cause cannot be thought of as independent from the first.   
     Hodge also talks about the efficiency in the interplay between the first and 
second causes saying that ‘the efficiency of the first cause is in the second, and not 
merely with it.’
718
  Thus, the secondary cause acts according to its nature but upon 
by the efficacy in the first cause.
719
  In Hodge, the first cause is the will of God, 
God’s set purpose and foreknowledge (Acts 2:23).  The secondary cause is self-
actively-causing.  Accordingly, even something such as matter itself has a powerful 
active cause whose effect is also influenced by God.
720
  Hodge argues that God has 
endowed matter with various properties or powers which are the proximate causes of 
physical evidence.
721
  This theory helps to explain the truth of God’s filling Heaven 
and Earth.  We know, then, that God is everywhere present and everywhere 
perfectly active.  To be more specific, God is immanent with every particle of matter, 
not only of being, but also of knowledge and power.
722
    
     The second cause can be explained by diverse connotations either qualitatively or 
quantitatively.  It sometimes stands for the mere occasion; the instrument by which 
something is accomplished; the efficiency to which the effect is due; the end for 
which a thing is done; the ground or reason why the effect or action of the efficient 
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cause is so rather than otherwise.
723
  Hodge secures the liberty of the second causes 
and their self-generating effects through the doctrine of concursus: 
1. The effect produced or the fact performed is to be referred to the second, 
and not to the first cause….  2. The doctrine of concursus does not deny the 
efficiency of second causes.  They are real causes, having a principium 
agenda in themselves…. 3. The agency of God neither supersedes nor in any 
way interferes with the efficiency of second causes….  4….  The efficiency 
or agency of God is not the same in relation to all kinds of events….   5. The 
divine concursus is not inconsistent with the liberty of free agents….  6…. 
[T]he great difficulty attending [the doctrine of concursus] is in relation to 
sin….  So it is argued that the same divine efficiency sustains and animates 
all free agents.
724
 
     As Hodge illustrates, the efficiency is a kind of transference or translation as seen 
in the rays of the sun which transfers its power to various objects with different 
results of translation.  That is, the second causes translate what is transferred—for 
example, the same ray melts wax while it hardens clay—according to their own 
nature.
 725
  As Hodge recognized above 1, the referent of the fact performed is the 
second cause.  These secondary causes are related to the innate natures of the wax 
and clay, the free agents in this analogy.  With this idea, Benjamin Warfield could 
study the Bible without fearing the human aspect of Scriptures, while retaining 
belief in its Divine origin and character.  
     As the above example shows, the concept of secondary causes provides a key to 
explaining the will of God to different peoples and cultures.  God takes care of their 
second causes, even when their way of thinking and their cultural phenomena are 
quite different from ours.  Then, we can affirm that God is the author of textuality, 
because God predetermined the direction and government of the second causes of 
the free agencies.  Yet we should keep in mind that the effect performed is referred 
to as the second cause, since ‘when a man speaks, it is the man, and not God who 
utters the words.’
726
  God gives to second causes the power of acting; preserves 
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them in being and vigor; excites and determines second causes to act; and directs 
and governs them to the predetermined end.
727
 
     At the same time, we should recognise that God rules free agents such as matter 
or human beings in such a way that His efficiency does not supersede that of His 
creatures.  To explain this, Hodge differentiates two classes of causes: 
The one class consists of effects which do not, the other of those which do 
indicate design.  In the latter we see evidence of a purpose, of foresight, of 
provision for the future, of adaptation, of choice, of spontaneity, as well as of 
power.  In the former all these indications are absent.
728
 
     Such cases as the flow of water from a higher to a lower level, vaporisation, heat 
producing expansion, cold contraction, and alkalis correcting acidity, are examples 
of effects having no evidence of purpose or design.
729
 
     The concept of concursus enables us to believe that God has made it possible to 
study the same phenomena from very different but coherent perspectives.  If we 
agree with a critic that ‘the adequacy of an attempted contextualization must be 
measured by the degree to which it faithfully reflects the meaning of the biblical 
text’,
730
 the concursus of God, which fully affirms the authority of the Bible, makes 
it possible to regard our discussion on textuality in khora as Biblical.  Such a 
theological argument, that the authority of the Bible is ‘neither given nor willed’
731
 
can be fully criticised by this doctrine because concursus acknowledges the 
Providence of God, which uses human ability for His purposes.
732
  Discussing this 
theme, Mark Noll explains concursus in Warfield’s theology: 
For Warfield the idea of concursus meant the simultaneous activity of divine 
and natural agency, neither replacing the other, neither excluding the other.  
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Warfield himself used this idea to reconcile Scripture and evolution, by 
claiming that what happened in nature must in principle reflect the constant, 
overarching providence of God.  But he made greatest use of the concept in 
his doctrine of the Scripture.  The Bible was a thoroughly divine book; the 
Bible was a thoroughly human book.  Christians, of all people, should be 
eager to do the research which illuminates the natural history of the Bible, its 
process of human composition.  In principle nothing discovered in such 
inquiry can negate the divine inspiration of Scripture, because that 
inspiration works through human agency, rather than as a substitute for it.
733
 
     Sometimes, analyses of Warfield’s concursus are one-sided.  Some argue that 
there is no consideration of a human contribution or initiative in Warfield’s 
exegetical analysis on the Scripture.  But if we recognise the providential 
preparation of those whom God moved to write, we cannot say that Warfield’s 
concursus is one-sided.  We can always see the manifestation of God’s sovereignty 
in the ordinary operation of the world.  To Warfield, concursus was grounded in 
general considerations of both God’s immanence and his transcendence, and it was a 
conception that Warfield linked to doctrines of both Providence and grace.  It was, 
in other words, a necessary device growing out of mature theological reflection. 
     Then, how can we understand transference when the two Powers compose 
together?  How can we recognise the moment of event when the conceptual Powers 
are colliding?  These questions lead us to inquire what Hodge means by the 
efficiency of the first is in the second cause.  At least, what we can find is that the 
apparent opposition (studium/punctum, or ordinary/absolute) facilitates an efficient 
composition between the two sides.734  As soon as the two occur together—we are 
not able to discern between the two contents or things—the predicatively determined 
concept of the opposite two is scarcely graspable.
735
  At this moment, there is no 
clear distinction between life and death but ‘the haunting of the one by the other’.
736
 
At this moment, clearly distinct and opposable identity representing one or the other 
can be recognised as that the absolute is in the ordinary or the punctum in the 
stadium. The efficiency of the first in the second can be seen as the “scansion” or 
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“invasion” of ‘the studium by a punctum that is not opposed to it even though it 
remains completely other, a punctum that comes to stand in or double for it, link up 
to it, and compose with it’.
737
  This “scansion” as a concursus will evoke limitless 
love for the other because it suspends all the conceptualised images (hypothetical 
necessities of God) whom I strongly want to get and know.  A concept at one’s 
disposal is possible only by the presupposition of a closed system or guarantee 
sealed heritage.
738
  However, the power of punctum functions like a metonymic 
force that ‘divides the referential trait, suspends the referent and leaves it to be 
desired, while still maintaining the reference’.
739
  Then, the relationship between the 
“invasion” of the punctum seen as the metonymic  power and the coded studium is 
‘neither tautological nor oppositional, neither dialectical nor in any sense 
symmetrical, it is supplementary and musical (contrapuntal)’.
740
  Likewise, the 
efficiency of the potentia absoluta functions as the structure of the metonymic 
power of punctum in concursus.  The incessant substitution of metonymy will direct 
to the truth without knowing how far it is from Truth.     
 
F.  Khora and Providence 
     Unlike Turretin, in the discussion of the Providence of God, Hodge tends to link 
human minds directly to the control of God by taking our minds for granted as 
having a moral and religious nature.  However, Hodge should have recognised the 
contingency of Joseph’s brothers—whether they will kill or sell Joseph—in his 
discussion of Providence.  Our minds are not like mechanical robots that are ready 
to comply with the will of God.  Rather than meeting and demanding of our moral 
and religious nature (what we ought to do), the universal Providence should allow 
everything to happen by human minds’ tracing of God under His preservation, 
because human minds can never predict how what God provides is to happen.  The 
Providence of God does not demand that something happen, but is important and 
meaningful in signifying our faith to trace of Him in khora. 
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     There is only one preserved khora as the providential space of God, even if khora 
can be a pure multiplicity of places. As the Providence of God is not God, khora is 
neither God nor the Kingdom of God.  The difference is that khora does not generate 
anything by force.  It does not give any order or make any promise.  It is a 
qualitative place that definitely remains as the place of waiting, awaiting the 
realisation of the promise.  Even if khora is a waiting place—and therefore does not 
presuppose God, the Kingdom of God and the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy 
Spirit—it is the preserved space of universal Providence.  Khora is not influenced by 
but is embedded in the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.  It is just the 
supplement.  Yet it makes us wait for the promise to come true, whatever the 
promise is.  
     As we discussed in chapter I, khora is the event/place of the death of the I: the 
place of responsibility that passes through the very ordeal of seemingly monstrous 
life experiences; of faith that ventures into absolute risk; and of gift with the 
transcendental selfless goodness through a new experience of death.  When the 
death of the I is embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy 
Spirit, khora adds one more character: humility to die as Christ did.  As D. Clair 
Davis shows, in Calvinism, the secularity of humanity—including the function of 
the death of the I—does not undermine God’s original plan for this world: 
To take seriously humanity and its history does not take away from God’s 
direction of the course of history.  The reality of human thoughts, emotions 
and decisions is never antithetical to the reality of God’s power and love in 
his communication with his people….  To be sure, the doctrine of providence 
is further subdivided to make clear that God deals in a special way with his 
people, and in an even more special way in his supernatural dealings with 
them.
741
 
As far as we recognise God’s ‘supernatural dealings’ as what is transcendentally 
signified, God’s Providence includes everything, as far as God uses secular culture, 
language and mindset of sinners. 
     Let us think of khora in the context of the Upper Room of Mark, where God 
provides (Acts 2:1-13).  The Holy Spirit comes to 120 people staying at the attic on 
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the Pentecost. It is in this place that a true transcendental point fully occurs.  The 
Holy Spirit is promised by Jesus, and the people wait and experience it.  However, it 
occurs without being caused by the anticipation of any sensory mechanism—i.e., it 
is not caused by their expectation in the attic.  ‘Human senses’ only recognise what 
is happening.  ‘Human senses’ are not limited by anything but such experiences as 
the event of the Holy Spirit. 
     Then where is the place of khora in the event of the Holy Spirit?  Is it the Upper 
Room of Mark?  Is it the Holy Spirit?  Is it the conscience or faith of the people in 
the room of attic?  No.  Khora is not the place of the Upper Room, not the place of 
the Holy Spirit, not the place of the conscience or the faith of people.  It is the 
temporal place of the death of the I’s thousands years of waiting for the provided 
promise of God to be fulfilled.  
     Again, khora is not exclusively a place of the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy 
Spirit because it is not influenced by the power of the Holy Spirit alone.  It is a third 
place between the people in the Upper Room and the Holy Spirit.  In this sense, 
khora is a common ground of the universe insofar as it represents the universal 
textuality of the space and the time as the supplement.  For Derrida, since khora 
remains alien to the order of presence and absence, it seems that one could invent it 
in its very otherness at the moment of the address.
742
  This is why we should 
distinguish the death of the I from the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.  
The death of the I does not have any intended force, but the Holy Spirit has the 
power of saving. 
     The death of the I plays a supplemental enigmatic role for the people of 
responsibility making an absolute decision without knowledge, and those of faith 
venturing into absolute risk beyond knowledge and experiencing a new death, a true 
transcendental point.  The Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, sent by Christ 
of the humiliating Cross, made the perseverance of the saints possible.  Khora—
which is nothing but a supplemental space, but makes possible what we think 
impossible—is also under His Providence. 
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     Khora is radically nonhuman, ‘atheological’ and ‘ahistorical’ because nothing 
happens through it and nothing happens to it.
743
  Even if khora is neither God, Jesus 
and the Holy Spirit, nor evil spirits, it is the space of the Providence of God, which 
makes Christians think of or trace the promise that they have in mind.  Then they 
will be where the promise is continuously fulfilled by participating in their ordeal of 
Kierkegaard’s monstrous (undecidable) lives.  For 120 people in the Upper Room, 
whether the Holy Spirit will come is not the issue; it is, rather, that of the promise of 
the blood of Jesus Christ, the promise of His total and transcendental Messianic 
Providence. 
     However, Hodge acknowledges that the miraculous event in the Upper Room is 
not of any law, but totally spontaneous.  Referring to the Bible, he asserts that ‘the 
providential agency of God is not only exercised over all the operations of 
nature’,
744
 but also extends over the animal world, over nations and over 
individuals.
745
  Affirming the Westminster Confession, Hodge also acknowledges 
miracles which occur without second causes.  God works freely without, above or 
against means of pleasure.
746
  The Bible also shows the miracle as evidence of the 
immediate power of God.  It not only asserts ‘the absolute independence of God of 
all his works, and his absolute control over them, but is also filled with examples of 
the actual exercise of this control’.
747
  In this sense, Hodge is correct to object to the 
doctrine of higher laws because it is gratuitous, unsatisfactory and not supported by 
the Scriptures.  A miracle like the work of the Holy Spirit in the Upper Room of 
Mark is the ‘material fact as coinciding with an express announcement or with 
express supernatural pretensions in the agent’.
748
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G. Deism, Atheism and Theism 
     The concept of preservation comes from the idea that ‘all things out of God owe 
the continuance of their existence, with all their properties and powers, to the will of 
God.’  Thus, when Hodge explains preservation, he distinguishes it from Creation, 
because Creation is ‘the calling into existence what before did not exist’, while 
preservation is the ‘continuing, or causing to continue what already has a being’.
749
  
In the course of Creation, ‘there is and can be no cooperation’, but in preservation, 
as distinct from creation, there is ‘a concursus of the first, with second causes.’750  
This distinction between the first and second causes in the doctrine of preservation 
prevents us from attributing authorship of sin to God.
751
  
     Thus, Hodge proposes as dangerous the doctrine of continuous Creation, because 
it would make God, rather than man, responsible for sin, or else eliminate altogether 
the concept of sin.
752
  In the same way that the problem of evil can be explained by 
such a doctrine, the phenomena of the material universe or the external world can be 
interpreted by the doctrine of Providence.
753
  For these reasons, Hodge distinguishes 
the efficiency of natural forces from Divine efficiency.  In other words, he likes to 
explain natural forces and their efficiency by Providence, especially preservation, as 
we discriminated between the efficiency of the death of the I in khora and Divine 
efficiency.  
     Hodge develops his doctrine of God’s relation to natural laws in opposition to 
Deism.
754
  He wants to preserve God’s role as a guide to the processes of nature so 
as to preserve His role in answering prayer.  Such a doctrine of Providence would 
provide a foundation for the Christian belief that God, who is concerned with man, 
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is also able to guide the laws of nature so that He can respond to man’s prayers for 
help.  If prayer is to be more than subjectively efficacious, God must be able to 
control the forces of nature.
755
  On the other hand, in opposition to the doctrine of 
continued Creation, Hodge wishes to preserve the efficiency of natural forces as 
distinct from Divine efficiency.  To fail to keep these distinct would, he fears, lead 
to idealism and pantheism, as well as involve God in responsibility for sin.
756
 
     For these reasons, Hodge emphasises the reality of the external world, the 
distinction between Creation and preservation, and the distinction between the 
efficiency of God and that of second causes.
757
  He defines the doctrine of God’s 
providential government as ‘the idea of design and control’.
758
  Therefore, God’s 
Providence is understood as universal (including all the creatures of God and all 
their actions), powerful, wise and holy.
759
  The Providence of God not only 
‘necessarily flows from the Scriptural idea of God’, but also has ‘omnipresent and 
infinite intelligence, to comprehend and to direct all things however complicated, 
numerous, or minute’.
760
 
     The Deistic idea, that God determines all things according to the laws which He 
impressed upon them from the beginning without his continued intervention, is 
rejected by Hodge as doing violence to the Scriptural teaching that God is 
everywhere present in his essence, knowledge and power.
761
  It denies ‘the 
instinctive religious convictions of all men’, whether they love and trust Him or fear 
Him because they recognise Him as active and present everywhere.
762
  Not only 
does God preserve the world in existence but, according to Hodge, He also governs 
it for some great end and many subordinate ends.  To achieve His purposes, God 
controls and governs the material world according to fixed laws, irrational animals 
according to instincts, and man according to his rational nature.
763
  So, Hodge rejects 
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both the theory of divine government, which sees the world as a machine operated 
by natural law, and the opposing theory of absolute dependence on God, which 
views God as the only cause.
764
  He also rejects the view that would eliminate all 
physical forces by giving to some mind, whether of God or of man, all power of 
producing effects.
765
  Hodge opposes the doctrine of pre-established harmony 
because it violates the facts of consciousness.
766
 
     Hence, we also think of ironists’ virtues of ‘tolerance’ and ‘flexibility’ in 
relationship with others under God’s Providence.
767
  Since, as Rorty recognises, 
‘tolerance’ and ‘flexibility’ operate in the intersubjective modes, and since 
objectivity is possible only in the contingency of these modes, they should be 
observed in the operation of second causes.  G. Elijah Dann determines that Rorty’s 
view on religion is ‘anticlericalism’ rather than ‘atheism’, after analysing that Rorty 
speaks about religious belief without philosophical epistemology.
768
  The atheists’ 
argument that we do not have any tool to investigate whether God exists is 
meaningless, if we think of the secret of God as secret no more in a true 
transcendental point of concursus.  Our sensitive responsibility to be tolerant and 
flexible to differences for the sake of solidarity will guide us to the point of 
concursus where the old dualism between theism and atheism is overthrown and 
placed aside.
769
 
 
H. Human Sense and Linguisticality 
     One of the distinctive characteristics of Hodge’s doctrine of the Providence of 
God is the recognition of human senses where the components of the linguisticality 
of hermeneutics function.  This linguisticality can be found especially in the 
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relationship between human senses and faith.  Here my question is, what kind of 
authority is due to human senses in matters of faith?
770
 
     According to Hodge, the doctrine of transubstantiation of the Roman Catholic 
Church contradicts the testimony of our senses of sight, taste and touch.  Therefore it 
is natural for Protestants to appeal to this contradiction as decisive evidence against 
Catholic doctrine.  Protestants believe the following points regarding the human 
senses: 
1) Confidence in the well-authenticated testimony of our senses, is one of 
those laws of belief which God has impressed upon our nature.  2) 
Confidence in our senses is, therefore, one form of confidence in God.  It 
supposes him to have placed us under the necessity of error.  3) All ground 
of certainty in matters either of faith or knowledge, is destroyed, if 
confidence in the law of our nature be abandoned. Nothing is then possible 
but absolute skepticism.  4) All external supernatural revelation is addressed 
to the senses.  Those who heard Christ had to trust their sense of hearing; 
those who read the Bible have to trust to their sense of sight; those who 
receive the testimony of the Church, receive it through their senses.
771
   
The first aspect above shows that the laws of belief function by our confidence in 
the testimony of our senses.  That is, even before knowledge, there is human 
confidence caused by senses.  This presupposition leads us to the conclusion in the 
fourth point above, that even supernatural revelation of God is not meaningful 
without the work of human senses.  
     Hodge clearly anticipates the ideas of Gadamer that hermeneutics as the science 
of interpretation is not a mere method of determining truth, but a process of 
perceiving the conditions (application) for a real fusion of horizon which make truth 
possible.
772
  Human senses for Hodge are vehicles to perceive the knowledge of God.  
On the one hand, senses become the tools of universal linguisticality, and on the 
other hand, senses are to be trusted only within their legitimate sphere:
773
  
Intuitive truths belong to the several departments of the senses, the 
understanding, and our moral nature.  In the first place, all our perceptions 
are intuitions.  We apprehend their objects immediately, and have an 
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irresistible conviction of their reality and truth.  We may draw erroneous 
conclusions from our sensations; but our sensations, as far as they go, tell us 
the truth.  When a man feels pain, he may refer it to the wrong place, or to a 
wrong cause; but he knows that it is pain.  If he sees an object, he may be 
mistaken as to its nature; but he knows that he sees, and that what he sees is 
the cause of the sensation which he experiences.  There are intuitions, 
because they are immediate perceptions of what is true.  The conviction 
which attends our sensation is due not to instruction but to the constitution of 
our nature.
774
 
     According to Hodge, we may draw erroneous conclusions from our senses, but 
our senses eventually guide us to the truth.  Again, this sensation cannot be obtained 
by our knowledge or instruction, but by what constitutes us.  Hodge believes that 
intuitions are immediate perceptions of what is true.  As Hodge shows above, truth 
cannot be obtained by a particular technique or procedure of inquiry because it 
transcends the limits of methodological reasoning.  In order to find the truth of 
spoken or written language, Hodge seeks the conditions for understanding its 
meaning with the recognition of human senses and intuition.  What Hodge means by 
‘proper’ and ‘legitimate’ is, therefore, definitely linguistic.  However, the difference 
to Gadamer’s linguistics is that Hodge’s ‘human senses’ and ‘intuition’ are confined 
to the ‘conditions for understanding’ truth, i.e., the Holy Spirit.  
     As we studied in chapter IV, Gadamer believes that human linguisticality is the 
very tool for achieving hermeneutic universality.  For Gadamer, this linguisticality is 
not separate from or exclusively confined to something, but abides in every 
dimension’s social diversities and pluralities, including such work and domination.  
While Gadamer’s universality is made by both hermeneutics and social lives which 
are equally legitimate and interpenetrating, Hodge’s understanding of the 
linguisticality of ‘human senses’ is always related to the domain of the Holy Spirit.  
Rather, Hodge wants to interpret the work of the potentia absoluta through human 
senses.  
     In khora, the One who comes from on high does not ‘simply wait on the horizon’ 
but never leaves us without doing anything inadvertently, because He precedes, 
swoops down upon and seizes us here and now without being noticed, yet, ‘in 
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actuality and not potentiality’.
775
  In Hodge’s concursus, the promise of the future is 
immanently working the One is working with incessant interception.  Concursus 
reveals the regulative idea of the promise and makes it ‘the absolute and 
unconditional urgency of the here and now’.776 This structure of promise is the key 
to understand how we can sense the undeniable real and sensible function of the 
interruption relationship of two causes: heterogeneous but inseparable function with 
‘the infinite secret of the other’.
777
 As Hodge recognised in the last sentence of 
above citation, what seems to be impossible does not remain as an idea that should 
be learned but can be immediately sensible as a discourse of the happenings of the 
promise to come. 
 
I. Liberty and Ability in Free Agency 
     Hodge speaks of the free agent as a tool to explain God’s absolute providential 
control over all events.  God rules entirely over the free agents by acquiescing to 
their liberty: ‘[God] governs free agents with certainty, but without destroying their 
liberty, and material causes, without superseding their efficiency.’
778
  Free agency in 
Hodge is governed by God; however, it enjoys its total freedom in its action.  In 
Hodge’s epistemology based on Kant and Thomas Reid, the freedom in ‘free 
agency’ is that of the self-assertive will of ‘the autonomy of the “I”’.  With this 
introductory insight on Hodge’s conception of freedom and free agency, I want to 
discuss Nietzsche’s idea of freedom, ‘the will to power’, in connection with Hodge.  
     The questions of Nietzsche that I raised in chapter I were all about freedom.  Let 
me cite his questions from On the Genealogy of Morality again: how can we know 
truth?; why do we wish not to be deceived?; to what extent is life bearable without 
the existence of ideals?; must religious beings always be ascetic?  Nietzsche’s 
questions can be construed with the concept of de libero arbitrio.  Among Lutheran 
                                                 
775
 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 
84. 
776
 Ibid., p. 85. 
777
 Ibid., pp. 84; 88.  Derrida acknowledges that the distinction of the two was first developed in his 
article Force and Law and further elaborated in his Spectors of Marx., Ibid., p. 88. 
778
 Hodge, ‘President Lincoln’, Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review 37 (1865), p. 436. 
  
 
238 
and Reformed theologies, the concept of de libero arbitrio779 means that the faculty 
of will, the voluntas, is free.  We know that sin or the total depravity of a human 
being is the core element of the faculty of will.  But when this concept refers to the 
theological issues of sin and the gift of grace, we cannot but think of the relation 
between nature and the necessary conditions of free agency.
780
 
     Hodge defines the necessary conditions of free agency following Augustine.  In 
the controversy between Augustine and Pelagius on ‘free will’, Augustine denies the 
free will of human beings because they are intrinsically fallen, while Pelagius 
affirms it.  The Reformers in the sixteenth century, following Augustine, ‘ascribe 
free agency to man in the true sense of the words, but deny to him freedom of 
will’.
781
  In order not to confuse liberty and ability in the discussion of freedom and 
free agency, Hodge follows Augustine’s three-fold division of the states of man: The 
liberty of man before the fall, which was an ability either to sin or not to sin; The 
state of man since the fall, he has liberty to sin but not to do good; The state of man 
in heaven, he has liberty to do good but not to evil.
782
 
     To Hodge, since the fall, the ability is lost but liberty remains, and the latter is 
understood as the power to decide for good or evil, holiness or sin.
783
  Hodge 
summarises the function of his theory of liberty for a human being: 
It teaches that a man is a free and responsible agent, because he is the author 
of his own acts, and because he is determined to act by nothing out of 
himself, but by his own views, convictions, inclinations, feelings and 
dispositions, so that his acts are the true products of the man, and really 
represent or reveal what he is. The profoundest of modern authors admit that 
this is the true theory of liberty.
784
 
For this reason, Hodge argues that human beings do not have the ability to change 
what and who they are, but have the liberty to act upon it.  So free agency should be 
distinguished from ability, which was only possible before the fall, according to 
Hodge’s definition: 
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Free agency is the power to decide according to our character; ability is the 
power to change our character by a volition. The former, the Bible and 
consciousness affirm, belongs to man in every condition of his being; the 
latter, the Bible and consciousness teach with equal explicitness, does not 
belong to fallen man.
785
 
     Here, we need to recognise that free agency is the basic characteristic of the 
death of the I.  Since khora is the space where sinners, whether forgiven or not, are 
residing, like the free agency for Hodge, the death of the I cannot exercise its ability 
to do something, but just acts according to its own particular character or identity. In 
this sense, it cannot create something but only recognises something is there.  Hence, 
as Hodge argues that the death of the I as a free agency belongs equally to every 
identity, to God, angels, saints in glory, fallen men and Satan.
786
  It has a sense of 
belonging in every identity, including God and us, and the textuality between both in 
the space and time of khora.  Following Hodge’s argument that God is the only free 
agent with ability, while every creature is a free agent with only liberty, khora 
recognises that God is the only Transcendental Signified with His voluntary will, 
and that all the creatures living in this world are free agents with liberty. 
     Hence, in Hodge, Nietzsche’s will to power (freedom) is liberty.  In the paradigm 
of khora, since self-denial or recognition of the self as totally depraved comes from 
Hodge’s sense of liberty, it should not be perceived as a phenomenon of self-
contradiction, as Nietzsche understands.  Rather, it is the very tool for the expression 
of liberty.  In khora, at its transcendental point of an event, the death of a subject 
(self-destructing will) becomes the source of power that makes the impossibility 
possible.  Thus, Nietzsche’s four questions above become proper guidelines for 
Hodge’s free agency and the death of the I.   
     In khora, the freedom of sinners comes from the death of the subject in the grace 
of God, where our freedom rather enhances our selflessness, self-denial and self-
sacrifice.  The freedom in God has to be thought by the idea of ‘the event with the 
machine’, even though the event exceeds a programmable and calculable 
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machine.
787
 As Derrida recognises, it is extremely difficult to understand the status 
of ‘the event with the machine’, however, it is necessary to track the effects of the 
calculation of a machine so as to grasp ‘where we are affected by the other’ with 
which nothing can render the encounter.
788
 Derrida believes that it is also a scientific 
responsibility not to deny or ignore unforeseeable and incalculable coming of the 
other by taking into account what ‘defies accounting’ and ‘inflects otherwise the 
principle of reason’.
789
 Hence the free agent’s selflessness can be observed by the 
event.  As we have studied, khora presents the way to overcome the limit of the 
modern paradigm of thinking and judgement, and thus rehabilitates modern theology 
and philosophy.  At this point of discussion of free agency as the death of the I, I 
want to return to Hodge’s conception of a free agent and its responsibility.  
     Hodge argues three truths regarding human beings’ nature: that they are free 
agents; that none but free agents can be accountable for their character or conduct; 
and that they do not possess the ability to change their moral states by the acts of 
their will.
790
  We can see that Hodge’s above view of human beings as free agents is 
inherited from Reid.  Hodge cites Reid on free agency as follows: 
Reid says that all that is involved in agency is that man is an agent, the 
author of his own acts, or that we are ‘efficient causes in our deliberate 
voluntary actions’….‘To say that man is a free agent, is no more than to say 
that, in some instances, he is truly an agent and a cause, and is not merely 
acted upon as a passive instrument.’
791
 
Human beings as free agents, according to Hodge and Reid, should assume 
responsibility for their character and conduct since they act upon their own liberty 
(freedom).  
     So Hodge criticises Jonathan Edwards for his confusion of the self-determination 
of an agent and the self-determination of the will.  Edwards is ambiguous on the 
power of self-determination.  According to Hodge, an agent is self-determined when, 
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first, ‘he is author or efficient cause of his own act,’ and second, when ‘the grounds 
or reasons of his determination are within himself.’
792
  That is, in Hodge, the 
concept that ‘the will is self-determined’ denies that ‘it is determined by anything in 
the man’.
793
  Therefore, citing Reid, Hodge continues to confirm that the idea that 
‘the will is self-determined’ separates the will from the other constituent parts of a 
man:
794
 
‘Was there a cause of the action?  Undoubtedly there was.  Of every event 
there must be a cause that had power sufficient to produce it, and that exerted 
that power of the purpose.  In the present case, either the man was the cause 
of the action, and then it was a free action, and is justly imputed to him; or it 
must have had another cause, and can not be justly imputed to the man.  In 
this sense, therefore, it is granted that there was a sufficient reason of the 
action; but the question about liberty, is not in the least affected by this 
concession.’
795
  
Reid attributes the cause of free action to a human being (Kant might have had a 
Reidean understanding of cause and effect, since he followed Scottish Common 
Sense Realism, as we discussed in chapter III).  Therefore, human beings are to be 
totally responsible for their actions: 
Again [Reid] asks, ‘Why may not an efficient cause be denied to be, a being 
that had power and will to produce the effect?  The production of an effect 
requires active power, and active power, being a quality, must be in a being 
no effect; but where these are conjoined, the effect must be produced.’
796
 
     By examining the difference between an agent’s self-determination and that of 
the will, we can gain insight into an ‘event in khora’ in Hodge’s theology.  As I 
proved throughout the first four chapters that the self-determined liberty of a sinner 
(a signifier, in Derridean terms) is happening as an event in khora, I follow Hodge’s 
distinction between the claim that ‘agents are self-determined’ and the claim that 
‘the will is self-determined.’  Because khora also acknowledges that all people 
living in different times and cultural dimensions are free agents with liberty.   
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     That these ‘agents are self-determined’, while ‘the will is not self-determined’ 
means two things for Hodge: 
1st. That [an agent] is author or efficient cause of his own act.  2d. That the 
grounds or reasons of his determination are within himself.  He is determined 
by what constitutes him at the moment, a particular individual, his feelings, 
principles, character, dispositions; and not by any ab extra or coercive 
influence.
797
 
 
J. In Sum 
     Hodge’s idea that agents are self-determined and free in the Providence of God 
clearly shows the juxtaposition between the functions of free agency and of the Holy 
Spirit.  This juxtaposition inevitably makes a free agent to be context-sensitive.  
With a clear understanding of this juxtaposition, George Newlands writes, ‘The 
humility of God should lead us to sensitivity about other religions in speaking of 
revelation.’
798
  In Newlands, ‘true concern for God’ and ‘true concern for humanity’ 
do not compete with each other, but are observed in our self-humbling generosity in 
our reconciliatory life experience of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
799
  
This generosity will also affirm Hodge’s function of free agency as the death of the I.  
Since, in khora, the autonomous self-determination of various agents is not the same 
and recognises the fact that the Providence of God encompasses each agent’s 
‘proper’ ways of thinking, we need to break through incompatible belief systems 
and ideologies with such a non-violent generosity: ‘a force in nourishing 
authenticity in the other’.
800
   
     Actually, if Providence is meant by government and preservation, it does not 
designate the regulative ideal concept of God but is like a space of ‘archives’ where 
old documents and records are preserved.  The relationship between the future-
coming-of-God and preserved documents signify Providence of tension: A tension 
in the process of a concept is being formed.
801
  In the space of Providence, this 
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tension always remains ‘inadequate relative to what it ought to be, divided, 
disjointed’ between the concept and the efficiency of the first cause (God).
802
 Since 
providence is the now-tense of the future promise and always happens here, the 
tension of the two has to be reconciled with ‘the movements of promise and of 
future’.  
     People of all life experiences in different times and spaces give different priority 
to these ways of thinking.  With these differences understood, such a generosity—as 
a movement of promise and of future—will achieve a true transcendental point in 
cross-cultural communication.  In God’s Providence, our responsibility, gift, faith, 
humility and generosity will always trace of Him as genuine sources of freedom.  In 
His potentia ordinata, the humanity of a free agent will achieve Messianic 
universality not in creating something, but in preserving what is created.  Hodge’s 
doctrine of conservation is possible only by our recognition of the work of the Holy 
Spirit in our life experiences of now.   
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 
       The relevance of the thought of Derrida to Hodge’s theology is to secure the 
space of khora as event and as true transcendental point.  Such a strong theology as 
Hodge’s needs the space of khora to be truly Reformed, especially when it is to 
defend what it believes to be true at the same time as reforming, by enlarging its 
adaptability to the very limit of finitude, death and beyond.  Metaphysical, strong 
theology in modern epistemology may well present truth according to the Bible.  
(See footnote below on ‘weak metaphysics’).  However, it may be meaningless if 
the truth one believes is not at the same time context-sensitive.  The event in khora 
shows how potentia absoluta works in potentia ordinata as a true transcendental 
point.  The true transcendental point between God and a totally depraved human 
being, as in Calvin and Augustine’s view of man, happens at the very event of 
concursus.  This event in Hodge’s theology is observed at the moment of Derridean 
‘death’, when the impossible humility of death is realised and even welcomed.
803
  
Still it must be acknowledged that there is a clear conflict of interest between 
Derrida’s agenda and a theology of Hodge due to their heterogeneous historical, 
philosophical and theological foundations.   
     The purpose of this thesis, however, has been to explore the profound linkages 
between these two very different thinkers, discovered in the theme of concursus and 
khora in the providential space of God.  As a result, it is possible to anticipate 
genuine theological possibilities in a post-modern world, built upon, at one and the 
same time, a recognition of the nature of post-modernity and all its consequences, 
and also a deep conformity with the tradition of Reformed theology as seen in 
Hodge.  As we observed at the very offset, the key linking these two is to be found 
in the common ground of Schleiermacher’s experiential theology. 
                                                 
803
 Hence we might observe, through the theme of kenosis, the, at first sight seemingly unlikely, 
concurrence (in the post-Kantian tradition of Schleiermachian epistemology) between the ‘strong 
theology’ of Hodge and the current discussion of ‘weak metaphysics’ in the thought of Derrida’s 
erstwhile colleague, Gianni Vattimo. See, Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo, eds, Religion (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998) and Vattimo, After Christianity, trans. Luca D'Isanto (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002). 
 
  
 
245 
     The concursus as a true transcendental point is only possible with the initiation of 
God’s potentia absoluta.  Hence, the immediate, certain point that unreflective 
voices of strong theologians, politicians and military warriors target may well steer 
clear of concursus.  David Jasper, in the postscript of The Sacred Desert, shows the 
role of a poet in the sacred desert: the one of ‘common sense left, who matters so 
little that they have been forgotten by the world, to the point that they are entirely 
other than all its concerns’, so that all kinds of ‘warring dualism of God and Satan’ 
will be reconciled in the pure concursus in His ‘Total Presence’.804 The mature 
silence of the one in the sacred desert will hear the voices of God’s speech.  Since 
pure Gospel, written in a believer’s heart through the work of the Trinitarian 
personhood of the Holy Spirit, has true life, it has to be demonstrated with the power 
of humility and selflessness.  
     This might have been the righteous one in total silence, sacrifice and humility 
before him whom God sought in Sodom and Gomorrah.  So a theologian needs to 
cherish the doubts of agony in Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Emerson, so that a 
theology can be reflective and meaningful in our life experiences in the space 
between God and us.  Without being humble in this space, there will be no true 
transcendental point.  
     In chapter I, we had four questions from Nietzsche in his On the Genealogy of 
Morality (1887); what is it in us that wants truth? (how can we know truth?); why do 
we wish not to be deceived?; to what extent is life bearable without the existence of 
ideals?; must religious beings always be ascetic? In chapter IV, we considered 
Kierkegaard’s questions in Fear and Trembling: can we suspend ethics?; how can 
we know that there is such a thing as an absolute responsibility towards God?; is 
Abraham’s silence about his purpose to others ethical?  In chapter V, we examined 
Emerson’s question about religion: ‘why should we not have poetry and a 
philosophy of insight rather than tradition, and a religion by revelation to us and not 
the history of theirs?’ 
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     These questions do not simply represent such philosophical ideas as Nietzsche’s 
Nihilism, Kierkegaard’s Existentialism and Emerson’s Transcendentalism.  These 
are the questions of human beings both in their daily life experience, between ‘what 
ought we to do’ and ‘what would happen’, and also in their religious experience, 
between their objective knowledge of God and their subjective faith.  In the modern 
context, the answers to these questions have been formulated into existential 
theology, transcendental theology and the ‘death of God’ theology, in an effort to 
understand God in our turbulent life experiences.  However, these theologies have 
not been successful in situating our faith and knowledge at a true transcendental 
point, due to, I believe, the limit of modern philosophical epistemology in these 
theologies.  
     As a result of distortion by the epistemology of modern theologies in keeping up 
with Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Emerson, conservative circles tend to dismiss their 
genuine struggles for the true meaning of life, and consider their doubts as too 
liberal and, sometimes, heretical.  However, in this thesis, I tried to practise theology 
by raising the possibility of adapting these secular questions to the very sources and 
contents of theology and to theology itself.  
     These questions are also those of a philosopher and theologian who loves the 
values and conviction in the theology of Charles Hodge, which is considered to 
represent Evangelicalism, Calvinism and sometimes Fundamentalism in the 
American context, by its opponents.  My question in this thesis was whether a 
theology is possible, particularly Hodge’s theology, in the space and time where we 
are now living together, without falling into any ‘–isms’—liberalism, humanism, 
relativism or heresy—while keeping true values and convictions of the knowledge 
of and faith in God.     
     In chapter V, we discussed such ideals for being in this world as Emerson’s 
‘genius’, Rorty’s ‘ironist’, Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich, Kierkegaard’s Abraham and 
Hodge’s ‘theologian’.  As beings in a space living together, all of them have been 
examined in the context of responsibility, faith, gift and humility.  The sacrifice of 
Isaac in Fear and Trembling is particularly seen as an event of the death of the I 
embedded in Abraham with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.  Here, we 
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recognise that Abraham’s faith is related with the other, being-with the Other, i.e., 
Emmanuel.  That is, faith is related to ‘promise’ as a means to direct the end, a true 
transcendental point.  Then the responsibility of Abraham is seen in the endless 
tracing of God by deferring to speak about what he is doing with Isaac.  While 
tracing of God, Abraham’s responsibility enables total gift, humility and sacrifice.  
Abraham’s silence is not secret, because it is open to the space of khora. 
     Since the space of khora regards Christianity as one particular religion among 
others, Christianity can secure its distinctive knowledge of a true transcendental 
point, yet khora makes it humble and selfless to the level of unconditional sacrifice, 
so its knowledge may be observed at that point.  Only at this point of event, 
universality is achieved by the tracing of God.  This ‘tracing’ appears to be nothing, 
but nothing yet produces all by being embedded in everything, and allows a human 
being to reach the true transcendental point.  In this way, khora takes precedence 
over every other particular identity, including Christianity.   
     In the discussion of hermeneutic universality, we have to keep in mind that it is 
not achieved by religious syncretism or pluralism.  In Christianity, hermeneutic 
universality will be accomplished by its distinctive belief that the Messianic 
prophecy of the Christian Kingdom of God will be fulfilled in the parousia 
(παρουσία).  The way that universality is exercised in Christianity is its context-
sensitivity, hoping for the realisation of the promise that the Kingdom is to come 
here.  When we place Hodge’s theology in the space of khora and the time of now—
since ‘now’ is a Messianic time as an opening to the future and to the fulfilment of 
the promise as the advent of justice—the context of ‘what is happening now’ within 
the event of concursus in Hodge’s theology will achieve universality, as will ‘the 
supplement’ of Derrida.   
     Thus, Charles Hodge’s theology will naturally expose the contingency and 
deconstructibility of the present Kingdom at hand.  With the promise of the 
Kingdom of Heaven already-not-yet achieved, in which we are responsible for the 
entire history of humankind, forgiven and unforgiven sinners shall know what is 
happening in khora, in parousia.  In order to place Hodge’s theology in khora, i.e., 
to think of Hodge’s theology in view of the diverse and plural society of this era, I 
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first defined such important terms as the death of the I as the identity of a being as 
an image of God who is tracing of God in this space, and ‘khora’ as a providential, 
universal space which the condition of God permeates.  
     We also recognised that when the character of a self, the death of the I embedded 
in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, the death of the I: 
passes through the very ordeal of the paradoxical life experiences; ventures into 
absolute risk; has a relationship with God with the transcendental selfless goodness 
through a new experience of death; and humbles itself for the true transcendental 
point, concursus.  When we place Hodge’s theology in the space and time of khora, 
‘facts’ in the inductive method of his theology cannot be found only in the text of 
the Bible, but also in the textuality, where text itself produces meaning through the 
death of the I.  Here we also affirm that, for Hodge, the inductive method is the 
vehicle that makes it possible for the Bible to be the source of truth.  However, we 
find that the method itself cannot be truth, but a mere passage or vehicle for 
practising theology. 
     In the Derridean space of khora, the intersubjective modes of Gadamer and 
Habermas are replaced by the event of a signifier of a signifier.  That is, the 
happenings of a concurrent time and space can be perceived as facts of 
understanding.  Furthermore, what is distinguishable is that the event always traces 
the Transcendental Signified.  This trace makes substitutions of the supplements, 
and has the capacity to manoeuvre the future in view of the past.  This futurity 
makes the impossibility possible.  In Hodge’s theology, potentia absoluta and 
potentia ordinata need to be understood as an event.  That is, potentia absoluta—
such as incarnation, resurrection and miracle works of God—where the true 
transcendental point is taking place, has to be observed in the space of khora, where 
impossibility is possible.  
     The embedding of the death of the I in a passage of Hodge’s theology will 
accomplish ‘Khoral Theology’.  ‘Khoral theology’ means a theology that is based on 
hermeneutic universality with endless context-sensitivity through the temporal and 
spontaneous movements of faith acts, and at the same time, that is distinctive in its 
particular conviction where God’s identity as God is never dependent on His 
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creation.  Here we should notice that the instances of faith and knowledge in khoral 
theology are not the simple result of a practical subsequent application of a theology, 
but are the very sources of theology.  In this ‘Khoral theology’, all kinds of doctrinal 
debates are possible because it allows freedom (liberty, in Hodge’s words) to all, 
freedom to each of them, freedom to each signifier—a particular conviction of faith.  
Since the very foundation of truth is freedom, if you really believe that what you 
believe is the truth, you have to respect the freedom of others, because the truth that 
you know will eventually be fulfilled not by your own freedom, but by the potentia 
absoluta of God in the event of concursus.  Concursus in events, whether in free, 
contingent or necessary modes of the experience of first and second causes, captures 
the religious immediacy of Hodge’s theology.  
     In chapter II, we focused on the juxtaposition of the death of the I and the 
Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.  The bipolarity of the two is clearly seen 
in life/death, universality/particularity and event/intersubjectivity.  While 
understanding the particularity of a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the 
Holy Spirit, the death of the I achieves universality through the context-sensitivity of 
‘tracing’ and ‘the supplements’.  Context-sensitivity in theology is not displacing the 
text (God, the Bible) in favour of the viewpoint of a context (human beings).  Rather, 
it is a voluntary involvement of the text in the experience of the context.  This 
context-sensitivity is seen in the idea of textuality, which already involves the 
differences of space, time, culture, world-view, language, behaviour, ways of 
thinking and judgement, and so on in its passage of history of religion, i.e., the death 
of the I. 
     In chapter III, I examined how such Enlightenment ideas as Scottish Common 
Sense Realism and Kant function in Hodge’s theology.  With context-sensitivity in 
mind, I scrutinized Hodge’s inductive theological method and discussed its 
adaptability in the context of khora.  We can conclude that Hodge’s method has 
limits due to its following a Kantian epistemology that deals equally with science 
and religion, i.e., reason and faith.  If Hodge’s theological method followed Kantian 
epistemology completely, then the truth that Hodge really wants to preserve would 
be lost.  However, Hodge preserves truth by simply presupposing that the Bible is 
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truth.  The Kantian concept of facts is used as a mere methodological tool in 
Hodge’s inductive theology.  For Hodge, as a scientist pursues facts, a theologian 
has to research the facts written in the Bible.  On the one hand, Hodge’s facts are 
unchangeable truths.  On the other hand, Kantian facts are self-evident truths.  Yet 
the problem is that while Hodge follows the logic of Kant in his methodology, he 
not only regards facts as truth, but also the effects of facts on a reader, a point with 
which Kant would not agree.    
     The problem for Hodge comes from the limit of his theological epistemology: he 
regards the effect (religious life) of the cause (the facts in the Bible) as truth.  His 
understanding that religious experience is the effect of the cause, i.e., truth, is due to 
the limit of a modern methodology.  Hodge also has no sense of understanding the 
relationship between truth (facts in the Bible) and the inductive method.  If Hodge 
believes facts are of God, logically, his inductive method is also a fact in his 
theology of God.  Hodge himself cannot recognise that facts as truth in the Bible are 
already embedded in his method.  
     In chapter IV, within the context of hermeneutic universality, I examined the 
concepts of ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’.  ‘Process’ in John Dewey is 
observed as working in pragmatic and anti-dualistic ways.  ‘Intersubjectivity’ in 
Habermas and Gadamer shows us profound and diverse ways of being context-
sensitive.  Yet ‘intersubjectivity’ in both of them has a limit in the discussion of the 
true transcendental point.  Although ‘event’ in Derrida is something that cannot be 
understood by reason, it shows a true transcendental point spontaneously in a 
secretive and enigmatic way: it just happens as an event, rather than in the modes of 
process and intersubjectivity.  In this event, such ideas as subjectivity and objectivity 
are understood by gift along with history and faith.  While admitting the limit of 
both Gadamer’s and Habermas’s intersubjectivity for achieving universality, we find 
that in the Derridean X, the true transcendental point is understood as the possibility 
of the impossibility.  
     Such space of khora, where the Derridean X functions, is the space of death.  
Death does not mean suicide, or wasting one’s life or wasting time, but giving life 
by sharing it with others.  According to Derrida, this space where death takes place 
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is the origin of happiness: ‘I cannot consider myself happy, or even believe myself 
to have been happy, before having crossed, passed and surpassed the last instance of 
my life.’
805
  Throughout this thesis, we have recognised that this crossing, passing 
and surpassing have been possible by the concepts of ‘tracing’, ‘the supplement’ and 
so forth.  Therefore, the space of death would be ‘more essential, more originary and 
more proper than those of any other territory in the world’.
806
  This space overcomes 
the belief of negativity that cannot pass through the borders or the limits of truth.  
Therefore, this space is the possibility of the impossibility: 
Death as the possibility of the impossible as such is a figure of the aporia in 
which ‘death’ and death can replace—and this is a metonymy that carries the 
name beyond the name and beyond the name of name—all that is only 
possible as impossible, if there is such a thing: love, the gift, the other, 
testimony, and so forth.
807
 
     In chapter VI, with the above implications of death, I discussed how the doctrine 
of the Providence of God works in the space and time of Derridean khora.  As 
Francis Turretin maintains that the work of God does not take away our contingency 
from the condition of second causes and from our modes of action, khora proves to 
be a providential space of free and voluntary things which are in our power and 
executed by our purpose.  That is, khora is a space of spaces or a topos of ‘in 
between’ kairos and kronos, or potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata in God’s 
Providence.  In this chapter, I examined the doctrine of the Providence of God in the 
theology of Turretin and Hodge, and then how khora can be understood in their 
doctrines.  In the doctrine of concursus, Hodge distinguishes the first from the 
second causes so as to avoid attributing authorship of sin to God and falling into 
pantheism and idealism.  He confidently interprets the material universe and the 
external world through this oppositional distinction of the first and second causes.  
Although the second causes act according to their natures, their efficiency is in the 
first cause.  The concept of second causes provides a key to explaining the khora of 
different spaces and times, and the possibility of the impossibility will be observed 
in the concursus of first and second causes.   
                                                 
805
 Derrida, Aporia, pp. 7-8. 
806
 Ibid., p. 3. 
807
 Ibid., pp. 78-9. 
  
 
252 
     In chapter VII, in the discussion of Hodge’s doctrine of the Bible, we found that 
the différance between Hodge and Derrida lies in Hodge’s idea of concursus and 
Derrida’s event in khora.  In Hodge, concursus happens on the border between the 
first cause and the second causes.  Accordingly, at a proper time, an event of which 
the cause and effect guarantee nothing will take place fully by His gracious 
Providence.  Hodge’s process of cause and effect in concursus is observed in 
Derrida as gift.  Due to the unpredictability and anachronicity of event, gift as the 
very otherness of triton genos occurs at the moment of the thinking, speaking and 
acting of a free agent.  Nobody can foretell the exact time and place of what might 
happen.  
     As we have seen, through His Providence, God is ultimately in control of all 
things, superintending what happens in order to accomplish his own purposes. 
Hodge, then, is used as a free agent, endowed and operated by God’s wisdom.  We 
can know that God designed and uses Hodge, who is accustomed to the 
contemporary culture of Common Sense Realism and Kant, to reveal His word.  As 
Hodge’s case illustrates, textuality in event has been practised and understood within 
God’s Providence with His efficient operation in second causes.  As Hodge’s 
doctrine of Providence implies, the event in Derridean khora is the work of God 
surpassing time and space under His Providence.  
     Before closing, with the universality of khora in mind, I want to discuss the 
schism between Princeton Theological Seminary and Westminster Theological 
Seminary in 1929.  Nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century debates between 
Fundamentalism and Liberalism eventually split the mainstream Presbyterian 
Church of America.  During the Old Princeton days (1812-1929), the Princeton 
seminary was influential in the foundation of the sentiment of the new American 
republic’s culture and society and in defending Calvinistic orthodoxy in the era of 
Darwinian evolution and Protestant Liberalism.  Around the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the seminary itself, however, yielded to the pressure of Liberalism 
in the administrative reorganisation in 1929, which led to the founding of 
Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia.  Westminster was formed 
largely under the leadership and funding of J. Gresham Machen, to follow the 
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theological tradition of Old Princetonians such as Archibald Alexander, Charles 
Hodge, A. A. Hodge and Benjamin B. Warfield.  
     While Westminster remained committed to orthodox Calvinism and regarded 
itself as a defender of the purity of doctrine, Princeton remained affiliated with the 
PCUSA and developed a neo-Barthian theology.  The universality that Westminster 
wanted to maintain was the purity of Christian doctrine, while Princeton wanted to 
preserve the universality in life experiences.  However, the result of the separation 
of Westminster from Princeton has been more of an affliction than a blessing to both 
sides.  There has been a great deal of suffering that cannot be discussed here.  
However, it can at least be said that it was a loss that Hodge, the theological father 
of American Presbyterianism, has not been properly treated by either side.  I believe 
the claims of universality—Westminster’s the purity of Christianity and Princeton’s 
Christian life experiences—of both sides will be achieved in khora.  If both argue 
that each one’s universality is the only one, the universality each of them fought to 
keep to the bitter end remains nothing but conceptually signified.  There was no 
harmony, but only militant prejudice, and disputes about different ways to claim 
truth.  In Christianity, regarding oneself as a distinct particular does not mean that 
particularity is inferior to universality.  Differences are the very tool for being 
together.  
     In sum, I have argued that the true transcendental point that Hodge means by 
concursus has to be observed as a contingent event of the objective knowledge and 
the subjective faith of a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit in 
Derridean khora.  Placing Hodge’s concursus in the space and time of khora 
requires a hermeneutic change in his inductive theological method.  However, it 
sustains the values and convictions that Hodge embraces in theologising.  The 
dualistic and metaphysical epistemology of his theology, influenced by Kant and 
Scottish Common Sense Realism, has been examined by ‘process’, 
‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’ with such social and political theories of Dewey, 
Gadamer and Habermas.  I believe that these three ideas have the characteristic of 
context-sensitivity in daily life experience and in knowledge, as well.  This 
examination has been imperative for pluralistic and diverse contexts, where the 
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criteria for knowledge and faith are in confusion, secularised, deflected and thrown 
into sectarian strife and civil unrest. 
     Indeed, the discussion of the space and time of khora is significant in the inter-
faith movement in academic departments of theology, as well as in the religious 
field.  Since I believe that synthetic inter-faith movements only result in religious 
syncretism and another form of metaphysical epistemology, it will never be possible 
for every religion to be understood in only one way.  Rather, in khora, they can co-
exist as they are in this world, without losing their distinctive religious convictions 
at all.  In this sense, placing Hodge’s theology in khora in this thesis will be a model 
of how to co-exist meaningfully for every religion.  For Christian circles, especially 
evangelical ones, I hope this thesis can be a challenge and source of insight for 
practising theology.  And for me, being of Korean origin, this thesis will be a 
theological and philosophical foundation in the search for a methodology of coming 
together before and after the unification of South and North Korea, which have been 
separated for more than half a century.  I believe this trial and their unification may 
also be the possibility of the impossibility under Adam Smith’s invisible hand. 
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